How do economic recessions affect European citizens’ attitudes towards environmental policies? In this article we investigate the attitudes of European citizens towards environmental protection considering its importance both at individual and country levels and adopting a longitudinal view. In light of the existing research on the link between pro-environmental attitudes and economic affluence of societies, including Ronald Inglehart’s theory of post-materialism, we hypothesise that levels of economic well-being as well as trust in political institutions are important drivers of Europeans’ attitudes towards environmental protection. Taking into consideration some macroeconomic indicators and the environmental attitude of public opinion, our main results show that even in time of crises, citizens’ pro-environmental attitudes persist in terms of importance, both at country and individual levels.

Ministers can have an incentive to adopt policies through secondary legislation that deviates from the general compromise reached via the primary legislation. We suggest that when secondary legislation is at stake, in some countries coalition partners can rely upon the ex-ante legal scrutiny of courts as an extra-cabinet control mechanism. We focus on the interaction between governments and the Council of State, the highest administrative court and the most important consultative body of the government in Italy. Our findings support the general hypothesis that the Council's activism as an advisor is generated by the demand for control mechanisms on the secondary legislation. Such a demand is affected by specific political conditions, i.e. the level of government heterogeneity and government alternation. The findings on the Italian case can be a starting point for research on the different levels of involvement of administrative courts in the executive politics that characterize European Democracies.

In the aftermath of a European Parliament (EP) election, there are normally two prominent aspects that receive attention by scholars and experts: the turnout rate and whether the Second Order Election (SOE) model proposed by Reif and Schmitt (1980) still applies. That model is based on the idea that, because EP elections do not themselves provide enough stimulus as to replace the concerns normally present at national elections, the outcomes of EP elections in any participating country manifest themselves as a sort of distorted mirror of national (Parliamentary) elections in that country. The mirror is distorted because those national concerns are modified, not so much by the concerns arising from the European context in which EP elections are held as simply by the fact that EP elections are not national elections. In particular, at EP elections, national executive power is not at stake. The same party or parties will rule in each country after an EP election as ruled there before.

The practice of sharing products, services, and other activities among people living in the same city has emerged as one of the most important waves of social innovation in recent years. However, the public and scientific debate have, to date, been mostly rhetoric and rarely relied on empirical evidence. A study of the role played by local institutions in governing the phenomenon is still lacking. This paper addresses the issue of the relationship between local governments and private actors in the sharing economy sector, exploiting the ‘political exchange’ approach. Departing from this governance perspective, it appraises the political exchange – and its outputs in terms of co-operation – underlying the governing structures in two Italian cases between 2014 and 2018. We thus bridge the gap between a theoretical understanding of the sharing economy and empirical cases, providing scholars with a framework to study this phenomenon which highlights the crucial impact of the political investment of public institutions.

Over recent years, a new transnational conflict has been deemed to be structuring political conflict in Europe. Several scholars have posited the emergence of a new ‘demarcation’ vs. ‘integration’ cleavage, pitting the ‘losers’ and ‘winners’ of globalization against each other. This new conflict is allegedly structured along economic (free trade and globalization), cultural (immigration and multiculturalism), and institutional [European Union (EU) integration] dimensions. From an empirical viewpoint, it is still a matter of discussion whether this conflict can be interpreted as a new cleavage, which could replace or complement the traditional ones. In this context, the European Parliament (EP) elections of 2019 represent an ideal case for investigating how far this new cleavage has evolved towards structuring political competition in European party systems. In this paper, by relying on an original dataset and an innovative theoretical and empirical framework based on the study of a cleavage's lifecycle, we test whether a demarcation cleavage is structuring the European political systems. Moreover, we assess the evolution of this cleavage across the 28 EU countries since 1979 and the role it plays within each party system. The paper finds that the demarcation cleavage has emerged in most European countries, mobilizing over time a growing number of voters. In particular, this long-term trend has reached its highest peak in the 2019 EP election. However, although the cleavage has become an important (if not the main) dimension of electoral competition in many countries, it has not reached maturity yet.

The 2014 European Parliament election and the 2016 Constitutional Referendum in Italy occurred in the middle of two general elections. These votes, taking place respectively at the beginning and the end of the government led by Matteo Renzi of the Democratic Party (PD), represented a public test of the PD leadership. The election results were diverse in many respects, but they replicate social, economic, political, and cultural differences. In particular, between the two electoral exercises the differential electoral behaviour of South compared with the rest of the country is deepened. Moreover, the results can be interpreted as the outcome of differences in age, educational levels, social, and economic unrest; all these variables are synthesized by the territorial distribution of the vote and this helps in interpreting the evolution of political sentiment in Italy. A spatial statistics methodology is utilized to analyse votes by means of their territorial distributions. The outcomes indicate that referendum result was influenced by the economic vote. Apart from the substance of the constitutional reform, the referendum result can be traced back to economic factors: the absence of perceived economic improvements and the persistence of high unemployment.

