This article outlines the ways in which the United Kingdom manages civil litigation concerning sensitive national security material. These are: (i) the common law of public interest immunity; (ii) the use of a closed material procedure and special advocates; and (iii) the secret hearings of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. With these existing alternatives in mind the article analyses the background to, the reasons for, and the controversies associated with the Justice and Security Act 2013, enacted in the wake of the UK Supreme Court's 2011 ruling in Al Rawi v Security Service.

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court completely divests the Court of the power to compel a state to disclose evidence in its possession if the state opposes such disclosure on grounds of national security. If a state refuses to disclose information essential to the adjudication of a case on national security grounds, the ICC may settle fair trial concerns either by drawing factual inferences favourable to the defendant or by staying the proceedings. I argue, however, that in practice such judicial powers do not provide a sufficient guarantee of a fair trial. I propose to allay fair trial concerns arising from the refusal of states to allow the ICC access to evidence in their possession by introducing a reform in the exercise of the ICC's prosecutorial discretion. According to my proposal, the requirement of a fair trial, which entails the disclosure of material essential for the defence, would be incorporated into the criteria that guide the ICC Prosecutor in the selection of cases for prosecution. Although the present article focuses on the issue of national security evidence, the reach of the proposed reform extends to all cases of state refusal to allow the ICC access to evidence, regardless of the grounds for refusal.

The protection of ‘morals’ appears frequently as a limitation on the exercise of fundamental rights, both in international covenants and in constitutional charters. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights is not an exception, and ‘public morals’ may be called upon to justify the restriction of several important rights granted by the Convention, such as freedom of expression or the right to respect for private and family life. To avoid arbitrary restrictions of these rights it is important to understand the meaning of this general clause. This article aims to suggest a reading of the ‘public morals’ clause that singles out its scope and its boundaries.

In the wake of the UN General Assembly's recent recognition of Palestinian statehood, the Palestinian government has made clear its intention to challenge in the International Criminal Court (ICC or the Court) the legality of Israeli settlements. This article explores jurisdictional hurdles for such a case. To focus on the jurisdictional issues, the article assumes for the sake of argument the validity of the merits of the legal claims against the settlements.

The ICC only takes situations of particular ‘gravity’. Yet settlements are not a ‘grave breach’ under the Rome Statute. No modern international criminal tribunal has ever prosecuted crimes that do not involve systematic violence and physical coercion. The ICC's gravity measure involves the number of persons killed; for settlements it would be zero. Indeed, the ICC Prosecutor triages situations by the numbers of victims; settlements do not appear to have direct individual victims. Finally, the ICC would at most have jurisdiction over settlement activity only from the date of Palestine's acceptance of jurisdiction. Settlement activity in this time frame would not immediately cross the ICC's gravity threshold.

The practice of house demolition in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (‘the Territories’) pursued by Israel for the purpose of deterring potential terrorist activities (as opposed to planning or operational purposes) has attracted voluminous literature, most of which is critical. Scholarship postulates that the practice is immoral and ineffective, that it is contrary to Jewish morals and international law, and that it may amount to an international crime. Some of the critical writings focus on the practice of the Israel Defence Forces; others concentrate on the failure of the Israeli Parliament to curb the practice, while others examine the practice in its wider context, namely the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. This article focuses on the regulation of the practice by the Israeli Supreme Court (‘the Court’). This theme has already been examined by numerous scholars including, in particular, Kretzmer and Simon, who found that the Court's jurisprudence is contrary to public international law and its reasoning is unpersuasive. This article aims to add to the existing scholarly corpus by using a different prism. It contrasts the Court's house demolition jurisprudence with its own jurisprudence in comparable areas in which it is called upon to resolve tensions between security and human rights in the Territories, postulating that in handling house demolition measures the Court is unfaithful to its own jurisprudence. Building upon these findings, the article distils the manifestations of that unfaithfulness and its negative repercussions in normative, coherence and legitimacy terms. It concludes with the call that when the issue of house demolition is brought back before the Court, it should apply the same approach, spirit, techniques and benchmarks that it has employed in analogous areas of law.

This article questions the value of the basic right to marry that was recognised by the Israeli Supreme Court in the early 2000s as part of the basic right to human dignity. Since its early days, Israeli law has developed a tradition that has diminished the significance of formal marriage as a way to bypass the religious-based restrictions on marriage in Israel, with the emphasis instead on the idea of functional joint intimate lives.

Against this legal background, the article explores the basic right to marry. It discusses and analyses the Supreme Court cases that have recognised a basic right to marry. It then considers several options to help in understanding the meaning of this right, and supports an understanding of the right to marry within a framework of equality, according to which human dignity requires equality in affording official recognition to intimate partnerships. Nonetheless, given the potentially limited effect of a basic right to marry in Israel, the article considers the idea of abolishing legal marriage in Israel altogether. Responding to potential critique by reference to the unique Israeli context, it suggests that such abolition could resolve the continuous conflict between Israel's self-definition as a Jewish state and its self-definition as a democratic state in the context of recognising adult intimate relationships. As presented in this article, constitutional limitations do not stand in the way for the State of Israel to abolish legal marriage.