Words, like thoughts, often change their significance when used as political symbols. For a great many Swedes neutrality has come to be a synonym for peace and independence. Of course neutrality, if it succeeds, always means peace for the country itself. But it is hardly a policy intended to preserve peace among nations. It is more similar to one of those means which man has invented in order to be able to wage war. When neutrality began to appear as a conception in international law it was rooted in the view that war is a legitimate contest and that no distinction should be drawn between an aggressor state and the state attacked. When in modern war a mighty aggressor looks upon the neutrality of small countries not as a useful limitation of the theater of operations but as an obstacle to victory, that power simply forces its will upon the neutral. At the same time the great contest of our time arises from a conflict between authoritarian states and free democracies and tends to be total, involving all spheres of national and individual life. Moreover, international law no longer implies a sovereign right to go to war but moves towards a distinction between an unjust war of aggression and a just war of defense. All this means that the states attacked are not likely to look upon impartial neutrality as a matter of course and a proper standard of conduct.

A short meeting of the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), devoted exclusively to East-West relations, was held on September 4, 1959, following a visit by United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower. United States Secretary of State Christian Herter, opening the session, explained to the Council why Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev had been invited to the United States and reviewed the general world situation since the Geneva Conference, including the current state of disarmament negotiations.

At the conclusion of the two International Telecommunication Union (ITU) conferences held in Geneva in 1959—the Plenipotentiary (October 14 to December 16) and the Administrative Radio (August 17 to December 17)—two international documents were officially signed by the representatives of 85 and 84 countries respectively, namely: 1) the new Convention, replacing the International Telecommunication Convention of Buenos Aires, 1952; and 2) the new Radio Regulations, replacing those of Atlantic City, 1947. The Convention was to take effect on January 1, 1961, and the Radio Regulations on May i, 1961. Some additional protocols had to be signed as well, so that certain decisions (for example, the elections of the newly-constituted Administrative Council, the Secretary-General, and the Deputy Secretary-General, and changes made in the budget system) could take effect forthwith. Numerous recommendations and resolutions were also adopted, and decisions concerning the way ITU was organized, how it was run, and its future development were reached by the Plenipotentiary Conference, the chairman of which was Mr. J. D. H. van der Toorn, head of the Netherlands delegation. The chairman of the Radio Conference was Mr. Charles J. Acton, head of the Canadian delegation.

For almost a decade commentators on international organization have nurtured the myth that the UN Charter was originally ‘oversold’ to the American public by enthusiastic supporters, who represented the organization as a panacea for the ills of twentieth-century world politics. So unrealistic were the expectations created by this publicity barrage, so the story runs, that subsequent disillusionment with die UN was inevitable. Although propagated with many variations, the myth finds a classic formulation in the words of Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., uttered before the House Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, July 8, 1953: ‘The United Nations,’ said Ambassador Lodge, ‘was oversold. It was advertised entirely as an automatic peace producer. All we had to do was sign on die dotted line—so it was said—and all our troubles would be over’. A recent volume on international relations, currently in use as a college text, restated the myth in a some what less extreme form: ‘Considered a towering edifice of strength in 1945, the United Nations was often shrugged off in the early 1950's with the damning phrase, ‘debating society.’ Because expectations had been so extravagant, the achievements of the United Nations seemed ridiculously trivial to many who had expected a Utopian revolution in international relations that the United Nations could not hope to provide.” Other variations on the theme are no doubt familiar to students of international organization. Use of the expression ‘myth’ implies no denial that ‘a veritable wave of propaganda and influence was generated on behalf of American membership’ in the UN. The country was flooded with information, from bodi government and private sources, designed to win over the public to the desirability of postwar international organization. It is also true that those engaged in selling the UN to the public tried to give their arguments an optimistic, hopeful tone. Recalling the League's fate, they emphasized the differences between the League and the proposed new organization rather than their patent similarities. Often they were guilty of oversimplifying the facts of world politics upon which the future of the UN would necessarily depend. The growing split between Russia and the Western allies, so ominous for the new organization, was not usually highlighted in speeches urging the establishment of the UN. A vigorous selling campaign was unquestionably conducted.

