Thomas Cranmer's register is important in shedding valuable shafts of light on the nature of the episcopal office in Tudor England. Despite the government's break with Rome in the 1530s, much of the archbishop's routine administration continued unaltered. Nonetheless, there were profound changes in Cranmer's role. Royal commissions, proclamations, injunctions, letters missive and acts of parliament all served to modify Cranmer's position as principal minister of the king's spiritual estate. When the crown issued a commission to the archbishop for the exercise of his jurisdiction, the prelate's position as a royal official was clear for all to see. It is sure, however, that the impact of Christian humanism and reformed theology also did much to shape Cranmer's work. The enforcement of the English Litany and, most notably, of the 42 Articles reveal the changing nature of the episcopal office at this time. In contrast to received orthodoxy, it is now clear that the bishops mounted a widespread campaign at the end of Edward VI's brief reign to secure use of this reformed formulary. There can be little doubt that Thomas Cranmer's years at Canterbury were of great significance in reshaping the role of the episcopate in early modern England.

In February 1610, the English chargé d'affaires reported that Henry IV of France, having decided to go to war in the Spanish Netherlands, had lately been measured for a new suit of armour, and had also displayed in his chamber a table or tableau, ‘wherein is paynted a man fleeing from Venus and the image of gaming, and following Hercules after two other images, of hope and fortune, with these verses: I go to the temple of virtue, hope and fortune precede me; farewell damned pleasure.’ This piece of visual propaganda encoded a variant of the Choice of Hercules, which appealed to the king's lifelong self-construct as heroic warrior. We trace the complex history of his heroic self-fashioning, showing how Henry IV after 1598 compensated for the absence of war through the hunt, gambling, and sexual domination. The dissonance between what Henry IV perceived himself to be and what he feared by 1610 he had become makes it easier to understand what drove him to his appointment in the rue de la Ferronerie.

This article is an analysis of the hysterical debates in the house of commons over the 1753 Marriage Act, placed in the context of the failure of existing marriage law to prevent clandestine marriage and bigamy, and the crucial importance of the marriage market for the male propertied elite. It shows that the proponents of the act appealed strongly to the patriarchal and material instincts of the majority in the Commons, while its principal opponents, who claimed to stand for affective marriage and championed the interests of women, actually represented the exploitative marital and sexual behaviour typical of many Georgian men. The article concludes that the passage of the Marriage Act in these circumstances absolutely contradicts some historians' theories about the progress of ‘affective individualism’ among the elite, and implies rather the continuance of patriarchy and the use of marriage for economic and political advantage.

The identity of eighteenth-century North Britons needs to be disaggregated: there were significant variations in North British attitudes to the Anglo-Scottish relationship in areas such as politics, economics, language, religion and manners. In the first-order spheres of politics and economics North Britons generally subscribed to an Anglo-British identity and tended to welcome anglicization of Scotland's feudal institutions and laws as an acceleration along the pathway of modernization. Although this crucial aspect of North British identity became widespread only from the 1730s its roots can be traced back to the sophisticated debates which had preceded Scottish agreement to incorporating Union. This adherence to an Anglo-British form of patriotism was a common feature of political discourse in the eighteenth-century British Atlantic world. North British patriotism also shared another prominent characteristic with Anglo-Irish and American identities. The aspiration to share English liberties to the full, when thwarted, could trigger anglophobic responses, as occurred in America in the 1760s and 70s, and in the Irish constitutional revolution of 1780–2. Among North Britons, a coherent Anglo-British ideology of improvement co-existed with a traditional Scottish chauvinism, which was normally dormant, but whose occasional eruptions tended to be provoked by perceived exclusions of North Britons from the liberties of Englishmen.

Much recent historiography has adopted a revisionist approach to Habsburg policy in restoration Italy, jettisoning the ‘black legend’ which long surrounded Austrian rule of Lombardy-Venetia. Nevertheless the Habsburg police still tend to be portrayed as essentially repressive, constantly preoccupied with the threat of revolution. This case study of the police in the Venetian provinces during the reign of Francis I challenges such a view. It looks first at the problem of establishing forces of law and order in the aftermath of Napoleonic rule, demonstrating how under-funding conservatism and a desire for uniformity with the rest of the empire meant that the Venetian constabulary was often ill-suitedfor the prevention of crime. Then follows an examination of the part played by the police in the administrative machine. This emphasises a number of roles performed by higher-ranking police officials and the secret police, and suggests their major concerns were not merely with the threat of revolution, but with gathering information essential for efficient government, and with maintaining a watchful eye over other branches of the bureaucracy. These in turn contributed considerably to the efficiency of Habsburg rule and the remarkable political passivity of the Venetian provinces in this era.

This paper examines an important and rather neglected forum for popular discussion – the debating society – in London in 1780. This was the first full year that debating societies left their semi-private, club-like sites and took to new rooms, all across the metropolitan area. These new venues were large (seating between 400 and 1200) commercial settings, where men and women could come to speak and to listen, to enjoy an evening of rational entertainment at a small price. Using the many daily London newspapers as its main source, this essay examines the audiences present at these debates, the types of questions asked and the nature of the responses, when known, and surveys the wide range of reactions to such activity. Finally, it suggests some explanations for and evaluations of the growth and decline of this important cultural form.

On 9 May 1950, Robert Schuman, the French foreign minister, offered to pool the coal and steel resources of France with those of its European neighbours. The proposal was directed principally at Western Germany. After a year of negotiations six western European states agreed to form the European Coal and Steel Community, an organization rightly seen as the beginning of the European Union. However significant at the time and subsequently, this creation resulted from a series of political bargains familiar to any practitioner of traditional politics. France was determined to limit the competitive advantages of German heavy industry to prevent future dominance by the Ruhr industrialists whose unsavoury past was also remembered. Jean Monnet, the head of the French delegation at the talks held in Paris, insisted on the ‘deconcentration’ of the steel and coal industries. Steel companies would be compelled to dispose of the colleries which they owned. To do this, however, Monnet had to invoke the help of the American high commissioner in Germany, John J. McCloy and his expert advisers. In terms of its origins the Coal and Steel Community can be considered the product of a bargain struck between the Federal Republic and America, not France and Western Germany. That the safeguards against vertical combinations and a single sales agency for coal proved unnecessary (and unenforceable) may partly explain the success of the first venture in European integration.