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ICRC operational security: staff safety in armed conflict and internal violence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 November 2009

Patrick Brugger
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Abstract

Humanitarian work, especially in conflict areas, has become more dangerous and every humanitarian organization is affected by serious security problems, constituting a threat to their staff and hampering much-needed activities on behalf of the victims of armed conflicts and other situations of collective armed violence. The article outlines the general approach of the ICRC to security issues and describes the pillars of the security policy it has adopted in the field to protect its operational staff.

Type
Reports and documents
Information
International Review of the Red Cross , Volume 91 , Issue 874: War victims , June 2009 , pp. 431 - 445
Copyright
Copyright © International Committee of the Red Cross 2009

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References

1 A joint report from the Overseas Development Institute, UK, and the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, USA, collates data on violence against aid workers and analyses how perceptions of increased risk have shaped new security measures and programming approaches. Since 1997 the number of major acts of violence (killings, kidnappings and armed attacks resulting in serious injury) committed against aid workers has more than quadrupled. Overall, there were 792 reported acts of major violence against aid workers from 1997 to 2008, involving 1618 victims and resulting in 711 fatalities. Violence is most prevalent in Sudan (Darfur), Afghanistan and Somalia, which together accounted for more than 60% of incidents. Most aid worker victims are deliberately targeted for political and/or economic purposes, rather than being randomly exposed to violence. See Abby Stoddard, Adele Harmer and Victoria DiDomenico, ‘Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: 2009 Update’, Humanitarian Policy Group, Policy Brief No. 34, April 2009, available at http://www.cic.nyu.edu/Lead%20Page%20PDF/HPG_2009%20.pdf (visited 20 April 2009).

2 In Darfur in 2006 and 2007, there were about 30 security incidents per year involving the ICRC (out of a total of 100 ICRC security incidents on average worldwide each year), fewer than other organizations considering the greater exposure of the ICRC in terms of field trips, travel by road rather than air, and geographical coverage.

3 See Krähenbühl, Pierre, ‘The ICRC's approach to contemporary security challenges: A future for independent and neutral humanitarian action’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 86, No. 855, September 2004, pp. 505–514.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 International and transnational groups often affiliated to Al Qaeda, e.g. the Groupe salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (Salafist Group for Call and Combat – GSPC) becoming Al Qaida au Magreb islamique (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb – AQMI), or Al Qaeda in the Arabic Peninsula.

5 See Pfanner, Toni, ‘Asymmetrical warfare from the perspective of humanitarian law and humanitarian action’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 87, No. 857, March 2005, pp. 149–174.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 E.g. on UNHCR, Algiers, December 2007 (the attack led to formation of an Independent Panel on Safety and Security, under Lakhdar Brahimi – see The Independent Panel on Safety and Security of UN Personnel and Premises Worldwide, Towards a Culture of Security and Accountability: Report of the Independent Panel on Safety and Security of UN Personnel and Premises Worldwide, 9 June 2008, available at http://www.humansecuritygateway.info/documents/UN_panelonsafety_9Jun08.pdf (visited 21 April 2009); on MSF-NL in Somalia, January 2008; on the children's NGO Plan International in Pakistan, February 2008; on the International Rescue Committee in Afghanistan, August 2008.

7 Currently the ICRC maintains a permanent presence in over 60 countries and conducts operations in about 80 with 12,473 employees, 1542 expatriates and 10,931 national staff.

8 Security incidents are internally defined as ‘events that may constitute a threat to the physical or mental integrity of ICRC staff and that may have implications for operational matters’.

9 All three have now been released.

10 In the areas of operational support, training, situation monitoring and security policy.

11 Agreement on the Organization of the International Activities of the Components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (hereinafter Seville Agreement), Seville, 26 November 1997, Art. 6.1.2(A)(c) provides that in situations where the ICRC is acting as lead agency, it has the specific responsibility ‘to define and ensure the application of any measure which may prove necessary to guarantee, to the greatest extent possible, the physical safety of personnel engaged in relief operations in the field’.

12 See also by Dind, Philippe, ‘Security in ICRC field operations’, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 323, 1998, pp. 335–345.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

13 On the use of the emblem, see Slim, Habib, ‘Protection of the red cross and red crescent emblems and the repression of misuse’, International Review of the Red Cross, No. 272, 1989, pp. 420–437.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

14 For questions and answers about the adoption of an additional emblem, see http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/emblem-questions-answers-281005?opendocument (visited on 25 March 2009).

15 Seville Agreement, above note 11, Art. 6.1.2(A)(c).

16 ‘Geographical’ refers to the physical environment in which the ICRC works (mountains, town, countryside, flatland, etc.).

17 ‘Political’ refers to the following factors: licences delivered by the authorities, import of material, conflict context (banditry, belligerents' use of technology, etc.).

18 Situations where banditry prevails.

19 See ‘Report on the use of armed protection for humanitarian assistance’, extract from a working paper submitted jointly by the ICRC and the International Federation, Council of Delegates, Geneva, 1–2 December 1995, available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/57jneg?opendocument (visited on 25 March 2009).

20 Within the framework established by the Assembly Council.

21 For instance, in Iraq in 2004–2008 at the height of the conflict, following several serious security incidents in 2003.