Before discussing some problems of the Halachah and modern medicine, I must spend a little time on the halachic view of the nature of the physician's responsibility and the authority he possesses in applying his knowledge and training.

The school of Rabbi Ishmael, to whom an important and entire system of exegetical rules for expounding the Torah is attributed, regarded the passage in Exodus xxi, 19, “and shall cause him to be thoroughly healed”, as the source of the physician's authority to practice his healing craft. These words were construed literally, in denial of the fatalism found in various religions and philosophies of those and later times, and which asked: “how can man presume to try to heal and, so to speak, to interfere with divine decree when the hand of Providence strikes?” Rabbi Ishmael's comment is especially significant since he was not merely an outstanding halachic sage but also a physician engaged in the practice of medicine.

The state of our “criminal law” in 1905 was described by William H. Taft as “a disgrace to our civilization”. This state had not changed much almost half a century later, when Justice Frankfurter quoted Mr. Taft's statement. Several major modern reform projects formulated since 1952 introduced some noteworthy modifications. I have in mind particularly the American Law Institute Model Penal Code, on the one hand, and the German Draft of a Penal Code, both of 1962, on the other. In the former I should like to draw attention to the serious attempt at a systematization of punishment scales, and in the latter to the effort at a systematic structuring of the “guilt principle”. The German Draft incorporated results of various revisions introduced since the collapse of the National Socialist régime, by either statutory or judicial legislation—revisions born out of the growing concern in Germany with “guilt”. Prominent among these revisions, of course, is adoption of the defence of “error of law” of ancient origin, derived from biblical, talmudic and canon law teaching. Nevertheless, these two projects have but touched the surface of the profound problems that are involved in formulating truly modern penal legislation.

Sec. 55(1)(b) of the Civil Wrongs Ordinance, 1944, which deals with compensation for the tortious death of a person, prescribes:

This provision is taken from sec. 52(1)(b) of the Cyprus Civil Wrongs Law, 1932(s. 53(1)(b) of the 1950 edition of the Laws of Cyprus) and goes back to sec. 1 of the English Fatal Accident (Damages) Act, 1908 (now sec. 2 of the Fatal Accident Act, 1959).

There is a more general provision in sec. 65 of the local Ordinance (sec. 86 of the New Version):

This section reproduces sec. 62 (sec. 63) of the Cyprus Law, and an explanation given of that provision states that “this incorporates the general principle of English Law”.

On 26 November 1968 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession a Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. The purpose of this paper is to explain the origin of the Convention, to summarize its principal provisions and to comment briefly upon them, particularly in the light of the discussions that preceded its adoption. We shall not deal in depth with the general principles of law involved in such discussions nor with the historical and political matters closely connected with the reasons that made it “necessary and timely”—to use the wording of the Preamble of the Convention—to affirm that international law does not recognize any period of limitation for some major crimes. Of course, the informative nature of this paper will not preclude some criticism, when pertinent.

Members of the United Nations have conferred upon the Security Council “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” and have agreed “that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf” (article 24 of the U.N. Charter). The question may be asked whether the Security Council lived up to this responsibility during the May 1967 crisis in the Middle East which preceded the Six Day War. Did the Security Council do everything in its power to avoid the clash, and what were the reasons for its failure to avert the crisis?

In order to be able to evaluate the Council's stand, it will be necessary to recall summarily the developments which led up to the hostilities of June 1967, as well as the Security Council's powers under the Charter of the U.N.