The Israel Law of Marriage and Divorce is unique in many aspects. In European and European-based systems of law, the rivalry between Church and State ending in the triumph of the State over the Church is a matter of past history. Ecclesiastical courts were long ago deprived of jurisdiction in matters of marriage and divorce. Canon law, nevertheless, continues to this day to be the source of the law of the land in this field in all jurisdictions of both Roman civil and common law, even after the pollution and dilution in varying degrees of such source by the secular powers. Principles rooted in canon law were incorporated wholesale in the secular law of the land, and thus made to apply to the entire population irrespective of individual religious affiliation. The continuous activity of a single system of lay courts dealing with matrimonial issues in the course of its general preoccupation with the administration of justice, utilizing a single set of laws of evidence and rules of procedure, gradually welded the principles taken over from the canon law and die law emanating from other sources into one homogeneous body.

Israel alone, among all Western systems of law, retains the law relating to the creation, incidences and termination of the matrimonial status in its almost unadulterated form of religious precepts, and maintains a ramified system of religious tribunals for the administration thereof. This enables nearly all to achieve either marital bliss or, if necessary, the happiness resulting from the dissolution of a miserable marriage in the manner sanctioned by the authorities of their own religious denomination.

It is a signal honour to have been invited to lecture at this world-renowned University—located, as some geographers would have it, at the very centre of the world. Certainly all eyes are concentrated on it at the moment. And it is an exhilarating thought that perhaps this new Law Centre will generate new legal approaches which we all seek, far transcending the limited legal problem and its solutions which we discuss tonight.

Let me say at once that in comparing Israeli and United States company law, I speak about your half of the subject—Israeli law—with much diffidence, although I am emboldened by the realization that every student of comparative law inevitably feels somewhat insecure in his grasp of law outside his own country. Still when I pondered what would be the most useful area for this lecture, I was struck by a fundamental similarity—for although we are separated geographically by half the world, the basic concerns of corporate investors are the same the world over: (1) an agreed-upon allocation of the rewards, if the corporate venture prove successful, and (2) control over management of the enterprise into which they have put their capital. Of first concern then is the law governing the corporate structure since this is what determines the investors' financial and voting rights, and secondly, the law protecting the investor against an unresponsive or irresponsible management. The legal sanctions here involved—statute law or case law—are a matter of concern to foreign capital. The reaction of foreign investors should be of special interest to you because Israel's social, economic, and political goals cannot be achieved without a substantial influx of capital investment from the outside. Foreign investors can operate either through foreign corporations doing business in Israel or through Israeli-formed companies. Tonight, because of time limitations, we confine ourselves to Israeli-formed companies. Other problems for a foreign investor, such as foreign exchange controls, do merit more than passing reference—but we cannot take time to elaborate them.

With the exception of Great Britain and, for the present at least, of Israel, probably all states possess a written constitution, systematically arranged and with set articles. Another term often used for constitution is basic or fundamental law, since the constitution provides a foundation and framework for the other regulations and norms which form the legal system of the country. In most countries, in fact, the constitution is made in such a way that it is more difficult to change than are ordinary laws; for instance, a set majority in parliament may be required for amendment, or the lapse of a certain amount of time, perhaps there must be an intervening parliamentary election between the proposal and adoption, or an amendment must be ratified by popular vote, etc. An exception to this is the procedure in New Zealand, where although the constitution is systematically arranged, no attempt is made to ensure the stability of it by means of such technical procedures; it can be changed in the same way as an ordinary law.

1. Claim to the Right of Intervention in the Defence of Socialism: The Brezhnev Doctrine asserts the Soviet Union's right to intervene in the internal affairs of the states comprising the Socialist Bloc. The source of this Doctrine is Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's declaration at the June 27, 1968, session of the Supreme Soviet, when he announced that the Socialist commonwealth would not tolerate the withdrawal of any of its constituent parts, should it be attempted.

This statement formed the basis of what is called the “Brezhnev Doctrine”, as formulated in an article appearing in Pravda on September 26, 1968. The Doctrine is designed to affirm the “limited sovereignty” of every Socialist State and to justify the military intervention of members of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia.

The Pravda article asserted that Czechoslovakia's self-determination impaired the essential interests of the Socialist commonwealth and required the “Soviet Union and the other Socialist countries…to take actions…in the fulfillment of their international obligations towards the Czechoslovak nation and in the defence of their Socialist achievements”.

The Soviet Union's special role within the Socialist commonwealth and its right to intervene in its name was justified as follows:

The problem of computerized data has been largely conceived of in terms of the concept of privacy. Thus any check of legal periodicals will disclose a number of articles on computers and privacy, and a recent Bill before the English Parliament is entitled “A Bill to Prevent the Invasion of Privacy through the Misuse of Computer Information”.

In fact privacy is only one aspect of a wider complex problem, and the concept of privacy both factually and legally is far from coextensive with that problem. Proposals such as the English Bill which speak in terms of privacy are really concerned with problems of accuracy of information, its dissemination and use; and the information may be public or private, it may have been acquired legally or illegally, with or without intrusion of privacy, with or without knowledge, with or without consent.

Perhaps the problem could here be categorized as one in which society is attempting to set standards of fair acquisition, fair dissemination, and fair use of information. It is confusing, as will be illustrated below, to set these standards in terms of privacy which is only one of a number of personal and societal values involved.