The prominent place given to decentralization in the design of post-1990 African constitutions has been likened to a silent revolution. This is not surprising, for sharing power has been anathema to post-independence African leaders, who have striven to personalize power and concentrate it within a privileged clique in the capital city. This article assesses the nature and significance of the increasing trend in Africa towards constitutional entrenchment of decentralized forms of government. It examines the concept of decentralization and its manifestations in contemporary African constitutional design. It provides an overview of the extent of the constitutional entrenchment of decentralization in African practice, and then considers the rationale for, and possible implications of, this process. From an analysis and comparison of emerging trends, it argues that only a formally and constitutionally entrenched decentralization framework can ensure that the process is effectively implemented and is not dependent on the goodwill of the central government.

This article examines the themes emerging from the engagement of African states with the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) mechanisms of the UN Human Rights Council. The underlying principles of universality, cooperation and dialogue that guide the review have given African states a renewed sense of engagement with the international human rights institution. Despite the universality of the process, regionalism and cultural relativism are important aspects in the engagement of African states with the UPR mechanism. This article considers the extent to which regionalism and cultural relativism may prevent UPR from acting as an effective mechanism for human rights enforcement. It examines the potential for UPR to complement other national, regional and international human rights mechanisms, and the danger of state ritualism. These have ramifications for the extent to which UPR can achieve its goal of improving the human rights situation on the ground in Africa.

Security challenges have continued to trouble governments internationally. From the Islamic State terrorists in the Gulf region, to the murderous activities of Boko Haram and “herdsmen” in Nigeria in recent times, it has become imperative for those entrusted with maintaining security to redefine the conditions of national security. In this context, it is now conventional for various governments in Nigeria to appropriate enormous amounts of money in their budgets for “national security” (“tagged security vote”). This article explores the emergence, configuration, constitutionality and abuses of security votes in Nigeria. It also explores the appropriation and expenditure of security funds in the USA and attempts to draw lessons from this jurisdiction. It argues that there is a robust connection between security votes and corruption and, thus, attempts to identify legal structures for preventing the misspending and embezzlement of public funds (security votes) in the country's monetary appropriation and expenditure.

The quality of judicial support and respect for the principle of minimum intervention are crucial factors in assessing whether a jurisdiction is attractive for arbitration. While there have been efforts to present Nigeria as an arbitration-friendly jurisdiction and an attractive arbitration venue, questions remain about the adequacy, effectiveness and certainty of legal rules concerning arbitration in Nigeria. There are also questions about the quality and efficiency of judicial support for arbitration in light of some judicial decisions affecting arbitration that have generated controversy. Through a careful analysis of key statutory provisions and judicial decisions, this article analyses support for arbitration in Nigeria in respect of selected topics, including party autonomy, upholding arbitration agreements (especially concerning the stay of judicial proceedings), the stay of arbitration proceedings and third party intervention. The article identifies scope for improvement in statutory and judicial approaches. It makes suggestions concerning both judicial approaches and reform of the statutory regimes.

Technology-driven payment instruments and services are facilitating the development of e-commerce; however, security concerns beleaguer their implementation, particularly in developing countries. This article considers the limits of private ordering in the regulation of e-payment systems. It uses Nigeria to exemplify a developing country that is increasingly pushing for the adoption of a regulatory framework for e-payment systems based on private ordering. It argues that, although technical standards and self-regulation by the financial industry are important, law is an essential regulatory mechanism that is largely absent. The article proposes that law be used as a mechanism to set and compel compliance with technical and industry standards, thus building trust, catering to public interest concerns and legitimizing the regulatory process.

In June 2016, the Zimbabwe Constitutional Court held that life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is unconstitutional, finding that it constituted cruel and degrading punishment and a violation of the right to equal protection under the country's new constitution. The court widely cited international and foreign law to assess global trends on life imprisonment, especially the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. The decision illustrates the benefits for human rights advocates of citing international and foreign law in their pleadings, and is an example of “sharing” constitutional jurisprudence across borders and the diffusion of constitutional norms.