In Presenting this paper to an audience of historians I find myself in a painfully ambiguous position. I am not qualified to talk to you as a historian; therefore what I am going to say will lack the richness of empirical detail that usually characterizes historical papers. On the other hand, in order to qualify as “comparative analysis” this paper ought to have a firm theoretical foundation for its analysis, and accepted standards of reference for its comparisons. Unfortunately, the development economists are still at the beginning of their difficult attempts to isolate the factors that make for economic development, and the complex interaction of these factors has so far eluded systematic analysis and presentation.

This paper represents an attempt to summarize the first stages of a research project, the completion of which is still remote. Its purpose is to pose one or two basic problems and to indicate the directions along which the answers may lie.

It is obvious that in the decades following its political unification Italy's economy remained very backward in relation not only to that of England, but also to the economies of industrially advancing countries on the continent of Europe. Whatever gauge one may choose for the purposes of comparison, be it qualitative descriptions of technological equipment, organizational efficiency, and labor skills in individual enterprises; or scattered quantitative data on relative productivity in certain branches of industry, or the numbers of persons employed in industry; or the density of the country's railroad network; or the standards of literacy of its population, the same conclusion will result.

Little more than a century ago India rubber was a curiosity. Today, it is vital to our existence. The purpose here is to examine the basic factors that have influenced the growth of the rubber industry in the United States and the United Kingdom. The method chosen is to review the industry's position before and after the introduction of the automobile, say at 1900 and 1950. Much of what is to be said might be compressed into current economic terminology. Neither disrespect for this procedure nor the inapplicability of many of its concepts to economic history has prevented this course from being adopted.

The Nazis dealt rather cautiously with the German monetary system during die first two years of dieir regime. Hitler was particularly sensitive to questions of “confidence,” and was glad to saddle Schacht with the responsibility of keeping die monetary system from blowing up in die face of die new government. But by the end of 1934, diere were signs that the Nazis were beginning to take Germany out of die stream of what Goering contemptuously called “the so-called free play of economic forces.”

Whatever may have been the merits of the gold standard in die nineteenth century, it has not proved a satisfactory system of exchange since 1913. The decentralization of the world financial system, the greater liquidity of the public's holdings, and the appearance of capital movements unrelated to movements of trade have rendered abortive attempts to return permanently to the gold standard. In any event, the unwillingness of governments, increasingly dependent on the favor of the lower income groups, to allow or compel the contraction of domestic credit in response to changes in international demand prevented the operation of a system that depends on such adjustments. But the gold standard of die nineteendi century cast a long shadow behind it.

Iam Going to talk about historical comparison along a time axis in connection with the problem of a new framework for social history. Lest I be thought to aim at heights of egomania never before scaled, let me hastily add, however, that the full title of my remarks would not be “Comparison along the Time Axis: A New Framework for Social History! Come and get It!” It might rather be “Comparison along the Time Axis: A New Framework for Social History? Can Anything be Done with It?”