Theory on high-frequency traders (HFTs) predicts that market liquidity for a security decreases in the number of HFTs trading the security. We test this prediction by studying a new Canadian stock exchange, Alpha, that experienced the entry of 11 HFTs over 4 years. We find that bid–ask spreads on Alpha converge to those at the Toronto Stock Exchange as more HFTs trade on Alpha. Effective and realized spreads for non-HFTs improve as HFTs enter the market. To explain the contrast with theory, which models the HFT as a price competitor, we provide evidence more consistent with HFTs fitting a quantity-competitor framework.

We present evidence of investors underreacting to the absence of events in financial markets. Routine-based insiders strategically choose to be silent when they possess private information not yet reflected in stock prices. Consistent with our hypothesis, insider silence following a routine sell (buy) predicts positive (negative) future returns, as well as fundamentals. The return predictability of insider silence is stronger among firms with a poor information environment and facing higher arbitrage costs, and a large fraction of abnormal returns concentrates on future earnings announcements. A long–short strategy that exploits insiders’ strategic silence behavior generates abnormal returns of 6% to 10% annually.

This paper examines the effect of real-world, investor-level investment constraints, including several that have not been studied before, on hedge fund performance and its persistence. Using a large consolidated database, we demonstrate that hedge fund performance persistence is significantly reduced when rebalancing rules reflect fund size restrictions and liquidity constraints but remains statistically significant at higher rebalancing frequencies. Hypothetical investor portfolios that incorporate additional minimum diversification constraints, minimum investment requirements, and focus on open funds suggest that the performance and its persistence documented in earlier studies of hedge funds is not easily exploitable, especially by large investors.

Union and public pension funds, the most prolific institutional activists employing low-cost targeting methods, are often accused of pursuing private benefits. Extant literature finds that unions representing workers, as stakeholders, are not aligned with shareholders. Limiting shareholder power may mitigate “special interest” activism but can also exacerbate managerial agency problems. In two different settings, majority approved and withdrawn shareholder proposals, we examine and find supportive evidence that the director labor market as a corporate governance mechanism can selectively mitigate the negative influence that conflicted stakeholder-shareholder union funds have over firms without stifling all influence of low-cost activists.

We investigate the Dead Hand Proxy Put, a contractual innovation in corporate debt agreements that may impact hedge fund activism. We find the provision principally in loans, not bonds, and provide evidence linking the adoption of the provision to hedge fund activism. Furthermore, controlling for endogeneity, we find that the provision significantly reduces the cost of loans. Bondholder wealth also increases. Moreover, cross-sectional analysis of share returns reveals that the provision is positively associated with repeat banking relationships and negatively associated with free cash flow problems, suggesting a cost-benefit tradeoff.

We study consumption and investment decisions given realistic time-varying constraints on borrowing. We first consider the case where borrowing is constrained by a maximum debt-to-income ratio. We then consider collateral borrowing with a maximum loan-to-value ratio. The resulting implications for optimal policies differ considerably from those obtained in the existing literature based on fixed borrowing limits but are consistent with those documented in the empirical literature.

Using mergers as shocks to fund size, I analyze the return-to-scale property of mutual funds. I find that acquiring funds’ performance deteriorates after experiencing a positive shock in size resulting from mergers, and liquidity plays an important role in the negative relationship between size and performance. I also find that the decline in performance is not due to higher performance prior to the merger, nor driven by higher integration costs after the event. These findings are consistent with mutual funds having decreasing returns to scale and thus provide empirical evidence that supports the theoretical model of Berk and Green (2004).

We compare major factor models and find that the Stambaugh and Yuan (2016) 4-factor model is the overall winner in the time-series domain. The Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015) q-factor model takes second place and the Fama and French (2015) 5-factor model and the Barillas and Shanken (2018) 6-factor model jointly take third place. The pairwise cross-sectional R2 and the multiple model comparison tests show that the Hou et al. (2015) q-factor model, the Fama and French (2015) 5-factor and 4-factor models, and the Barillas and Shanken (2018) 6-factor model take equal first place in the horse race.

The intertemporal capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) predicts that an unobservable factor capturing changes in expected market returns should be priced in the cross section. My Bayesian framework accounts for uncertainty in the intertemporal risk factor and gauges the effects of prior information about investment opportunities on model inferences. Whereas an uninformative prior specification produces weak evidence that intertemporal risk is priced, incorporating prior information about market-return predictability generates a large space of ex ante reasonable priors in which the estimated intertemporal risk factor is positively priced. Overall, the cross-sectional tests reject the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and indicate support for the ICAPM.

In a model where investors disagree about the fundamentals of two stocks, the state-price density depends on investor disagreements for both stocks, especially the larger stock. This implies that disagreement among investors in a large firm has a spillover effect on the pricing of other stocks owned by these investors. The pricing effects of investor disagreements crucially depend on the average belief biases. Empirical findings support the novel model prediction of a disagreement spillover effect and help reconcile some mixed evidence in the literature.

We find a positive relation between the amount of pension deficits and the cost of bank loans. The effect of pension deficits on the cost of bank loans is driven by financial constraints, information-asymmetry problems, and higher pension-investment risk. Banks tighten lending terms for firms with larger pension deficits by requiring collateral, increasing the number of loan covenants, and shortening loan maturity. Borrowers with larger pension deficits are also more likely to violate covenants in the future. Collectively, these findings indicate that pension deficits represent an additional source of risk priced by banks.

We highlight the role of cash-flow uncertainty on corporate employment and investment. We find that a 1% increase in cash-flow uncertainty leads to a 0.62% decrease in tangible investment, a 1.39% decrease in intangible investment, and a 3.67% decrease in corporate employment growth. Our results are statistically and economically significant. We further find that these relationships are stronger during economic recessions. Our findings have significant policy implications. To wit, if policy makers would like corporations to increase their employment and investment, they should focus on policies that decrease corporate cash-flow uncertainty.