Complementing and challenging the existing literature on the Italian asylum crisis, this article develops an actor-centred approach to open the ‘black box’ of asylum governance, showing the constitutive effects of governance on the asylum issue. It then applies this approach to the case of the Veneto region in Italy during the recent ‘refugee crisis’. By doing so, the article, first, investigates the cognitive mechanisms that shape key actors’ asylum policy decisions. Drawing concepts and ideas from framing and sensemaking theories, it shows that, while there is certainly a strategic element that shapes actors' policy preferences, there is also a meaningful cognitive component in asylum governance. Indeed, it argues that actors' strategies are shaped, more than by anti-immigration public attitudes per se (as often assumed), by how political actors make sense of these attitudes. The article then applies SNA to examine how actors' understandings are located within and depend upon network relations and investigate actors' agency, power and interactions. It ultimately shows that local asylum policy outcomes are deeply influenced by the ‘politics of policy-making’, that is by power dynamics and how powerful actors position themselves, behave and mobilize their understandings. Finally, by examining the impact of policy outputs on cognitive micro-level mechanisms, the article sheds light on the interplay between the ‘regulatory’ and the ‘public reaction’ dimensions of the Italian asylum crisis, illustrating the relationship between public attitudes on migration, frame emergence, asylum policy-making, politics and public mobilizations in the active constitution of the Italian asylum crisis.

In many post-communist countries, the concept of patriotism is used instrumentally in populist discourses. It is rarely the subject of a substantive public debate, in which symbolic elites would be able to openly discuss and negotiate the scope of its meaning in front of an interested audience. A long-term plan to shape constructive civil attitudes gives way to the pressure of being effective in current politics. The author proposes to look at the category of patriotism in a socially useful way and to treat it as an important factor in the process of building a civil society. The young generation can play a significant role in this process. Poland seems to be an interesting case for the analysis of this research problem. This paper has two objectives. The descriptive objective is to present the author's research data on a sense and understanding of patriotism among Polish students. Its aim is to describe the prevailing pattern of patriotic attitudes and ideas about patriotism as shared by students. The explanatory objective of this paper is to answer the question about the constructive potential of patriotism: whether and to what extent it is an important determinant of civic activity. The results obtained should lead to practical conclusions that may be useful for various social institutions which are interested in releasing the positive energy of citizens and orienting them to functional goals, that is, the education system, as well as for political institutions that design and implement elements of the so-called youth policy.

Are European Parliament (EP) elections still second-order? In this article, we test the classical model at the individual level in contrast to an alternative ‘Europe matters’ model, by investigating the relative importance of domestic vs. European Union (EU)-related issues among voter-level determinants of aggregate second-order effects, that is, individual party change. We do so by relying on an original, CAWI pre-electoral survey featuring a distinctively large (30) number of both domestic and EU-related, positional and valence issues, with issue attitudes measured according to the innovative ICCP scheme (De Sio and Lachat 2020) which includes issue positions, issue priorities and respondents' assessment of party credibility on both positional and valence goals. Leveraging the concept of ‘normal vote’, we estimate multivariate models of electoral defections from normal voting separately for general and European elections, based on issue party credibility. This allows us to assess: (a) the distinctiveness of the two electoral arenas in terms of issue content; and (b) the relative impact of EU-related and domestic issues on defections of Italian voters. Our findings show that although second-order effects are still relevant in accounting for results in EP elections, vote choice in the latter is also partly due to specific effects of certain policy issues, including some related to the European dimension. This indicates that EP elections have their own political content, for which Europe matters even after controlling for the importance that EU-related issues have acquired in national elections.

This article seeks to enhance our understanding of the European Parliament (EP) elections in an era of populist and anti-European Union (EU) politics. Specifically, it aims to evaluate both the conventional second-order elections theory as well as an alternative approach that regards EP elections as an arena for conflict between liberal-democratic Europeanism and populist, extremist and euroskeptic alternatives. It does so by deriving a series of hypotheses from both approaches and testing these with party-level data from all EU member states in the context of 2019 EP elections. Our results challenge both explanations. Party size is a robust predictor of electoral performance in EP elections, and its effect is moderated by electoral system design. While large parties lost votes across the EU, their losses were more pronounced in countries where national legislatures are elected under plurality or mixed systems. We find no evidence of incumbent losses or electoral cycle effects. Party-level populism, extremism and euroskepticism did not systematically predict electoral performance but party ideology appears to have moderated the effects of incumbency and party size. Incumbency was associated with vote gain among populist and far-right parties but not other parties, and the effect of size also varied across party ideologies. In sum, these results suggest that vote fragmentation in the 2019 EP elections is partly explained by electoral system design, while it was not driven by the desire to punish political incumbents. Populist and far-right parties in power appear to be particularly immune to punishing behavior often associated with EP elections.