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development participated in several loans for electric power development during the late winter and spring of 1961. 1) On February 23, 1961, the Bank announced a loan of $30 million for the expansion of electric generating and transmission facilities in Yugoslavia. The loan was to help finance die construction of a 216,000-kilowatt hydroelectric plant in the Velebit mountains near Senj on the Adriatic coast and the installation of 790 miles of high voltage transmission lines to improve the country-wide electric power network. Six private commercial banks participated in the loan, which was for a term of 25 years and was to bear interest of 5¾ percent, with amortization to begin March 1, 1965. 2) The Bank also made a loan to the Japanese Development Bank that in turn was to re-lend the proceeds to the Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc., for the expansion of electric generating capacity on the island of Kyushu. The loan, announced on March 16, 1961, was to assist in financing the construction of a 156,000-kilowatt thermal power plant at Kokura in northern Kyushu, one of the most heavily industrialized areas in Japan. It was for a term of twenty years and bore interest of 5¾ percent, with amortization to begin September 1, 1962. The International Bank had previously lent $11.2 million in 1953 for the installation of an initial 75,000-kilowatt unit in the Karita thermal power station to expand the Kyushu company's power facilities. 3) Another loan for electric power expansion was made known on March 29, 1961, when the Bank announced that it had lent $8.4 million to the United Kingdom Protectorate of Uganda for the extension of the electric power transmission and distribution systems of the Uganda Electricity Board. The loan, guaranteed by the United Kingdom, was for a term of twenty years and bore interest of 5¾ percent, with amortization to begin June 1, 1964. Fourteen banks in the United States, Belgium, and the Netherlands participated in the loan, which was to meet the cost of imported goods and services for the Electricity Board's $14 million development program. 4) On May 12, 1961, the Bank announced a loan of $22 million for the expansion of hydroelectric installations to supply power to the metropolitan area of Medellin, an important manufacturing center in Colombia. The loan was made to the Empresas Publicas de Medellin, an autonomous public enterprise, and was to provide for the addition of 138,000 kilowatts of new capacity to the system already servicing the area and for the extension of transmission and distribution facilities. Empresas was to finance local currency costs from its own resources. The Bank had already loaned $12 million to Empresas in 1959 for the first stage of its electricity project. Four commercial banks participated in the loan, which was for a term of 25 years, bore interest at 5¾ percent, and was scheduled to begin amortization in March 1966.

It is now three years since the United Nations General Assembly first convened in London, and over five years since the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China announced at the first Moscow Conference their recognition of “the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization … for the maintenance of international peace and security.”

The International Wheat Council held its twenty-eighth session in London on October 19 and 20, 1959, under the chairmanship of Sir Edwin McCarthy. Twenty-eight countries were represented by delegates and advisers, with observers representing the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN and the European Economic Community.

The Assembly of Western European Union (WEU) held the second part of its fifth ordinary session in Paris from November 30 to December 3, 1959. The President of the Assembly Mr. Victoria Badini- Confalonieri (Italian Liberal), opened the first sitting with a tribute to the late John Edwards, following with an examination of the history and functions of WEU in the light of proposed changes of the organization's functions. He stated that the European Economic Community (EEC) of the Six and the Union of the Seven were complementary, rather than incompatible, as WEU's Council of Ministers could become a ”clearing house” for relations between the Six and the United Kingdom, the only member of WEU that was not a member of EEC. He expressed the hope that at the next meeting of the Council of Ministers the question of the new political role of WEU would be the chief matter considered. Mr. Giuseppe Pella, Italian Foreign Minister, speaking as Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council, stated that the Council of Ministers attached great importance to coll-laboration with the Assembly; noting that relations between the Council and the Assembly had improved since the creation of the organization, he went onto list areas that the Council had considered or was considering which concerned both organs, namely: 1) measures which would allow the Assembly a more direct share in the adoption of its budget; 2) the area of armament production; 3) the search for permanent offices for WEU; and 4) the question of transferring WEU's exercise of social and cultural activities to the Council of Europe. Regarding the latter, he stated that, in agreeing to the transfer, the Council wished merely to reduce duplication and not to detract from the Union's independence. Finally, he stressed that consultation among the Six should lead to political consultation with the United Kingdom in the WEU context, rather than ruling it out.

From its 921st through its 923d meetings the Security Council considered the complaint of the government of Cuba that the United States was planning direct military intervention in Cuba.Mr. Wadsworth, the representative of the United States and the first speaker, deplored the fact that because of continued provocation over nearly a two-year period the United States had been forced to break diplomatic relations with Cuba, and denied as false propaganda the Cuban charges that the United States was contemplating a military attack on Cuba. Mr. Roa, the Cuban representative, stated in his opening remarks that Cuba considered the Security Council the proper organ before which to bring its case, and that his country opposed any effort to transfer the examination of its claim to the Council of the Organization of American States. He charged, inter alia: 1) that United States materials had been air-lifted to counter-revolutionary groups in the Cuban mountains; 2) that United States Embassy officials had been engaged in espionage and in conspiracy with counterrevolutionary elements; 3) that false and harmful propaganda against Cuba was being broadcast from the United States, with the support of the United States government; 4) that mercenaries were being trained at Guantanamo Naval Base, with a view to launching a number of small military expeditions against different points of the island; and 5) that destroyers had been placed on the alert in Key West, ninety miles from Cuba. The ultimate objective of these movements, Mr. Roa added, was a military invasion of his country.

