Within the prevailing historiographical tradition of modern India, critics see the Poona Pact as having “disenfranchised” Dalits, which they attribute to the fact that, due to the numerical superiority of caste Hindus, the implementation of joint electorates resulted in the consolidation of power within the Indian National Congress: the party that, critics allege, protected the interests of the caste Hindu community. Critics further argue that Dalit candidates who successfully ran for office under the Congress party’s banner, garnering support mostly from caste Hindu voters, failed to speak for the interests of the Dalit community effectively. This article examines the returns of the provincial assembly elections held in 1936–1937 and 1945–1946, as well as the functioning of the Congress ministries in the provinces of British India between 1937 and 1939 and 1946 and 1947 to challenge the criticisms mentioned above and to argue that the inclusion of reserved seats, primary elections, and cumulative voting mechanisms had a significant role in enhancing the potential of the Poona Pact to ensure genuine descriptive representation of Dalits. The article also finds that the affiliation of Dalit legislators with the Congress party had a beneficial impact on their substantive representation in the provincial legislatures where the Congress formed ministries because Dalit interests and the ideological and programmatic dynamics of the Congress party were congruent. In this context, Gandhi, a member of the caste Hindu community, played the role of a “critical actor” who encouraged the Congress party to undertake measures to advance the interests of the Dalit community. Moreover, a powerful and autonomous anti-untouchability movement led by the Harijan Sevak Sangh played a crucial role in enhancing the institutional capabilities of the Congress governments, enabling them to effectively address the concerns and challenges faced by the Dalit community, which further bolstered the substantive representation of Dalits.

The assassination of the dictator Park Chung Hee by his intelligence chief Kim Chae-gyu was a momentous events in South Korean history, which garnered two feature-length filmic depictions released fifteen years apart in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. The President's Last Bang, released in 2005, was an irreverent black comedy in which all those involved that fateful evening were villains in their own right. The Man Standing Next, from 2020, took a much different tack. Kim gained a righteousness and revolutionary motivation that had been absent in the portrayal in the earlier film, in which Kim's intentions remained open to interpretation. This article analyzes the changes in Kim's depiction in the context of shifting respective political contexts, particularly the impeachment of Park's daughter Park Geun-hye in 2016, and the shadow cast by the legacies of authoritarianism, the specter of which seemed to loom over Korea again during the younger Park's administration. Consequently, the outpouring of public fervor in the ensuing candlelight vigils reaffirmed societal support for democracy and consequently elevated Kim Chae-gyu, Park's bane, to the role of champion of Korean democracy when it seemed under threat once again.

China's rise has been discussed in various ways, but only recently has scholarship started to examine it in relation to overseas Chinese, as politicians and commentators outside China, as well as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) itself and some scholars on “smart power” have come to realize their importance as political messengers of China. This paper analyses interview results with second-generation Chinese immigrants in Australia in tertiary education to examine how they are “telling the China story”. The results reveal this cohort's complex attitudes towards China's rise. On the one hand, they are proud of China's rise, especially in economic terms, and their socio-cultural attachment to it. On the other, they critically evaluate political and social issues in China, and are aware of their marginal position in Chinese society. These findings argue against the oversimplistic approach that regards Chinese immigrants as a homogenous group acting as political messengers of the CCP.

This article aims to reexamine the relationship between the artist Lee Ufan and nationalist art history through his idea of “ambivalent otherness,” which he defined as both “suffering” and “power.” Traditional art history is established upon a nationalist framework that emphasizes the artists' nationality, leading to the marginalization of national others at the border. As a zainichi Korean, Lee has undergone the “suffering” of being excluded by the art world and art historiography. However, he transformed it into his source of “power” to challenge art historiography based on nationality. This study analyzes the art criticism of “Japanese Contemporary Art History” written by Minemura Toshiaki and Chiba Shigeo in the 1970s and 1980s and highlights the ruptures that the artist's in-between identity wrought on nationalist art history. This shows how both the Mono-ha movement and the artist were marginalized in the construction of “Japanese Contemporary Art History.” Furthermore, this study scrutinizes how Lee attempted to rewrite art history using Mono-ha art theory and a perspective committed to “overcoming coloniality” from the postcolonial in-between position, by reinterpreting Lee's article on Chosŏn minhwa, written amidst an aesthetic controversy across the border between Japan and Korea.