This article analyzes the politicization of European integration in Italy. Has the euro crisis catalyzed a new electoral supply, which may have been matched by voters’ responses? After the crisis, Italian parties have increased their entrepreneurial efforts to prime EU issues into the political debate, trying to win over votes. This pattern may have led to a full politicization of European integration. To study the transformations in party strategies and voting behavior, I analyze the fluctuations in EU issue entrepreneurship and EU issue voting between 2009 and 2014. The findings reveal mixed results: parties have actually developed new strategies on EU issues, but without significantly changing voter preferences along the pro/anti-European dimension.

When the immigration issue has been strongly politicized, prejudice toward minority out-groups can be profoundly imbued with politics, to the point that citizen responses to partisan cues about immigrants tend to operate on the basis of a ‘political sympathy/antipathy bias’. This article demonstrates that there is a direct causal relation between the nature (i.e. contents and sources) of political communication over immigrants and voters' responses. Drawing on an experimental design based on ITANES (Italian National Election Studies) 2018 election survey data, it isolates the effect that the voters' ideology and party alignments, as well as the partisan source of a message, exert on manifestations of ethnic prejudice, operationalized as the refusal to accept a plausibile and counter-stereotypical statement about immigrants. It concludes that even a mere symbolic change in communication by those party actors (i.e. the League) which ‘own’ the issue would suffice to attenuate hostility toward out-groups, to the extent that it results from sustained partisan rhetoric and mobilization.

In the Southern Mediterranean region, the European Union (EU) supports the establishment of rule of law, pressuring for both the adoption of institutional guarantees of judicial independence and the enhancement of court administration capabilities. Drawing on a set of interviews with key EU and domestic actors, this study compares Morocco and Jordan, examining changes adopted at the institutional and administrative level since the ‘Arab Spring’ broke out. The findings show that external incentives for change penetrated only the administrative level of domestic judicial systems, while a path-dependent effect persisted at the institutional level. The evidence confirms the thesis that in areas of low politics even a mere normative pressure is able to drive rule adoption, whereas in more sensitive policy areas, as in the case of institutional judicial guarantees, the higher costs of adaptation make veto players resistant to external influences for change.

The literature on party change has shown how the advent of the digital revolution and the diffusion of new Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in the democracies of the 21st century have influenced the way political parties communicate and perform their functions. Less investigated, however, is the organizational reaction of political parties to the challenges posed by the transformation of the communications environment. The aim of this paper is to scrutinize whether parties evince a transformative tendency towards virtual models in which new digital ICTs are used as ‘functional equivalents’ of the old organizational infrastructures. To this end, the paper focuses on the Spanish democracy – a paradigmatic case of the political transformations that European democracies have undergone since the 2008 economic crisis – comparing the organizational models of the main political parties: the Partido Socialista Obrero Español, the Partido Popular, Podemos and Ciudadanos. Particularly the analysis – through the use of parties' documents – focuses on whether and how digital tools are used by the Spanish parties in three dimensions: the participants in the organization, the organizational configuration and the decision-making process. The main conclusions are: new challenger parties make a more intense and radical use of new ICTs introducing ‘disrupting innovations’ in their organization, while old and mainstream parties gradually adapt their organization to the new digital environment introducing ‘sustaining innovations’; parties on the left make greater use of ICTs in order to foster greater internal democracy when compared to their corresponding parties on the centre-right.

This article examines the 2019 European Parliament election in the UK. The main beneficiaries were the newly formed Brexit Party and the Liberal Democrats, both of which ran on clear Brexit platforms, while the Conservatives and Labour struggled to attract support. But the Brexit focus of the campaign – and the victory of parties with clear positions on these issues – belied the extent to which the election conformed to the expectations of second-order contest theory, with low turnout, declining support for the governing (Conservative) party, a surge in support for new and small parties, and scant discussion of European Union-level issues. While the vote shows realignment in the UK continues and can tell us much about the shifting politics of Brexit, we should be cautious inferring much from the victory of the Brexit Party and the Liberal Democrats given the second-order nature of the contest.

