We study whether firms spread out debt-maturity dates, which we call granularity of corporate debt. In our model, firms that are unable to roll over expiring debt need to liquidate assets. If multiple small asset sales are less inefficient than a single large one, it can be optimal to diversify debt rollovers across time. Using a large sample of corporate bond issuers during the 1991–2012 period, we establish novel stylized facts and evidence consistent with our model’s predictions. There is substantial heterogeneity (i.e., firms have both concentrated and dispersed debt structures). Debt maturities are more dispersed for larger and more mature firms and for firms with better investment opportunities, higher leverage, and lower profitability. During the recent financial crisis, firms with valuable investment opportunities implemented more dispersed maturity structures. Finally, firms manage granularity actively and adjust toward target levels.

We study changes in independent director behavior and labor-market outcomes after the experience of a forced Chief Executive Officer (CEO) turnover. We find that independent directors are more willing to fire CEOs of underperforming firms, hire outside CEOs after a firing, and encourage better board-meeting attendance by fellow directors. We also find that the shareholders of poorly performing firms react positively when experienced directors join the board. It does come with a small cost for directors, in terms of additional directorships, although the cost is not as great as that for directors who do not fire the CEO of a poorly performing firm.

I document wage convergence in conglomerates using detailed plant-level data: Workers in low-wage industries collect higher-than-industry wages when the diversified firm also operates in high-wage industries. I confirm this effect by exploiting the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and changes in minimum wages at the state level as sources of exogenous increases in wages in some plants. I then track the evolution of wages of the remaining workers of the firm, relative to workers of unaffiliated plants. Plants where workers collect higher-than-industry wages operate with higher capital intensity, suggesting that internal labor markets may affect investment decisions in internal capital markets.

Pástor and Stambaugh (2012) find that from a forward-looking perspective, stocks are more volatile in the long run than they are in the short run. We demonstrate that when the nonnegative equity premium (NEP) condition is imposed on predictive regressions, stocks are in fact less volatile in the long run, even after taking estimation risk and uncertainties into account. The reason is that the NEP provides an additional parameter identification condition and prior information for future returns. Combined with the mean reversion of stock returns, this condition substantially reduces uncertainty on future returns and leads to lower long-run predictive variance.

We study the impact of stronger shareholder control on bondholders. We find that the passage of shareholder-sponsored governance proposals causes a decline in credit default swap spreads, indicating a net positive effect on bondholders. Evidence suggests that the direct benefit of stronger shareholder control, through the “management disciplining” channel, is larger than the combined adverse effects of directly escalating shareholder-bondholder conflict and indirectly exacerbating exposure to shareholder opportunism. Results are stronger for firms with existing high levels of shareholder-bondholder conflict and for proposals that mitigate managerial entrenchment without exacerbating risk-shifting. Finally, stronger shareholder control improves credit ratings and operating performance in the long-term.

We study the impact of board reforms implemented in 40 countries worldwide on corporate dividend policy. Using a difference-in-differences analysis, we find that firms pay higher dividends following the reforms. The increase in dividend payouts is more pronounced for firms with weak board governance in the pre-reform period and those in countries with strong external governance mechanisms. Our findings corroborate the dividend outcome model, which postulates that board reforms strengthen the monitoring role of the board and empower outside shareholders to force management to disgorge dividends.

We exploit the expiring nature of hedge fund lockups to create a new measure of funding liquidity risk that varies within funds. We find that hedge funds with lower funding risk generate higher returns, and this effect is driven by their increased exposure to equity-mispricing anomalies. Our results are robust to a variety of sampling criteria, variable definitions, and control variables. Further, we address endogeneity concerns in various ways, including a placebo approach and regression discontinuity design. Collectively, our results support a causal link between funding risk and the ability of managers to engage in risky arbitrage.

We study the dynamics of cash-and-carry arbitrage using the U.S. crude oil market. Sizable arbitrage-related inventory movements occur at the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) futures contract delivery point but not at other storage locations, where instead, operational factors explain most inventory changes. We add to the theory-of-storage literature by introducing two new features. First, due to arbitrageurs contracting ahead, inventories respond to not only contemporaneous but also lagged futures spreads. Second, storage-capacity limits can impede cash-and-carry arbitrage, leading to the persistence of unexploited arbitrage opportunities. Our findings suggest that arbitrage-induced inventory movements are, on average, price stabilizing.

We use hand-collected data from acquisition press releases to investigate how acquisition experience affects the career outcomes of non-CEO senior managers. To address the non-random nature of gaining experience, we separately use manager and firm-year fixed effects, as well as an instrumental variable analysis. Acquisition experience is positively related to compensation, the likelihood of a future board seat, and the likelihood of promotion to chief executive officer. Further tests suggest that the effects of experience decay over time, have diminishing returns, and do not depend on deal quality. Finally, we search Securities and Exchange Commission filings to document novel information on managerial roles in mergers and acquisitions.

We exploit exogenous legislative changes that alter the priority structure of different classes of debt to study how debtholder monitoring incentives affect bank earnings opacity. We present novel evidence that exposing nondepositors to greater losses in bankruptcy reduces earnings opacity, especially for banks with larger shares of nondeposit funding, listed banks, and independent banks. The reduction in earnings opacity is driven by a lower propensity to overstate earnings and is more pronounced among larger banks and in banks with more real estate loan exposure. Our findings highlight the importance of creditors’ monitoring incentives in improving the quality of information disclosure.

We hypothesize that greater economic policy uncertainty (EPU) leads to increases in unhealthy behaviors by lowering individuals’ impulse control. Based on 6.1 million interviews over 22 years, our analysis reveals a positive relation between EPU and the propensity to make poor lifestyle choices, including higher rates of alcohol consumption, a larger number of drinks consumed, and greater binge drinking. EPU has long-lasting effects on drinking behavior, consistent with habit formation. Moreover, the relation is stronger for younger individuals whose habits are more malleable. We find similar results when using smoking rates to measure unhealthy choices.

By employing a novel, hand-collected sample of withdrawn and completed share issue privatizations, we show that both groups undergo comparable restructuring processes over the 3 years preceding the event. We employ matching procedures to explicitly control for the restructuring effect, isolating the effect of the ownership transfer from state to private investors on corporate policies and performance. We document that, absent the ownership transfer, most of the gains realized during the restructuring process are reabsorbed over the posttreatment period. The transition from state to private ownership thus represents a necessary condition for the long-term success of privatization programs.