We provide evidence regarding mutual funds’ motivation to hold lottery stocks. Funds with higher managerial ownership invest less in lottery stocks, suggesting that managers themselves do not prefer such stocks. The evidence instead supports that managers cater to fund investors’ preference for such stocks. In particular, funds with more lottery holdings attract larger flows after portfolio disclosure compared with their peers, and poorly performing funds tend to engage in risk shifting by increasing their lottery holdings toward year-ends. Funds’ aggregate holdings of lottery stocks contribute to their overpricing.

Firms with high levels of organization capital (OK), a firm-specific production factor provided by key employees, are known to be risky and earn high stock returns. We argue that fragility of OK (i.e., its sensitivity to potential disruptions) is an independently important dimension of this risk. We proxy for fragility by the size of the top management team and show that firms with small teams outperform firms with big teams by 5% annually. The return spread increases in the level of OK and correlates with the outside options of top executives. Further supporting our interpretation, shocks to team composition from unexpected deaths of chief executive officers cause larger value losses in smaller teams.

We provide evidence that managerial incentives to manipulate real activities can influence the effectiveness of fiscal policy. Increases in federal spending lead government-dependent firms to expand research and development (R&D) investment whereas industry-peer firms contract. The net result is a reduction in industry-level R&D investment. We find evidence of a novel mechanism for the crowding out of peer-firm investment: peer-firm managers respond to falling relative performance by cutting R&D to manage current earnings upward. We show that these differential responses manifest in firm value. These findings are robust to endogeneity and selection concerns as well as a battery of alternative explanations.

We examine short selling of equity exchange traded funds (ETFs) using the 2008 short-sale ban. Contrasting the previously documented contractions in bearish strategies during the ban, we find a significant increase in short sales of the largest, most liquid ETF, the S&P 500 Spider. We offer evidence suggesting that this upsurge was driven primarily by investors circumventing the ban. We show that the ban’s detrimental effect on stock liquidity was around 30% less severe for the Spider’s constituents. Our results suggest that ETF shorts can substitute for short sales of individual stocks, thereby alleviating short-sale constraints’ adverse effect on liquidity.

We show that high cash holdings can be used by executives in the ex post bargaining over their compensation. Cash holdings are positively associated with CEO compensation and is driven by non-salary components. In companies with weaker governance, this relation is more pronounced. Using exogenous shocks to the firm’s cash, we show that CEO compensation readily responds to increases in cash holdings, confirming that managers are able to derive personal benefits from excess cash holdings.

Using U.S. census survey data on CEOs’ residence in their formative years, I document a negative relation between CEOs’ endowed family wealth and managerial performance. Consistent with the view that CEOs born into low-income families face higher entry barriers but may possess greater levels of ability that enable them to become CEOs, I find that CEOs born into less privileged families outperform those from higher-wealth families. The outperformance of CEOs from less wealthy families is not driven by risk taking or omitted variables. Overall, my results suggest that CEOs’ social endowment provides a useful signal for their managerial ability.

Theory says an American call should never be exercised early, except possibly just before an ex-dividend date. But the best market bid is regularly lower than the intrinsic value for in-the-money short-maturity options. An American option can always be exercised to recover the intrinsic value, whereas selling a European call in the market may return considerably less. The article derives the liquidity value of American exercise in closed form as a function of the bid–ask spread and shows empirically that it is of comparable magnitude to, and often greater than, the theoretical value of American exercise to collect a dividend.

We study trading and risk management decisions of banks in over-the-counter markets, accounting for 2 types of risk: payoff risk from loans and counterparty risk from trading activities. Our model provides empirically supported predictions on the structure of the interbank credit default swap (CDS) market: i) banks with high default probabilities either buy or sell CDS contracts; ii) because of the counterparty risk friction, payoff risk is only partially shared; and iii) safe banks act as intermediaries and help diversify counterparty risk. Banks manage their default probabilities to become creditworthy counterparties, but they do so in a socially inefficient way.

Passive exchange-traded funds (ETFs) are ideally suited to style-level feedback trading because of their high liquidity, ease of short selling, and pure play on investment styles. I find strong evidence of short-term style-momentum trading in ETFs. Institutional investors that use ETFs do not act as arbitrageurs by trading against style momentum. Institutions, especially less sophisticated ones, are themselves style-momentum traders. Moreover, recent style-level demand predicts style-level return reversals. These findings suggest that uninformed positive feedback trading by less sophisticated market participants can destabilize financial markets in the short run.

This study examines corporate leverage during systemic banking crises in an international setting, including 85 countries from 1987 to 2017. Using the historically determined component of institutions and exogenous variations in institution building, the analyses show that leverage cyclicality varies substantially across institutional settings. Leverage is strongly countercyclical under more binding constraints on the capital supply, suggesting important supply effects of such crises on leverage. Weak institutions are more conducive to crises and uncertainty. Leverage countercyclicality is more pronounced during crises that coincide with higher uncertainty, whereas leverage is procyclical with stronger legal systems and information sharing in capital markets.

Conventional collateral requirements for derivatives are conservative, but not explicitly designed to buffer systemic risk. I explore collateral adequacy against systemic risk in the Canadian futures market during the 2008 crisis. I find that conventional collateral levels adequately absorb systemic risk, even allowing for an implausibly high level of stress, and that systemic risk spillovers do not exceed the effect of an approximately 1% downward stock price move. I also document that the largest systemic risk contributors are buffered relatively less than the rest, and that there is a large cross-country difference in the behavior of U.S. and Canadian institutions.

The prior literature links cash holdings and returns (Simutin (2010), Palazzo (2012)). Using two signals of aggregate-funding availability, I find that the positive association between cash and returns only exists during constrained funding environments. In unconstrained periods, there is no association between cash and returns. The relation in constrained environments does not appear to be related to capital expenditures, expected return, or distress risk but is more prevalent in firms undertaking research and development (R&D) expenditures. This suggests that the association between cash and returns is more consistent with expanding (or maintaining) future growth opportunities rather than being attributable to differences in capital expenditures or risk.

Foreign migration flows have important stock market consequences. Foreign-born resident networks within U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) are associated with excess return comovement between locally headquartered stocks and American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) from countries with ties to the MSA through the network of foreign-born residents. This comovement is hardly due to correlated fundamentals and at least partially driven by correlated trading within members of a common investor base consisting of foreign-born residents. Our evidence has implications for both investors and foreign multinational corporations (MNCs) seeking to reap benefits from cross-listings and is consistent with the notion that foreign-born residents exhibit both local bias and home (country) bias.