The 31st session of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), comprising the 1137th to 1149th meetings, was held in New York on April 4 and from April 19 through 28, 1961. There was some discussion as to whether the Council could meet since there was a vacancy in its membership due to the General Assembly's failure to elect the eighteenth member of the Council. Mr. Zorin (Soviet Union) expressed the view that a meeting of the Council as constituted at that point would be a violation of Article 61(1) of the Charter specifically providing for ECOSOC membership of eighteen; his delegation felt that it was essential to come to an understanding with the President of the General Assembly with a view to the election of the eighteenth member at the earliest possible date. The United States delegate suggested that the problem be referred to the Office of Legal Affairs. A vote on a Polish proposal that the meeting adjourn under rule 54 of the rules of procedure pending a vote in the General Assembly was defeated by 7 votes to 6 with 4 abstentions.

The Ministerial Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) held its spring ministerial meeting in Oslo, Norway, from May 8 to 10, 1961, under the chairmanship of the new Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Dirk U. Stikker. United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk announced to the assembled Ministers of the fifteen-member alliance that his government was prepared, in pursuance of the plan announced to the NATO Council by his predecessor, Mr. Christian A. Herter, to commit five Polaris nuclear missile submarines to forces assigned to NATO. The Herter plan had been contingent upon agreement by the European members to purchase an additional 100 nuclear missiles for NATO, but according to the press, this part of the proposal was understood to have been abandoned because of European objections to the cost of such an undertaking. The submarines were to be assigned to the command of Vice-Admiral George W. Anderson, who held the dual role of Commander of the United States Sixth Fleet, based in Naples, and of the NATO Strike Force South, it was also made known. Ultimate control of the eighty Polaris nuclear warheads would, however, revert to the President of the United States. A plan for the Permanent Council of the treaty powers to review the alliance's total military situation as a matter of high urgency was tied to Secretary Rusk's announcement on the Polaris submarines. The United States Secretary of State, in addressing the Council, gave his government's views on the situation in Cuba, the Congo, Laos, and South Vietnam and stated that the United States would consider it a violation of the legal situation in Berlin if the Soviet Union signed a peace treaty with East Germany. Should the Soviet Union proceed to sign such a peace treaty the allies would insist on continued Western rights of access to West Berlin and would make it clear that they were prepared to resist encroachment on their position, Mr. Rusk declared.

Commission on Human Rights: The sixteenth session of the Commission on Human Rights was held in Geneva from February 29 to March 18, 1960, under the chairmanship of Mr. Mario Amadeo (Argentina). The agenda adopted by the Commission included discussion of advisory services in the field of human rights, the right of everyone to be free from arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile, a declaration on the right of asylum, freedom of information, national advisory committees on human rights, the prevention of discrimination and protection of minorities, communications concerning human rights, and a review of the human rights program along with consideration of the control and limitation of documentation.

It was reported that during a meeting of the Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) on February 8, 1960, a debate took place on the alleged violations of human rights perpetuated by the government of General Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina of the Dominican Republic. Dr. Falcon-Briceno, Venezuelan ambassador to the United States, who had brought the charge on instructions of his government, contended that a concern for human rights was a basic function of the inter-American system and called upon the Council to investigate the situation. He was challenged by the Dominican ambassador, Mr. Diaz Ordoñez, who insisted that the prevailing situation was a matter of exclusively domestic concern to his government and stressed the fact that non-intervention in internal affairs was a basic principle of the inter-American system. The delegates were urged to action by the delegate of Honduras, who expressed the view that the principle of non-intervention should not close the door to action deemed to be necessary for the preservation of human rights and liberties. After a threehour debate, the Council reportedly decided, by a vote of 20 to none, with 1 abstention (the Dominican Republic), to initiate an inquiry into the matter. To this end, five nations—Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, Peru, and the United States—were appointed as a working group to consider whether and how the organization could conduct an investigation in the case.

