Scholars who are committed to single disciplines occasionally appear to lose sight of the fact that these disciplines are conventions, designed to enable the scholar to neglect, while clearly signifying his neglect, many aspects of life in order to concentrate on a few. We historians tend, I believe, to give ourselves license to warn our readers rather less explicitly of our neglect than do economists, political scientists, sociologists, or anthropologists. Yet, we have trained ourselves to pay particular attention to certain facets of the human experience. Some of us compromise with the positions of those we occasionally think of as our more exacting colleagues in the social sciences by adding to the term ‘historian’ various adjectives– ‘social’, ‘economic’, ‘cultural’, or ‘political’.

The sixteenth century came to an end with the countries of the Ottoman Middle East falling into a grave economic and social crisis which presaged a decisive turning point in their history. The most symptomatic sign of what was, in fact, a structural crisis was a series of popular revolts which appeared most prominently among the Muslim Turkish population of Anatolia. Known as the Celali revolts, these uprisings developed into open civil war against the forces of the Ottoman state, and in their first phase lasted approximately fifteen years, from 1595 to 1610.

Islamic studies progress. In recent years a great deal of work has been done on the Umayyad period, on the early history of Shi‘ism, and on the origins of the Muslim schools of law. A broader current of research has yielded numerous studies of the ‘ulamâ’ and their place in Muslim religious and communal life. New historical information and new points of view are gradually modifying received perspectives on Muslim religious movements and on the nature of Muslim religious elites.

‘If one seriously wanted to prepare the tribes for assimilation with France instead of reconstituting the government of Arabs by Arabs, would it not be wise to disorganize them, to multiply the little sheikhs and to replace the big leaders with French officers…?’ This candid question was asked by a French colon in 1847 shortly before the surrender of ‘Abd al-Qadir Ibn Mahi ad-Din, the most formidable Arab leader opposing the French establishment in Algeria. The question reflects the increasing impatience, self-confidence, and, one is forced to add, arrogance of the French colonialists. After many years of struggling against a largely indifferent French Chamber the colons had finally become a sizable and vociferous minority which could command a hearing in the halls of the Monarchie du Juillet.

The most important and undoubtedly the most fateful period in Ottoman history is the Young Turk or Union and Progress era in 1908–18. The final disintegration of the Ottoman empire, the rise of independent states in the Middle East, the intensification of conflicts over Macedonia, the full emergence of Turkish and Arab nationalisms, the start of the Muslim anti-imperialist mobilization through struggle in Libya in 1911, and other events of vital importance in the social and political history of the area occurred during the Young Turk era. It was a historical watershed which marked simultaneously the end of an imperial form of political organization in the Middle East and the beginning of a new political existence in the form of national states. The Young Turks affected profoundly the course of history among the peoples of the Middle East and the Balkans. Moreover the Young Turks were the first group in the Ottoman state to approach the social, political, and cultural transformation of their society in the spirit of modern politics. Yet the Young Turks remain the least studied and understood and the most distortedly portrayed power group in the history of the Balkans and the Middle East. Most of the existing works on the Young Turks, consisting mainly of memoirs, were written by their authors to credit themselves with political roles and achievements which did not always correspond to reality.

Speaking of comparative urbanization, Gideon Sjoberg noted that the Near East, the region in which cities first rose, has been understudied by urban sociologists. Few research projects have been realized on contemporary urbanization in the Arab World. This paper purports to examine recent trends of urbanization in the region; and their inter-relationship with the ‘modernization’ process.

It is too soon to measure the influence of G. E. von Grunebaum on developing trends in Islamic scholarship. But it is not too soon to assess the legacy of his writings. The assessment is bound to suffer from subjectivity and perhaps even border on the presumptuous. And I must confess at the outset that in this paper I have not ruled out a degree of inferential and impressionistic judgment, which in the end may only reflect my own limited vantage.

Although the effects of the Revolution of 23 July 1952 on Egyptian politics and the economy are well known, its impact on Egyptian culture has not yet been satisfactorily explained. Politically and economically, the Revolution has gone thrsough two more or less distinct phases. During the first decade of its existence, it moved cautiously on all fronts, and its spokesmen were fond of pointing out that their ‘ideology’ was experimental, pragmatic, and flexible rather than bound to any set of predetermined ideas. Then in 1961 the government veered sharply to the left. The so-called Socialist Laws were issued, altering profoundly the ownership and distribution of wealth in Egypt.