Why do oil-dependent developing countries exhibit divergent responses to oil crises? This study employs a comparative case study approach and utilizes a ‘most similar system design’ to examine the varying state responses to the 1973 oil shock in Turkey and South Korea. While the former refrained from implementing radical short-term adjustment policies and reforms, the latter adopted proactive measures to mitigate the worsening impact of escalating oil prices. This research contends that the existing literature, which emphasizes distinctions in industrialization strategies and fiscal policies among developing nations, offers an incomplete explanation for the divergent reactions of states to external price shocks. Instead, the study proposes a sociological perspective, focusing on the influence of varying degrees of state autonomy and the characteristics of bureaucratic systems on the decision-making processes of states. The key finding suggests that while pre-crisis economic policies and industrialization strategies may limit the array of policy tools available to counteract the adverse effects of an oil crisis, the extent of state autonomy and the organization of the bureaucracy – whether adhering to Weberian or non-Weberian principles – impact the efficacy of these policy tools and the determination of decision-makers to act in the best interests of the long-term public good.

This article leverages Watsuji Tetsurō's idea of aidagara – “inter-relationships” – to better appreciate the interpenetration of space and relationships in Japanese foreign policy narratives. I set Watsuji's philosophical framework against Japanese foreign policy narratives referring to various spaces as a case study to emphasizing the interplay of space and relationships in Japanese diplomatic efforts. On the one hand, we see the Japanese government invoking East Asia, the Asia-Pacific, and the Indo-Pacific as spatial descriptors to conceptualize the political dynamics surrounding them. On the other hand, Japan's relations with its interlocutors reify fluid geographical boundaries as spaces relevant for Japan's foreign relations. Thus, Watsuji helps us to rethink international politics as an aidagara in which the space produces political relationships, while political relationships themselves reproduce, or even redefine, space.

Modern Chinese diplomatic histories rarely discuss the marriages of diplomats, leaving the impression that women made little impact on their husbands' careers. The extraordinary performance of Oei Hui-lan (1889–1992), wife of celebrated diplomat Wellington Koo (1888–1985), challenges this view. Hui-lan's contributions to diplomacy call our attention to the role played by Chinese diplomatic wives: as reception hostesses and embassy managers, they cultivated social relationships to facilitate diplomatic exchange. Hui-lan's story reminds us that to study modern diplomatic history solely through the lens of professionalization and institutionalization – while forgoing perspectives of gender and family – is insufficient to explain China's success in this period. Hui-lan's Peranakan family background in the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) equipped her with the financial assets and cosmopolitan upbringing to shine as a diplomatic wife. And yet, though she benefited from her overseas origins, Hui-lan had an uneasy relationship to her Chinese identity. Concealing the tension in her two autobiographies, Hui-lan later reconstructed her past, emphasizing her patriotism and ethnic Chineseness to befit her established position. Thus, her case also shows how the complicated process of identity rebuilding and selective adaptation played out for elite overseas Chinese women through their engagement with modern China.

This article investigates the impact of male migration on left-behind women in nineteenth-century Chongqing, focusing on the intersection among gender, migration, and religion. It analyze the unintended consequences of failed male migration, in which the husband's failure to send regular remittances was prone to cause tremendous anxiety and financial difficulties for his wife. In the absence of strong male-centered kinship organizations, Chongqingese women exploited unorthodox options to support themselves. Buddhist monasticism proved appealing because it provided both a stable source of livelihood and an inclusive all-female space. However, female renunciation was controversial because it challenged state-sponsored patriarchal values. Returned husbands enlisted the state's help in revoking their wives' religious decisions. Paradoxically, for vulnerable women like concubines, nunhood proved an attractive option because it helped them obtain migration-triggered divorces on favorable terms. They strategically synergized the bodily practice of monastic celibacy with the discourse of female chastity to assure their estranged spouses of lifelong commitments to non-remarriage. By doing so, these women succeeded in receiving generous financial compensation. This study highlights how the combination of religion and translocality enabled women to renegotiate their positionality within the patriarchy.

This article argues that South Koreans' anti-Japanism in the post-liberation period can be regarded as an ideological construction, which was inevitably required to reshape their national identity, rather than as a reasonable and serious critical consideration of colonial Japan. Anti-Japanism functions as an identification framework in an era when Koreans needed to develop a new discourse which reflects the rapid politico-socio-cultural changes of that period. Under military control of the United States and the Soviet Union, Koreans made Japan the other in a number of ways in order to unite their nation state and national identity, relying specifically on racial difference and hierarchy. First, Korean intellectuals, who once cooperated with colonial Japan in the political sphere or in their ordinary lives, explicitly revealed their anti-Japanese sentiments in their writings right after liberation. Second, after liberation, anti-Japanism emerged from a process that Koreans would exploit, after demarcating the moral difference between themselves and the remaining Japanese migrants, to exclude the Japanese from their community. Finally, anti-Japanism in the post-liberation period can be detected in Koreans' tenacious attitude, as they tacitly restricted the articulation of filial or cultural hybridity with the Japanese people in order to reconfigure their national identity.