This paper seeks to develop a new typology of revisionism based on the nature of the aims (territorial/normative/hierarchy of prestige), the means employed (peaceful/violent), and the level of action (regional/global). This will then be used to explain the escalation of Russia's foreign policy from regional to global claims with reference to its military interventions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria and to identify the type of revisionism involved in each of the three Russian military interventions undertaken both inside (Georgia and Ukraine) and outside (Syria) the post-soviet space. The paper is divided into three parts. The first examines the concept of revisionism and suggests a new classification of six types in relation to the means, nature, and level of the claims put forward by revisionist powers. The second discusses the interventions carried out by Russia within its regional area (in Georgia and Ukraine). The third analyses the intervention in Syria and highlights the escalation of Russian claims from the regional to the global level.

Italy has developed a long-dated partnership with Mozambique, where it has emerged as an actor committed to norm promotion in the fields of conflict management, debt relief, and sustainable energy cooperation. This paper challenges the dominant interpretation of such a cooperative relationship that emphasizes ideational motivations and focuses, instead, on the role of Italian investors in the sectors of infrastructure and energy and of the Italian economic diplomacy. A favorable institutional and political climate in Italy has channeled investors' demands in the policy process since the independence of Mozambique. The late institutionalization of Italian development policy, the long gestation of the reform of development policy, and the lack of clear-cut borders between the competences of foreign and development cooperation institutions have empowered business groups that shape the investment strategy of the Italian foreign ministry as actors in development policy-making. Finally, convergence of interests between Italian investors and the NGO Sant'Egidio, which ultimately led to a partnership between these actors, has increased the legitimacy of Italian foreign and development policy toward Mozambique, contributing to consolidating Italy as a norm promoter in the country.

The economic decline of Italy between the mid-1990s and the outset of the financial crisis is a critical case in European political economy because its model of capitalism was deeply reformed at the time when its decline commenced. This paper argues that the Italian economic stagnation cannot be attributed to the lack of market-friendly reforms in a globalized economic context, as argued by previous literature. Instead, Italian economic decline is a consequence of institutional change which on the one hand has destroyed previous institutional complementarities, and on the other hand has led to an incoherent, or ‘hybrid,’ capitalist setting. Under the lenses of the Varieties of Capitalism approach, this paper reviews the main reforms in the fields of corporate governance and finance as well as in the labor market. It shows that such reforms established new institutions alternatively apt to support both strategic coordination and market coordination, resulting in institutional incoherence, and mixed incentives. In the short-run, incoherent reforms have reduced the availability of capital to SMEs; in the longer-run, they failed to give actors incentives to pursue innovation. This paper contributes theories of economic growth/decline focused on the supply-side of the economy and it is compatible with other – non-rival – explanations focused on the demand-side.

This paper presents an analysis of the personalization of the vote in Italian municipal elections in the period 1993–2017. Considering the ability of mayoral candidates to attract more votes than those of the lists that support them, the paper outlines the socio-demographic and political characteristics of the candidates who receive the most personalized votes. Contrary to what one might expect, the most personalized candidates are the losing candidates, not the winning ones. At the same time, the candidates who present themselves as outsiders are more personalized: women; candidates at the head of civic lists; those who lead coalitions positioned at the extremes of the left/right axis; candidates supported by one or two lists. Thus, the paper shows the propensity of the Italian electorate to use the split vote to reward those candidates who present themselves as challengers, rather than the established ones, also in the more pragmatic context of local government elections. Moreover, while it is true that personalization is increasingly more important in the political and electoral context, the ability to create lists of candidates for municipal elections capable of obtaining the broad support of voters seems to count as much, if not more.

The relationships between the State and political parties have often been analysed in dual terms. Yet, as Katz and Mair already noticed in their well-known (and criticized) article on the emergence of the cartel party, a clear separation between parties and public institutions has never been completely achieved, in the evolution of liberal democracies. In contrast, while parties act as agencies of institutionalization, public institutions recognize (de jure or de facto) parties as the legitimate actors of political representation. From this perspective, it is worth considering party change as a process intertwined also with institutional change. To date, however, the analysis of such a relationship has been neglected by political scientists, who have privileged explanations of party change based on other factors, whether at systemic or at a micro level. By avoiding a priori assumptions about causality, our main research question is the following: is it possible to identify patterns of co-evolution between State institutions – more specifically, public administration – and party organizations? Building on a new institutional approach to organization theory, the aim of this article is to investigate to what extent the evolution in the size of party organizations and in the size of public administration has followed similar trajectories. Our study focuses on the United Kingdom and Italy, from 1950 to 2010. Our findings confirm that parties' external face expands when public spending and the number of public employees increase, and vice-versa. The same holds for parties' internal face, at least in the Italian case.