In two recent cases before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the General Court (at first instance), the High Court of Justice of England and Wales and the Grand Chamber of the CJEU found that a trade agreement and a fisheries agreement between Morocco and the European Union cannot be applied to occupied Western Sahara without the consent of its people. In spite of the fact that it is the general view that Western Sahara is under belligerent occupation, none of the three courts invoked the law of occupation but based themselves instead on the principle of self-determination and the law governing the administration of non-self-governing territories, including the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. A possible implication of these judgments is that that law and the law of occupation are converging in certain respects, in particular as regards long-term occupation. This pertains not only to the substantive rules on the exercise of authority, which seem to require that the people are heard, but also to the basis for the establishment of that authority, namely bare control.

The digital age has brought new possibilities and potency to state surveillance activities. Of significance has been the advent of bulk communications data monitoring, which involves the large-scale collection, retention and subsequent analysis of communications data. The scale and invasiveness of these techniques generate key questions regarding their ‘necessity’ from a human rights law perspective and they are the subject of ongoing human rights-based litigation. This article examines bulk communications data surveillance through the lens of human rights law, undertaking critical examination of both the potential utility of bulk communications surveillance and – drawing on social science analysis – the potential human rights-related harm. It argues that utility and harm calculations can conceal the complex nature of contemporary digital surveillance practices, rendering current approaches to the ‘necessity’ test problematic. The article argues that (i) the distinction between content and communications data be removed; (ii) analysis of surveillance-related harm must extend beyond privacy implications and incorporate society-wide effects; and (iii) a more nuanced approach to bulk communications data be developed. Suggestions are provided as to how the ‘necessity’ of bulk surveillance measures may be evaluated, with an emphasis on understanding the type of activity that may qualify as ‘serious crime’.

The Russian Federation joins a list of countries where violence and terrorism often have a religious and an ethnic basis, and where the authorities seek ways to deal with the issue of online hate speech. In this context, in May 2014 the Russian Parliament enacted Federal Law No 97-FZ (the Bloggers’ Law). This legislation required the compulsory registration of all popular bloggers with the country's internet regulatory agency, Roskomnadzor, thereby forcing the disclosure of their real identities. The Bloggers’ Law has been widely criticised, however, and although the internet community is still engaged in a heated discussion over whether there exists a legal right to online anonymity, the law made anonymous blogging in Russia a daunting undertaking. The Bloggers’ Law was repealed in the second half of 2017, and updating of the ‘Bloggers’ Register’ ceased. This article attempts to (i) analyse the context and the reasoning behind the introduction of the Bloggers’ Register; (ii) disentangle the relevant legal provisions; and (iii) assess its effectiveness, drawing conclusions based on events in the Russian blogosphere during the period 2014–17.

We are faced with a new reality where our reliance on internet access to fulfil basic civil tasks is threatened by increasing personal and societal cyber vulnerability. This dichotomy of dependence and vulnerability requires a new framework for understanding the legal and human rights status of this evolving technological reality. A number of theories have sought to explain how internet access could attain the status of a human right. These include reliance on the freedom of expression protection offered by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. More recent approaches have suggested that international customary law could apply, or that internet access could attain the status of an auxiliary human right. Despite repeated demands by international institutions to address modern cyber challenges through a human rights lens, this assortment of legal approaches has failed to garner a consensus view in the international community. The article reviews the merits of each of these arguments, and grounds the debate in the lens of this reality of dependence and vulnerability. Of the four options surveyed, we find that auxiliary righthood is the most promising approach, but that additional research is required to substantiate the claims.

These words come at what I see as an important historic juncture. It is 70 years since Israel was born, 70 years since the values in the declaration of independence were articulated. It is also the 70th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Genocide Conventions, and the 80th anniversary of Kristallnacht. All of these, and the fact that we observe Holocaust Remembrance Day on Thursday, form the backdrop to this lecture on judicial independence.

It is a pleasure and an honour to give a masterclass on treaty withdrawal. This is an especially appropriate topic for an ESIL Research Forum focused on international law in times of disorder and contestation. I am grateful to Professor Yuval Shany and the other organisers for inviting me to share with you my long-standing interest in exit in international law and politics.