Water scarcity, accelerated by climate change, affects water availability and may threaten peace and security. This role of water, as a contributing factor for triggering wars, sheds light on the significance of the protection of water during armed conflict. Keeping water out of war not only contributes to preserving an indispensable natural resource for life but also serves as a tool for the hostile parties to start negotiations, building trust and peace.

Territorial gangs are among today's main perpetrators of urban violence, affecting the lives of millions of other people. They try to gain control of a territory in which they then oversee all criminal activities and/or ‘protect’ the people.

Such gangs are found to differing degrees on every continent, although those given the most media attention operate in Central America. The violence that they cause has a major impact on the population in general and on their members' families, as well as on the members themselves.

Humanitarian organizations may find themselves having to deal with territorial gangs in the course of their ‘normal’ activities in a gang's area, but also when the humanitarian needs per se of people controlled by a gang justify action.

This article looks at some courses of action that may be taken by humanitarian agencies in an environment of this nature: dialogue with the gangs (including how to create a degree of trust), education, services, and dialogue on fundamental issues. Such action only makes sense over the medium to long term; it may have a very positive impact but only allows the symptoms of a deep-seated problem to be treated.

The participation of women in the 1994 Rwandan genocide should be considered in the context of gender relations in pre-genocide Rwandan society. Many ‘ordinary’ women were involved in the genocide but, overall, committed significantly fewer acts of overt violence than men. Owing to the indirect nature of women's crimes, combined with male ‘chivalry’, women may be under-represented among those pursued for genocide-related crimes, despite the broad conception of complicity in Rwanda's Gacaca Law. Women in leadership positions played a particularly important role in the genocide, and gendered imagery, including of the ‘evil woman’ or ‘monster’, is often at play in their encounters with the law.

Although women routinely display remarkable resilience and fortitude by adopting new roles and taking on new responsibilities when confronted by the ravages of war, they continue to be depicted by many humanitarian actors as being intrinsically weak and vulnerable – a depiction that results in the perceptible absence of women from decision-making bodies both during and in the wake of conflict. This article argues for the need to consider the plurality of women's experiences in war, including as female heads of households, as victims (and survivors) of sexual violence, as community leaders, and as armed combatants.

Organized crime and gang violence are global phenomena that often emerge in urban areas. Although they are not new, states only recently began to perceive them as serious threats to public security. Laws specifically designed to combat them have consequently been enacted. This article outlines the difficulties of dealing adequately in legal terms with these phenomena and analyses the different approaches adopted so far at the national and international level.

The judgement of key decision-makers to ignore the critical problem of impunity – the lack of accountability for egregious human rights violations – contrary to the wishes of the vast majority of Afghans has had devastating, if predictable, consequences. Disillusionment with the continued abuse of power, along with the steady increase in war-related casualties, is a significant driver of the escalating insurgency. Experience over the past nine years highlights an urgent need to address the strategic issue of systemic and structural injustice. It is not realistic to envisage an end to armed conflict and the development of democratic and accountable state institutions while impunity reigns.

Little attention is paid to the obligation of ‘care’ in Article 55(1) of Additional Protocol I. Beyond a general principle of upholding environmental value in times of armed conflict, what is the scope and content of the obligation? If it is worthless, what makes it so? Since the care provision includes the same high threshold of harm found elsewhere in the environmental provisions, has this stumbling block now been removed by state practice? Rule 44 of the Customary Law Study might appear to suggest that this is so, or does it? Ultimately then, is the care obligation worth caring about?

Prison systems are rarely gender sensitive, and are even less so in conflict situations. When women are detained, it is crucial that international standards, applied with sensitivity to women's particular needs, are brought to bear. This article gives an overview of the relevant international law, as well as the gender-specific considerations that need to be taken into account when implementing it.

In Afghanistan, rule of law projects have placed a heavy emphasis on rebuilding courts and law enforcement institutions. Little attention has been given to the critical element of defence, particularly criminal defence services for the poor. Yet, without defence lawyers, there can be no rule of law. This article examines the right to counsel in Afghanistan and the indispensable role that defence lawyers are playing in the development of the justice system, illustrated by the experience of the International Legal Foundation. By providing early and effective representation to their clients, lawyers ensure that Afghanistan's new laws and constitutional provisions protecting the rights of the accused are implemented.

Armies have traditionally avoided cities and siege operations. Fighting for and in cities is costly, slow, and often inconclusive. But sometimes they are unavoidable, either because they are located on main road or rail junctions or because of their value as political and/or economic prizes. Urban expansion in both north and south has made cities today the main theatres of military and humanitarian operations.

Armies' structures, equipment, and doctrines are undergoing a process of adaptation. Manoeuvre has given way to fire power and protection for the troops as the decisive elements of military power. While heavy fire power does considerable damage and causes civilians to flee their homes, operations using protection techniques are only suitable for stabilization. Moreover, their success depends essentially on the willingness of troops to make sacrifices, and on support from the public.

