The social formation of Iran in the nineteenth century was marked by the predominance of a precapitalist mode of production that had lasted for centuries. A semicolonial situation, superimposed upon Iranian society by the rival colonial powers in the latter half of the nineteenth century, however, set the stage for the beginnings of “modernization” along the lines of dependent capitalism. The result was an uneven and flawed development of capitalism, leading to the emergence and growth of a dual societal type in Iran.

The dualistic character of any social formation in the transitional stage toward capitalism is attributed to the coexistence of several forms of precapitalist, as well as capitalist, modes of production.

When Aqa Mohammad Shah Qajar overthrew the Zand dynasty and established himself on the Persian throne in 1794, large parts of the country were in the hands of tribal chieftains and local leaders. Aqa Mohammad himself had to fight several campaigns to assert his control over the provinces. Under his successors, further campaigns were waged to extend or, more frequently, to maintain or reassert central authority. In the second half of Naser al-Din Shah's reign (1848-1896), the authority of the central government appeared to observers to be more firm than in the early part of the century. But the hold of the center over the provinces, and particularly over the outlying areas, remained precarious. Any weakening of the center, deterioration of the financial situation, or other setback could potentially upset whatever delicate balance had been achieved between the center and the provinces and lead to a reassertion of provincial autonomy.

During the nineteenth century, the bazaar remained the center of commercial activity in Iran. However, the traditional structure of Iranian economy and society began to be deeply affected by Iran's increasing involvement in the international market, so that by the end of the century there had been nearly a twelvefold increase in the volume of Iran's foreign trade. This was accompanied by a rise in the general level of prosperity in the country, and an almost doubling of its population. The groups most directly affected by these developments were the merchants and craftsmen and it was the emergence of a small capitalist class which wanted a share in the political process that greatly contributed to the rise and success of the constitutional movement. The impact of the demands of the international market on crafts and guilds damaged some of the textile industry but stimulated the rise of new crafts, such as those associated with the production and processing of opium and carpets.

The study of Iranian history in the Safavid period is at a relatively rudimentary stage. Despite the wealth of chronicle, biographical, numismatic, documentary, and journalistic material available, few monographic studies of Safavid institutions have been produced. As Minorsky pointed out four decades ago, “not until all the available sources have been properly scrutinized and more material…discovered, shall we be able to get to the bedrock of social and economic conditions under the Safavids.”

His admonition holds true for political institutions as well. Certain fundamental features of the political life of Safavid Iran are well known to its students. But aside from the state structure itself, as analyzed by Minorsky in his translation of and commentary on the Tadhkirat al-muluk and in articles by Roger Savory and Ann K. S. Lambton, other aspects of political life—for instance the Safaviyya and the persistence of Sufi loyalties in political, life, the character and evolution of the qizilbash as a political party, the political integration of local aristocrats (e.g., the maliks of Farah and Sistan and the divs of Mazandaran), and the organization and functioning of tribal uymaqs—remain largely unstudied.