Modern views on pre-Islamic poetry have not markedly advanced our understanding of the structure of the poem beyond the views of the critics of the first three centuries of Hijra. In fact, if anything, modern views are more rigidly formulated, show a greater tendency towards generalizations, and are far less perceptive, as well as being based on a degree of knowledge and familiarity with the poetry inferior to that of the early critics. Ibn Qutayba's famous passage which attempts a description of the process through which the poet developed his poem remains one of the most perceptive statements on the subject. He, at least, had the objectivity and modesty to attribute the view expressed in his passage to ba'd ahl al-adab (a person, or people, of knowledge in the field of language and poetry). Ibn Qutayba does not claim that the statement he quotes was based on an analysis of the properties of the corpus of the poetry. However, the most interesting aspect of this statement is that it interprets the structural properties of the poem in psychological terms. It does not label the process a conventional device imposed by the tradition and by the poets' lack of desire to break away from that tradition. The interpretation the statement offers is also functional, in that it asserts that the process of growth in the poem is not arbitrary and illogical but purposeful, conscious, and pertaining to the total structure of the poem. In this sense Ibn Qutayba's remark is also structural, because it considers the structure of the poem in relation to the structure of other poems in the tradition.

The functions of a modern central bank are manifold, but fall into a few general categories — technical, advisory, and control. Technical activities do not demand a separate central banking institution; they could be performed equally well by alternative arrangements. These functions are of a clerical nature and do not require continuous decision-making. For example, central banks typically handle the government's financial accounts, making its payments and collecting its receipts, paying interest on debt as well as the principal when the debt matures, and marketing the securities when issued. In effect, the central bank acts as an agency of the Finance Ministry, the latter making the decisions, the former implementing them. Similarly, central banks typically monopolize currency issue, but in so far as this is an automatic procedure — issuing currency to whomever wishes to acquire it — no decision-making is involved. Indeed, these two functions have often been performed by the Treasury itself, and even today occasionally still lie in the domain of some treasuries.

One of the most significant, but unstudied, aspects of the reforms accomplished in the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century under the leadership of the Tanzimat statesmen and of Sultan Abd ul-Hamid II was a radical transformation of the traditional Ottoman tax structure and the introduction of the system that has remained in force, with relatively few changes, to the present day, at least in the Republic of Turkey.

Students of nineteenth-century Ottoman political history have concentrated on the central provinces of the Empire. Students of Arab political history of the same period have concentrated on anti-Ottoman nationalism centered in Cairo and Beirut. Relatively little work has yet been done to illuminate the nature of Ottoman government in the Arab provinces. The picture that is presented by Western travelers, Arab nationalists reminiscing about their youth, and diplomatic reports has been incomplete, biased against the Imperial government, and sometimes factually inaccurate.

Notwithstanding five generations of legislators and administrators bent on westernizing the economies of the Ottoman Empire and of its successor states, Islamic patterns were so intimately woven into the fabric of community and society in the Levant that every aspect of economic endeavor beyond the area of daily contact with the West continued to be cast in the mold of the all-encompassing Sharî'a until after the Second World War.1 Nowhere was this clearer than in rural Palestine, where an economic organization framed in Islamic concepts, operating in Islamic terms, and embodying the problems and the promises of the Islamic view of doing business and carrying on production, withstood a century of confrontation with Western settlers, traders, and administrators and a quickly expanding implanted sector.

At the beginning of the seventeenth century the beylicate in Tunisia was a minor executive office. In the course of this century Tunisia's political institutions underwent a gradual change, the outcome of which was the emergence of the beylicate as the country's dominant ruling institution. This development involved a twofold process: the transformation of the beylicate into a hereditary institution having roots in native Tunisian society, and the gradual isolation and reduction of the authority of the foreign military class which had usurped power from the representative of the Ottoman sultan.from the representative of the Ottoman sultan. In this study I will analyse the meagre data available for this period of Tunisian history in order to explain the historical circumstances and local forces which account for this development.

In Part I of this article I noted that the farming out of capital resources to an entrepreneur for a share of the profits, which has always played a very important role in the Middle Eastern economy, never won unqualified approval by the jurists of medieval Islam; for on the one hand farming out on shares was held to be closely allied to the sharika (an institution of broad scope corresponding to the partnership) yet on the other it did not meet all the criteria by which a sharika was accounted valid by the sharî'a. The requirement it did not meet, the jurists felt, was full contractual equality between the parties — in this case the owner of the resources and his working partner or entrepreneur. Owing to the pressure of necessity, farming out on shares was validated, but on the rather shaky grounds of custom and precedent.

On 14 October 1973 Turkish voters went to the polls for the seventh time since the advent of multiparty politics twenty-three years earlier. This election was the subject of unusual interest because it followed the 12 March 1971 military intervention. It was also of intrinsic analytical interest because it afforded an opportunity to determine whether previous electoral trends were continuing or not.