We investigate the empirical relation between corporate governance and stock market liquidity. We find that firms with better corporate governance have narrower spreads, higher market quality index, smaller price impact of trades, and lower probability of information-based trading. In addition, we show that changes in our liquidity measures are significantly related to changes in the governance index over time. These results suggest that firms may alleviate information-based trading and improve stock market liquidity by adopting corporate governance standards that mitigate informational asymmetries. Our results are remarkably robust to alternative model specifications, across exchanges, and to different measures of liquidity.

We examine the potential profits of trading on a measure of private information (PIN) in a stock. A zero-investment portfolio that is size-neutral but long in high PIN stocks and short in low PIN stocks earns a significant abnormal return. The Fama-French, momentum, and liquidity factors do not explain this return. However, significant covariation in returns exists among high PIN stocks and among low PIN stocks, suggesting that PIN might proxy for an underlying factor. We create a PIN factor as the monthly return on the zero-investment portfolio above and show that it is successful in explaining returns to independent PIN-size portfolios. We also show that it is robust to inclusion of the Pástor-Stambaugh liquidity factor and the Amihud illiquidity factor. We argue that information remains an important determinant of asset returns even in the presence of these additional factors.

We integrate appealing features of Markowitz’s mean-variance portfolio theory (MVT) and Shefrin and Statman’s behavioral portfolio theory (BPT) into a new mental accounting (MA) framework. Features of the MA framework include an MA structure of portfolios, a definition of risk as the probability of failing to reach the threshold level in each mental account, and attitudes toward risk that vary by account. We demonstrate a mathematical equivalence between MVT, MA, and risk management using value at risk (VaR). The aggregate allocation across MA subportfolios is mean-variance efficient with short selling. Short-selling constraints on mental accounts impose very minor reductions in certainty equivalents, only if binding for the aggregate portfolio, offsetting utility losses from errors in specifying risk-aversion coefficients in MVT applications. These generalizations of MVT and BPT via a unified MA framework result in a fruitful connection between investor consumption goals and portfolio production.

Deviations from put-call parity contain information about future stock returns. Using the difference in implied volatility between pairs of call and put options to measure these deviations, we find that stocks with relatively expensive calls outperform stocks with relatively expensive puts by 50 basis points per week. We find both positive abnormal performance in stocks with relatively expensive calls and negative abnormal performance in stocks with relatively expensive puts, which cannot be explained by short sale constraints. Rebate rates from the stock lending market directly confirm that our findings are not driven by stocks that are hard to borrow. The degree of predictability is larger when option liquidity is high and stock liquidity low, while there is little predictability when the opposite is true. Controlling for size, option prices are more likely to deviate from strict put-call parity when underlying stocks face more information risk. The degree of predictability decreases over the sample period. Our results are consistent with mispricing during the earlier years of the study, with a gradual reduction of the mispricing over time.

In a dynamic general equilibrium model, we derive conditions for a mutual fund separation property by which the savings decision is separated from the asset allocation decision. With logarithmic utility functions, this separation holds for any heterogeneity in discount factors, while the generalization to constant relative risk aversion holds only for homogeneous discount factors but allows for any heterogeneity in endowments. The logarithmic case provides a general equilibrium foundation for the growth-optimal portfolio literature. Both cases yield equilibrium asset pricing formulas that allow for investor heterogeneity, in which the return process is endogenous and asset prices are determined by expected discounted relative dividends. Our results have simple asset pricing implications for the time series as well as the cross section of relative asset prices. It is found that on data from the Dow Jones Industrial Average, a risk aversion smaller than in the logarithmic case fits best.

This paper investigates how a firm’s capital structure choice affects the informational efficiency of its security prices in the secondary markets. We identify two new determinants of a firm’s capital structure policy: the liquidity (adverse selection) premium due to investors’ anticipated losses to informed trading, and operating efficiency improvement due to information revelation from the firm’s security prices. We show that the capital structure decision affects traders’ incentives to acquire information and subsequently, the distribution of informed traders across debt and equity claims. When information is less imperative for improving its operating decisions, a firm issues zero or negative debt (i.e., holding excess cash reserves) in order to reduce socially wasteful information acquisition and the liquidity premium associated with it. When information is crucial for a firm’s operating decisions, the optimal debt level is one that achieves maximum information revelation at the lowest possible liquidity cost. Our model can explain why many firms consistently hold no debt. It also provides new implications for financial system design and for the relationship among leverage, liquidity premium, profitability, and the cost of information acquisition.

When a company goes public, it is standard practice that the underwriting syndicate allocates more shares than are issued. The underwriter thus holds a short position that it commonly fills by aftermarket trading when market prices fall or, when prices rise, by executing the so-called overallotment option. This option is a standard feature of initial public offering (IPO) arrangements that allows the underwriter to purchase more shares from the issuer at the original offer price. We propose a theoretical model to study the implications of this combination of short position and overallotment option on the pricing of the IPO. Maximizing the sum of both the profits from their share of the offer revenue and the potential profits from aftermarket trading, we show that underwriters strategically distort the offer price. This results either in exacerbated underpricing when favorably informed underwriters lower prices to secure a signaling benefit, or in informationally inefficient offer prices when underwriters pool in offer prices irrespective of their information.

This paper investigates whether comovements between euro area equity returns at national and industry level changed after the introduction of the euro. By adopting a regression quantile-based methodology, we find that after 1999 the degree of comovements among euro area national equity markets was augmented. By explicitly controlling for the impact of global factors, we show that this result cannot be explained by recent worldwide trends. A more refined analysis based on an industry breakdown suggests that the increase in national index comovements is mainly driven by financial, industrial, and consumer services sectors.

Horizon-matched historical volatility is commonly used to forecast future volatility for option valuation under the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 123R. In this paper, we empirically investigate the performance of using historical volatility to forecast long-term stock return volatility in comparison with a number of alternative forecasting methods. In analyzing forecasting errors and their impact on reported income due to option expensing, we find that historical volatility is a poor forecast for long-term volatility and that shrinkage adjustment toward comparable-firm volatility only slightly improves its performance. Forecasting performance can be improved substantially by incorporating both long memory and comovements with common market factors. We also experiment with a simple mixed-horizon realized volatility model and find its long-term forecasting performance to be more accurate than historical forecasts but less accurate than long-memory forecasts.

In a recently published paper, Edmans, García, and Norli (2007) reveal a strong association between results of soccer games and local stock returns. Inspired by their work, we propose a novel approach to exploit this effect on the aggregate international level with the following three unique features: i) The aggregate effect does not depend on the games’ results; hence, the effect is an exploitable predictable effect. ii) The aggregate effect is based on many games; hence, it is very large and highly significant. We find that the average return on the U.S. market over the World Cup’s effect period is – 2.58%, compared to +1.21% for all-days average returns over the same period length. iii) Exploiting the aggregate effect is involved with trading in a single index for a relatively long period.