A changing climate means more work for humanitarian organizations. Vulnerable people served by the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement are likely to experience new patterns of disasters. In the face of these rising dangers, science-based information about likely threats can be used to reduce risk and improve resource allocation. Examples such as the 2008 emergency appeal for flood preparedness in West Africa illustrate the benefits of turning early warnings into early actions at community, national, and regional levels, at timescales ranging from hours to decades ahead of a looming threat. By making better use of a wide range of new information, humanitarian organizations can enhance their work even in the face of the rising risks of climate change.

Law enforcement is not a task usually undertaken by military forces, at least within domestic legal contexts. Conversely, maintaining or restoring security within dysfunctional or ‘post-conflict’ areas of operation is a role commonly undertaken by them. Within these latter operations, the skill sets and highly calibrated application of force that are commonly associated with police forces in their law enforcement role are in fact manifested in a decisively military context. This article reviews the experiences and legal frameworks associated with military participation in two separate types of mission, namely UN-sponsored peace operations and unilateral/multilateral stabilization and counter-insurgency operations. It argues that these contexts have demanded a revised interpretative approach to the applicable law, one that is much more sensitive to social and political effect.

Millions are displaced by climate-related disasters each year, and this trend is set to increase as climate change accelerates. It raises important questions about how well existing instruments actually protect people driven from their homes by climate change and natural disasters. This article first examines current protection instruments and points out gaps in them. There follows an exploration of various proposals for filling those protection gaps, with the focus on cross-border natural-disaster-induced displacement. A multi-track approach is recommended, including context-oriented and dynamic interpretation of existing law, and creation of new law. Adhering to the principle of non-refoulement, and focusing on whether return is possible, permissible, or reasonable, could be a realistic way to begin developing protection regimes for victims of natural-disaster-induced displacement.

Since the 1990s, the concept of ‘state-building’ has become the means by which intervenors have attempted to tackle ‘state failure/fragility’. The ‘ideal’ referred to when attempting to do this – both theoretically and in practice – has been that of the classic ‘nation-state’ as developed by Max Weber. To answer the question posed by the title above, the article first looks generally at the evolution of the current state-building paradigm and global governance discourse. Second, a background of historical attempts at state-building in Afghanistan is given. Third, an assessment is made of the international community's approach to Afghanistan since 2001. Finally, the appropriateness of replicating a Weberian state-building model onto more traditional societies such as Afghanistan – where modes of governance and authority are often informal, complex, and characterized by historical and charismatic sources of legitimacy – is addressed. Until now, such contexts have barely been acknowledged, still less understood, by intervenors. Today, however, some academics are beginning to outline an alternative response to state fragility, recognizing more traditional sources of legitimacy and a hybridity of political order.

Facilitating critical reflection on the words and concepts used to write policy enables practitioners to avoid unconsciously reproducing the different forms of oppression and exclusion that their policies seek to overcome. In this article, the author provides an analysis of Chapter 5.10 of the United Nations Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, arguing that policy makers, scholars, students and practitioners cannot avoid making and/or changing meaning through their well-meaning interventions, but that this need not lead to political or practical inertia.

A survey of contemporary armed conflicts indicates that major military powers are increasingly facing militarily weaker adversaries and being drawn into unconventional engagements in cities, towns, and villages. Given the asymmetry of military capabilities in such conflicts, it is submitted that higher standards of reasonableness be imposed upon military commanders of major military powers to ensure constant care for civilian populations, and furthermore that civilian populations be spared more effectively from the effects of urban warfare by applying customary law ab initio, in order to avoid gaps in protection that may arise from the premature classification of armed conflicts.

Reparations are essential to establishing justice after armed conflicts. The question whether international law endorses an individual right to reparation has been a focal point of recent discussion in that regard. The victims of armed conflicts are, however, not only individuals but also collectives. The present article therefore examines the issue of collective reparation. While it is submitted that the question whether there is a right to such a remedy is not yet settled, it is argued that responsible parties should develop robust programmes of collective reparation.

Bad news about Afghanistan is a daily reality. War has plagued the country for three uninterrupted decades. Afghan women and men face daunting survival struggles. The majority of them have known nothing else but war. Considerable responsibility lies on the shoulders of Afghans themselves, who have caused extensive suffering for their fellow countrywomen and men. This article, however, argues that the future of Afghanistan lies in Afghan hands. The solution to its current problems cannot and will not come from outside. It is time for Afghan men and women to confront their problems, to address their divisions, and to envisage home-grown solutions.

Political violence amplifies contemporary trends occurring worldwide in the twenty-first century: globalization, an increasing reliance on the informal economy, a shift from twentieth-century manufacturing to resource and labour wildcatting, and the growth of complex international extra-legal trade networks. Women are central to all of these, though their roles both as leaders of development and victims of violence are often overlooked in mainstream analyses. To explain these invisibilities, this article introduces the concept of vanishing points – places where formal analyses and policy effectively cease, such as the dividing lines between formal and informal economies, and the violence associated with controlling extra-legal profits that is effectively invisible to the public at large. The realities of women's work amid political violence and postwar development, and across the spectrum of in/formality are explored. The conclusions serve to challenge established notions of power, profit, and economy, and the role of gender within these.