This article examines the violence of war from a temporal point of view, looking at various contemporary conflicts from a long-term perspective involving three kinds of time: “historical” time, “traditional” time and “mythical” time. It thus provides some elements that help explain the length of these conflicts, but also their deeper nature. In particular, it casts douht on the appropriateness of the term “ethnic war”, which has been used to characterize some of them. The hypothetical model presented here focuses on Africa, but it could also he applied to conflict zones in other parts of the world.

La Commission d'indemnisation des Nations Unies a été créée par le Conseil de sécurité pour examiner les demandes déindemnisation et verser des indemnités aux victimes de l'invasion et de l'occupation illicites du Koweït par l'Irak (1990-1991), Cet article examine I'importance que les considérations d'ordre humanitaire revêtent dans le cadre des travaux de la Commission, notamment dans la procédure d'examen des demandes d'indemnisation et dans les mécanismes pour la répartition des indemnités accordées aux requérants dont la réclamation a abouti. L'article examine également les sources des contributions versées au Fonds d'indemnisation des Nations Unies (à partir duquel les indemnités sont versées) dans le contexte de la situation humanitaire qui prévaut en Irak, et il établit une distinction entre le mandat de la Commission et les autres institutions et processus mis en place par le Conseil de sécurité après l'invasion du Koweït en 1990. Finalement, l'article explore brièvement comment les considérations d'ordre humanitaire peuvent jouer un rôle dans des futures procédures de réparation des dommages de guerre.

This article, based on existing studies and on newly available documents from the former Soviet archives, relates one of the most controversial missions in ICRC history, the one entrusted to Woldemar Wehrlin in the Soviet Union between the two world wars. In the absence of diplomatic ties between Switzerland and the Soviet Union, the ICRC's permanent delegate in Moscow — in addition to carrying out activities such as representing the ICRC in its dealings with the Soviet Red Cross, liaising with the Nansen mission, ensuring the repatriation of the remaining German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war and tracing those gone missing — was also led to defend the interests of his country of origin and fellow countrymen. Although the result of this exceptionally long mission, often called a “quasi-consular” one, was very positive for Switzerland and the Swiss community in Russia, it was more ambiguous for the ICRC, whose image was considerably tarnished by the issue of the organization's relations with the Swiss Confederation.

The object of this article is to identify several issues pertinent to impie-mentation of international humanitarian law in the Russian Federation. It first examines the relevant provisions of the Russian Constitution of 1993 and discusses the extent to which they provide for the incorporation of international norms. An overview of current Russian legislation is then given, focusing on some specific examples of legislative incorporation of international humanitarian law. That overview will not be confined to laws adopted solely by the Russian parliament. References to international law and more specifically to international humanitarian law can also be found in military field manuals that are binding on the Russian armed forces and other uniformed armed services. Finally, a notable case decided by the Russian Constitutional Court in 1995 with regard to the implementation of international humanitarian law is discussed. In its decision, the supreme body of judicial review in the Russian Federation made remarkable references to the Additional Protocol II of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.1

L'action pénale contre les personnes accusées d'avoir commis des crimes de guerre est un aspect fondamental du droit d'une victime à la justice. Toutefois, dans les conflits armés où des violations graves du droit international ont été perpétrées massivement, il est souvent nécessaire d'établir un équilibre entre le droit des victimes à obtenir justice de manière tangible et le besoin, pour l'Ètat territorial, de traiter les atrocités passées de façon à ne pas engendrer de nouvelles violences et à stimuler le processus de réconciliation. Dans de telles circonstances, une justice réparatrice associant des amnisties limitées à d'autres mécanismes de responsabilité peut constituer un moyen d'assurer l'État de droit tout en tenant compte de la complexité du processus de transition. Quand des États vivant une situation de transition prodament de telles amnisties, il est important d'établir si celles-ci seront reconnues par la communauté internationale.

Cet article analyse les règies et les principes internationaux qui fondent ou étayent la décision que prend un tribunal national ou international de reconnaître ou non une amnistie couvrant les crimes de guerre. l'auteur s'attache d'abord à déterminer s'il existe un devoir coutumier de traduire en justice les personnes accusées de crimes de guerre, quels qu'ils soient. Les effets du caractère de jus cogens de l'interdiction de commettre des crimes de guerres sont égakment examinés, tout comme la pratique plus récente des États d'établir des tribunaux spéciaux pour juger les personnes accusees de crimes de guerre. L'article fait valoir que le droit international n'interdit pas aux tribunaux nationaux et internationaux d'accorder une amnistie limitée à ceux qui sont considérés comme «les moins responsabks » de la commission des crimes de guerre, lorsque l'amnistie est associée à des mesures de contrôle et vise à faciliter l'instauration d'une paix durable.