The Security Council considered various aspects of the current situation in the newly independent Republic of the Congo (formerly the Belgian Congo) at its 873d, 877th–879th, 884th–889th, and 896th–906th meetings. The first meeting was called at the request of the Secretary-General to hear his report on the demand for UN action submitted to him by the government of the Republic of the Congo. Accordingly, the Secretary-General opened the discussion by describing the three communications which he had received from the government of the Congo, the first requesting urgent technical assistance in the field of administration, and the second and third requesting military assistance; since the first request was within the limits of the competence of the Secretary-General himself, it was only with the last two that the Council had to concern itself. Believing that the presence of the Belgian troops currently in the Congo was a source of internal and potentially also of international tension, the Secretary-General proposed to accede t o the demand of the Congo for UN military assistance by sending to that country a UN Force which would not be authorized to action beyond self-defense nor to any action which would make it a party to internal conflicts, and which would be composed of personnel such as to avoid complications because of the nationalities used—that is, participation of troops from of African nations would be desirable, while that of troops from the permanent members of the Council would not. It would be of understood that, were the UN to act as a proposed, the Belgian government would of see its way to a withdrawal of its troops from the Congo.

The Executive Board of the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) held its 56th session in Paris from April 4 to 30, 1960. Under the heading, Execution of the Program, the Board decided, inter alia: 1) to authorize the Director-General to utilize a sum of up to $14,000 to contribute to the carrying out of the International Study of University Admissions; 2) to set up a Consultative Committee to advise the Director-General in preparing his comments to be presented to the UN Economic and Social Council on the conclusions drawn from the survey on the main trends of research and on the dissemination and utilization of scientific knowledge for peaceful purposes; 3) to adopt the proposed agenda for the Intergovernmental Conference on Oceanographic Research to be held in Copenhagen from July 11 to 16, 1960; 4) to authorize the Director-General to advance financial assistance for activities to be undertaken during the summer in the United Arab Republic to safeguard the monuments of Nubia, noting with satisfaction the formation of national and international committees designed to secure contributions for the project; and 5) to communicate to the Economic and Social Council the Board's observations, based on the report of a meeting of experts, on measures for the promotion of further international cooperation in the fields of education, science, and culture.

According to press reports, the Arab League Council, at an April 3, 1960, meeting in Cairo, decided tentatively that its members should sever diplomatic relations with France in protest of the second French atomic test in the Sahara, and recommended the freezing of French assets in several Arab countries, as well as the boycotting of Paris economically and culturally. The action did not apply to Iraq and Tunisia, since they were not represented at the meeting, and it was considered doubtful that Lebanon would accede to such measures due to its traditional attachment to France.

Article 21 of the Charter of the United Nations provides that the General Assembly shall adopt its own rules of procedure and shall elect its President for each session. No other mention of the President of the General Assembly is to be found in the Charter and, as in the British fashion, his role is more a reflection of evolution than definition in the rules of procedure. It is perhaps for this reason that the highest office of the General Assembly has not been described at any length in the literature about the United Nations.

Recent schemes for international currency reform are unrealistic to the extent that they are derived as optimum solutions to economic problems alone. International currency arrangements are instances of international organization generally, and consequently fall within the scope of political sociology as much as—if not more than—of pure economics. Political complications must therefore not only be acknowledged, as they usually are, but analyzed as well, as they often are not. This essay represents an inquiry in that direction.

At Managua, Nicaragua, on December 13, 1960, the governments of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua signed the General Treaty, the basic treaty of the Central American Program of Economic Integration (CAPEI), often referred to as the Central American Common Market (CACM). Also signed at the same time were the Agreement establishing the Central American Bank for Economic Integration and the Protocol to the Central American Agreement on the Equalization of Import Duties and Charges. Sixteen months later the government of Costa Rica acceded to the three agreements.

The Council of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) held its twentieth session on October 14–18, 1963, under the chairmanship of Mr. D. Ramon Huidobro, permanent Chilean representative to the European Office of the UN. ICEM Director B. W. Haveman keynoted a discussion of ICEM's proper role with his request that fuller use be made of ICEM's migration machinery which, he pointed out, had aided in the resettlement of some one and one-quarter million people during the past eleven years. Mr. Haveman's proposals for future action included: 1) making the good offices and machinery of ICEM available in areas in which ICEM did not at present operate; 2) establishing improved reception and placement services, especially in Latin America; 3) exploring the possibilities of making the fullest use of ICEM in carrying out governmental migration policies and programs; and 4) encouraging the settlement of European farmers in Latin America.