That the question what is legal logic should still arise today appears paradoxical, for law is after all one of the oldest of human disciplines and logic has in the twentieth century become one of the most developed of the disciplines of contemporary philosophy. Yet comparison of a number of recent works dealing with the subject, all of which, not being without merit, have enjoyed a measure of success, is enough to show that the problem exists and is even strongly disputed.

Of four such works, two—those by E. Levi and K. Engisch—do not use the word “logic” in their titles, though they deal with legal reasoning and legal thought. The other two, on the contrary, expressly purport to deal with legal logic. Strangely enough, however, their authors explicitly deny the specific existence of such a discipline, whereas Levi and Engisch underscore, without any hesitation, the specific nature of legal reasoning and the existence of a particular logic, legal logic.

Thus in the first paragraph of his work, where Klug attempts to define the concept of legal logic, he states that it comprises the study of the rules of formal logic as used in the judicial application of rules of law (p. 6); that legal logic is therefore practical logic, consisting of the application to law of the rules of pure or theoretical logic which is general logic (p. 7).

The development of the law relating to bills of exchange in the Anglo-American legal system provides an instructive example of the interdependence of the judicial and legislative functions in legal development. The groundwork consists of over 2,500 cases concerning bills decided in England since 1602, when the first case on bills was decided by the common law courts. These decisions were based on the custom of merchants—whether in England or abroad—and on the writings of jurists from commercially advanced countries. Notwithstanding the great number of decided cases, the law was mostly uniform, owing to the judges' inclination to follow rulings given by their brethren and their desire to retain the uniformity of customary mercantile law. In 1882 the law in England was cast in statutory form and this was copied in toto, with minor changes, by many legal systems, including Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Ceylon, Cyprus and Palestine. Both in England and in countries which adopted the statute only few amendments have been made, thereby lending weight to Mackinon L.J's dictum that the English Bills of Exchange Act is the best law ever enacted by the British Parliament. Indeed, the drafting is clear and effective and has given rise to comparatively little litigation both in England and abroad. Whenever called upon to construe the Act, the English courts have usually interpreted it literally, with strict adherence to the letter of the law, and this interpretation was followed by other courts, whether by reason of the binding force of precedents or in order to maintain uniformity in the law. A monolithic system was thus created, based on a literal interpretation of the Act.

The issue of free navigation through international waterways is not academic nor need any hypothetical questions be posed. The concept of free navigation and international interest continues to confront the concept of sovereignty and national interest. To solve some of the acute problems thus engendered, it has become necessary to establish a body of rules within the scope of international law.

This paper is devoted to one category of international waterways, the so-called international straits. “Still waters run deep” and it seems as if narrow strips of water are often the most troublesome.

The most recent controversy concerning free navigation through straits arose in 1967 between Israel and the U.A.R. over the Tiran Straits. In the absence of an international power able to enforce the so-called international rule of free navigation or to convince the parties that the rule did not apply, the conflict was resolved by force of arms.

No agreement exists between the littoral States as to the legal status of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits. The most cited document in this connection is the Geneva Convention on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone of 1958. Examination of the preparatory and subsequent material of the 1958 Geneva Conference on the law of the sea, leads to the conclusion that the problem of straits in international law is not so much a question of substantive rule as a problem of defining international straits. The rule as such of free navigation is well established and was articulated long ago by Grotius. The right of innocent passage and the freedom of the high seas is today basically derived from the rule as defined by Grotius.

Under Israel law a person cannot be convicted for a sexual offence unless there is corroborative evidence. This means that if the accused denies that he has committed the offence, he cannot be convicted solely on the basis of the complainant's evidence.

Under English law the requirement is somewhat less rigorous: the judge must merely warn the jury of the danger of convicting without corroboration in such cases. The jury may convict in the absence of corroboration provided such a warning is given. There are, however, even in England, certain statutory offences where the more exacting requirement found in the Israel law is applied (i.e. that corroborative evidence be actually submitted).

E. Public Participation as a Factor in the Development of Jewish Law An additional important factor in the development of Jewish Law was the participation of the communal leaders and men of affairs in some of the Jewish legal institutions and in particular the major role of the community and its leaders in Jewish legislation. I have already referred at some length to the existence of the lay courts, on a considerable number of which halachic scholars sat alongside the lay leaders, business men and artisans, as well as to the institution of arbitration, in various areas of the Diaspora. Although in certain places and at certain periods these institutions induced limitations upon and even prejudiced the orderly development of the system of Jewish Law—and sometimes a proper juridical régime in general—nevertheless it would appear that when these institutions worked in harmony with the scholars and the courts constituted of qualified judges, this cooperation contributed not a little to the close adaptation of Jewish Law to the problems of everyday life, an event which was accompanied by great and fruitful development. In pre-emancipation Jewish society, which was as a group traditionally-minded, recognizing the higher virtues of and bound by the Halachah, such cooperation largely existed.