Victims of international law violations may bring civil actions for damages against the perpetrators under the United States Alien Tort Claims Act (hereafter ATCA). Lawsuits instituted pursuant to the ATCA may include claims based on violations of international humanitarian law but such claims are completely independent of prosecutions for war crimes or crimes against humanity that might arise from the same factual circumstances. Actions under the ATCA are not aimed at imposing penal sanctions but seek payment of monetary compensation by the defendant for the damage suffered by the victim.

Owing to widespread atrocities witnessed in the last decade of the twentieth century, and in particular those associated with the NATO intervention in Kosovo, the issue of humanitarian intervention has been thrust into the political and doctrinal limelight. In the legal sense, humanitarian intervention is one form of foreign forcible intervention.2 It may be defined as the use of force in order to stop or oppose massive violations of the most fundamental human rights (especially mass murder and genocide) in a third State, provided that the victims are not nationals of the intervening State and there is no legal authorization given by a competent international organization, such as, in particular, the United Nations by means of the Security Council. Such humanitarian intervention need not take the form of action by a single intervening State; but it must be unilateral. Thus, if several States pool their military resources together to intervene in a foreign territory, that constitutes a collective intervention. However, the intervention is unilateral, in that it is coercive action taken by some States acting as would do a single subject. Moreover, humanitarian intervention takes place only insofar as no consent is given by the third State. If consent is given, there is no need legally to invoke the concept of humanitarian intervention; rather, it will be intervention by invitation.

This article explores the process of the “study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare” under Article 36 of 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. It then considers the manner in which the legal review of weapons can take place in practice, including an examination of the evidence that will be available on which to base legal assessments.

The 1899 Hague Declaration (the Declaration) is a treaty prohibition based on particular technical specifications about a weapon system, namely, the construction of bullets. The Declaration has been widely adhered to and has assumed the status of customary law. Although there have been allegations of violations of this treaty, to our knowledge none have been proven. From this point of view, the Declaration could be regarded as an effective treaty.

In A Bed for the Night, David Rieff explains his frustration at the limitations and shortcomings of contemporary humanitarianism. He investigates the gap between the admirable norms of the human rights movement and the unpleasant facts of the humanitarian crises in Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo and Afghanistan. He urges us to revise our assumptions about the reach of the human rights revolution and the workings of the international community. He concludes that, however much one might wish it otherwise, independent humanitarianism is not capable, on its own, of advancing the cause of human rights, contributing to stopping wars, or furthering social justice. Humanitarianism only makes sense as part of a larger international response to human rights crises. It is a “saving idea that cannot save”. And, for the humanitarian enterprise, the risks of collaborating in such a wider response are considerable.

Au moment de la fondation de la Croix-Rouge et de l'adoption de la première Convention de Genève pour l'amélioration du sort des militaires blessés dans les armées en campagne du 22 août 1864, la France est encore perçue comme la Puissance dominante sur le continent. Le Second Empire brille de tous ses feux et c'est à Paris, où tous les pays sont représentés, que se traite une large part des affaires internationales.

Le 8 juin 1977, la Conférence diplomatique sur la réaffirmation et le développement du droit international humanitaire applicable dans les conflits armés (Genève 1974–1977) adoptait deux Protocoles additionnels aux Conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949 relatifs à la protection des victimes de la guerre. Si ces instruments n'ont point encore atteint la portée universelle acquise par les Conventions de Genève, le Protocole additionnel relatif à la protection des victimes des conflits armés internationaux (Protocole I) compte néanmoins 160 États parties, tandis que le Protocole additionnel relatif à la protection des victimes des conflits armés non internationaux (Protocole II) en dénombre 153.

The focus of attention with regard to “child soldiers” has tended to be on abducted children or those forced or coerced into fighting. When asked, however, many children and young people themselves say that they volunteered. Moreover, when negotiating the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on involvement of children in armed conflict, some governments claimed the right to continue to recruit volunteers under the age of 18 and indeed still do so, although others have raised their minimum age for recruitment.