I have been asked to speak to you about judging in the age of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, with particular reference to remedies under the Charter. You will understand, I am sure, that my treatment of the subject will necessarily be in the nature of an overview.
Stated broadly, I will be suggesting to you that the introduction of the Charter in Canada has required a fundamental reappraisal of how judges approach their tasks, of the processes that are employed and of the relationship between the judicial and legislative branches of government.
Before developing these two propositions, however, I should first give you some basic information about our Charter; to those for whom this is very familiar ground, I apologize and promise brevity.
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which was adopted by Canada in 1982, has one main animating principle from which flows one corollary. The animating principle is that certain human rights and freedoms should be part of the fundamental law of the land. The corollary is that when there is a dispute about the application or the meaning of these fundamental rights and freedoms, it is the responsibility of the courts in Canada to define and apply them through the legal process.