On January 13, 1958, a special committee which had been created to draw up the general policy to be followed in carrying out a proposed fellowship program of the Organization of American States (OAS), in addition to the regular fellowships already offered by the organization and the individual governments, presented a report and draft resolution to the Council for consideration. In accordance with the temporary provision of a resolution on the general policy for the fellowship program approved by the Council of OAS on January 15, Secretary-General Mora prepared the regulations for the award and administration of the fellowships and presented them to the Council at a meeting held on June 4, 1958. At that time it was agreed that the representatives on the Council would forward the regulations to their governments and that they would also be transmitted to the Committee on the Fellowship Program for its information. The regulations stated that the Secretary-General of OAS should be assisted in the administration of the program by the Executive Director of Technical Cooperation, the Technical Secretary, and an Advisory Board. According to the regulations, an OAS fellowship was one to be granted by the organization, after consideration of the applicant's study plans, to a person with advanced training in the branch of knowledge in which he had specialized, so that he might have an opportunity to study abroad. The regulations included sections on the selection of candidates and the processing of applications, and forfeiture, renunciation, and cancellation of fellowships.

The twentieth plenary meeting of the International Cotton Advisory Committee (ICAC), Which was held in Tokyo from May 10 through 23, 1961, was attended by delegates from 34 member states and from nineteen nonmember countries. Mr. E. D. White, chairman of the Standing Committee, commented in presenting its annual report that 1960–1961 had been a good year for cotton, with production at a new high and consumption well sustained. The cotton surplus of former years had been reduced to more manageable proportions, he added, with the result that in many cases prices had become more favorable for producers. He stressed the importance of keeping under study factors that might influence the long-term prospects of cotton. The Executive Secretary of the Committee, Mr. Robert Evans, noted in his annual report that there had not been any agreements to stabilize cotton prices and markets for a number of years. While United States stabilization of its own markets and prices had done much to stabilize those of the rest of the world, it could also be argued that changes in United States policy had upset the world market.

In 1961 the General Assembly declared the 1960's to be the UN Development Decade and called for intensified efforts to accelerate progress toward self-sustaining growth. During 1965, designated International Cooperation Year, the United Nations is to take stock of the progress made thus far. Next to peace and security, which are preconditions for progress in all fields, international cooperation to promote economic and social development of the less developed countries now holds the highest priority for United Nations action.

A proposal for an international inspectorate lies at the heart of every contemporary plan for armament control. Alternatives to the increasing perils of the unprecedented arms race of our era are made dependent on the development of a reasonably effective method of monitoring treaty compliance. Reduction of tension through control of weapons can be attempted only by the creation of a type of political instrument with which the world has had little previous experience. The achievement of a system of inspection, when viewed in the perspective of the history of international organization, is a task of political and administrative architecture on an unprecedented scale. Even the more modest proposals envisage staff and budgetary resources comparable, if not greater, in size than those of the present UN. More significantly, these plans imply an extension of international authority within national borders. Therefore, if arms control should become a viable instrument of international diplomacy, a rapid development of international political, judicial, and administrative techniques will be required.

The first concrete step in effecting international regulation of air navigation was taken by the Aeronautical Commission of the Peace Conference in 1919 when it drew up the International Air Convention of October 13, 1919, instituting the International Commission for Air Navigation (which came into being in July, 1922) in order to provide rules for air traffic. Later modifications in the text of the Convention were authorized in June, 1929.

This essay attempts to envisage potential conflicts of loyalty in the minds of soldiers of a future international peace force and to review some of the means and steps by which such conflicts might be eased or prevented. For it is a fundamental of co'llective action that for any group to be effective in pursuing its object its members must be reasonably free from crises of loyalty.

According to press reports, the Arab League Council, at an April 3, 1960, meeting in Cairo, decided tentatively that its members should sever diplomatic relations with France in protest of the second French atomic test in the Sahara, and recommended the freezing of French assets in several Arab countries, as well as the boycotting of Paris economically and culturally. The action did not apply to Iraq and Tunisia, since they were not represented at the meeting, and it was considered doubtful that Lebanon would accede to such measures due to its traditional attachment to France.

The General Assembly concluded its sixth session in Paris on February 5, 1952 having considered an agenda of more than seventy items. Major political questions before the Assembly included: disarmament and prohibition of the atomic bomb; collective measures; the establishment of a commission to investigate the possibility of German elections; termination of the United Nations Commission on the Balkans; and Palestine and related problems. The question of the independence of Korea was deferred pending the conclusion of armistice negotiations.

The report of the Director-General on the activities of the United Nations, Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) for 1960 included a discussion of: 1) relations with member states and international organizations; 2) execution of the program; and 3) administrative services. In the first section the Director-General commented that, in 1960, UNESCO's role had assumed its full importance in the collective system of international organizations and that its close cooperation with the UN had resulted in new possibilities for direct, large-scale action.

In his Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1966–15 June 1967 Secretary-General U Thant observed that during the period under review the international political situation had deteriorated considerably. The war in Vietnam had progressively intensified, there had been renewed warfare in the Middle East in June 1967, and the situation in Cyprus had not improved. Only limited progress had been made in such areas as disarmament, outer space, economic and social development, decolonization, and human rights. Frustrations in respect of South Africa, South West Africa, and Rhodesia continued, although in the cases of South West Africa and Rhodesia the General Assembly and the Security Council, respectively, had taken certain steps which might help in time to improve the situation

Partly by design, partly by coincidence the twelve months from September 1969 to September 1970 saw an “explosion” of reports about development problems. This article is particularly concerned with one of these, Sir Robert Jackson's A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System. While the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) covers only a minor percentage of total assistance extended to less developed countries, its significance reaches beyond its quantitative development impact It has become the single most important United Nations cooperative effort and, more generally, represents an unprecedented example of intergovernmental and interorganizational cooperation.

In “Rewarding Impatience: A Bargaining and Enforcement Model of OPEC” (International Organization, Spring 2004) I presented a theoretical model that suggested that in strategic situations where a bargaining phase is followed by an enforcement phase that resembles a prisoners' dilemma, impatient actors earned better outcomes than their more patient rivals. I also modeled the division of cartel profits in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), particularly with regard to the relationship between bargaining strength and disparate time horizons, and found that there is some threshold level for which states that discount the future more heavily tend to receive better production offers than those that do not. The critique presented in Goodrich deals with the final section of the article, which presents the results of statistical analysis testing the implications of these theoretical models.I am grateful to Jeff Lewis, Drew Linzer, and Ken Schultz for suggestions and advice. Many thanks to Thomas Plümper for sharing the computer code for his procedure to analyze fixed effects with time-invariant covariates in Stata. The usual disclaimers apply.

Explanations for the successful expansion and consolidation of the European Union and its legal system have long emphasized the importance of domestic courts’ sending preliminary references to the Court of Justice. Key to many of these theoretical accounts is the claim that domestic courts are better equipped than the Court of Justice to compel national governments to comply with EU law. Integrating insights from the comparative judicial politics literature into the context of the EU's preliminary references system, we provide a theoretical and empirical foundation for this claim by arguing that incorporating domestic courts into the EU legal process enhances public support for expansive judicial interpretations of EU law. We go on to argue, however, that this transfer of legitimacy depends on citizens’ views of the national and European courts. We support our argument with evidence from a preregistered survey experiment fielded in Germany.