One occasionally meets people, even among those who have lived or served in Africa,2 who speak light-heartedly about the study of native law and native courts and seem to imply that it is an esoteric exercise of little more practical importance than, say, archaeology; but it is safe to say that these people cannot have had occasion to give much serious thought to the matter.

Two recent judgments in Northern Nigeria have focussed attention on one of the many essential differences between the type of homicide for which the death penalty can properly be imposed under the Islamic law of the Maliki school and the crime of murder under the Criminal Code, and have thrown into bold relief the conflict of opinion which still prevails in that Region regarding the legislation which was intended to resolve some of these differences. These two judgments are of such intrinsic interest and importance that some discussion of their principles and implications seems appropriate to this Journal.

The legislative provisions necessary to grant independence to the Gold Coast under the name of Ghana with effect from the 6th March, 1957, followed in many respects the precedents established when independence was granted to Ceylon in 1948. As in that instance, the grant of independence to the Gold Coast was achieved by two separate legislative operations, namely, the passing of an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament followed by the making of an Order in Council, but there were some circumstances in the case of the Gold Coast that called for certain special provisions of interest. The purpose of this article is to mention briefly a few of these.