This article analyzes how creditors’ simultaneous debt and equity holdings affect firm investment policies. We find that firms with dual ownership are less likely to have capital expenditure restrictions in loan contracts, and the relation varies in predicted ways with the monitoring needs of borrowers and the monitoring capacity of dual owners. A less frequent use of capital expenditure restrictions, however, does not result in borrowers’ risk-shifting. Dual ownership firms are also more likely to be granted an unconditional waiver and do not significantly reduce debt issuance or investment expenditures after a financial covenant violation. Our results highlight how dual ownership can help mitigate shareholder–creditor conflicts.

We use a new identification strategy to assess whether an intensification of competition among banks increases or decreases the provision of a key banking service: liquidity creation. Although theory offers conflicting predictions about the impact of competition on liquidity creation, we find that regulatory-induced competition reduces liquidity creation. Consistent with a subset of models emphasizing that banks pushed toward insolvency reduce risk-taking activities, we discover that regulatory-induced competition reduces liquidity creation more among banks with less risk-absorbing capacity (e.g., less profitable banks).

In response to how they are compensated, mutual fund managers who are underperforming by mid-year are likely to increase the risk of their portfolios toward the year-end. We argue that an increase in the liquidity of the stocks that managers use to shift risk can lead to an increase in the size of their risky bets. This in turn hurts fund investors by increasing the costs of misaligned incentives associated with delegated portfolio management. We provide both theoretical and empirical results that are consistent with this argument. We use decimalization as an exogenous shock to liquidity to identify causal effects.

Using a novel data set that links individual investment bankers to the acquisition deals they advise on, we find that individual investment bankers with greater deal experience are associated with higher acquisition returns and post-acquisition operating performance, particularly for acquirers in complex and more opaque industries. The advisory fee on acquisitions is also positively associated with the investment banking team’s experience. Finally, when more experienced investment bankers switch to a new bank, acquirers are more likely to move with them. Overall, our results suggest that the human capital of individual investment bankers is valuable to acquirers.

We study the theoretical implications of cointegrated stock prices on the profitability of pairs-trading strategies. If stock returns are fairly weakly correlated across time, cointegration implies very high Sharpe ratios. To the extent that the theoretical Sharpe ratios are “too large,” our results suggest that either i) cointegration does not exist pairwise among stocks, and pairs-trading profits are a result of a weaker or less stable dependency structure among stock pairs, or ii) the serial correlation in stock returns stretches over considerably longer horizons than is usually assumed. Empirically, there is little evidence of cointegration, favoring the first explanation.

Using within-loan estimations to remove the impact of demand-side factors, we find that the capital levels of banks participating in the same syndicated loan are positively associated with the banks’ contributions to the loan. Consistent with the argument that higher capital reduces the cost of uninsured debt, the positive effect of bank capital on lending is stronger among banks that rely more on wholesale funding. Furthermore, we find that banks increase their contributions to syndicated loans after receiving Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funding. Taken together, we provide new evidence on the importance and causal effect of bank capital on lending.

Advances in variance analysis permit the splitting of the total quadratic variation of a jump-diffusion process into upside and downside components. Recent studies establish that this decomposition enhances volatility predictions and highlight the upside/downside variance spread as a driver of the asymmetry in stock price distributions. To appraise the economic gain of this decomposition, we design a new and flexible option pricing model in which the underlying asset price exhibits distinct upside and downside semivariance dynamics driven by the model-free proxies of the variances. The new model outperforms common benchmarks, especially the alternative that splits the quadratic variation into diffusive and jump components.

We examine whether speed is an important characteristic of traders who anticipate local price trends. These anticipatory participants correctly trade prior to the overall market and systematically act before other participants. They use manual and algorithmic order entry methods, but most are not fast enough to be high frequency traders (HFTs). Those anticipating price trends have impacts as if they are informed traders, while the case for anticipatory participants affecting the volume of other traders is rejected. A follow-up sample shows significant attrition in accounts and difficulty maintaining the anticipatory strategies. To identify anticipatory traders, we devise novel methods to isolate local price trends using order book data from the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil futures market.

This paper exploits a quasi-natural experiment to investigate the relation between the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 and corporate innovation: firms with a public float under $75 million can delay compliance with Section 404 of the act. We find a significant decrease in the number of patents and patent citations for firms that are subject to Section 404 compliance relative to firms that are not. This relation is more pronounced when firms are financially constrained and when firms face high litigation risk. Overall, our evidence suggests that SOX imparts real costs to the economy by decreasing corporate innovativeness.

We propose a single-factor asset pricing model based on an indicator function of consumption growth being less than its endogenous certainty equivalent. This certainty equivalent is derived from generalized disappointment-aversion preferences, and it is located approximately 1 standard deviation below the conditional mean of consumption growth. Our single-factor model can explain the cross section of expected returns for size, value, reversal, profitability, and investment portfolios at least as well as the Fama–French multifactor models. Our results show strong empirical support for asymmetric preferences and question the effectiveness of the smooth utility framework, which is traditionally used in consumption-based asset pricing.

We evaluate the link between chief executive officer (CEO) industry tournament incentives (ITIs) and the product-market benefits of corporate liquidity. We find that ITIs increase the level and marginal value of cash holdings. Furthermore, ITIs strengthen the relation between excess cash and market-share gains, especially for firms that face significant competitive threats. Additionally, for firms with excess cash, higher ITIs lead to increased research and development (R&D) expenses, capital expenditures, and spending on focused acquisitions as well as reduced payouts. Overall, our findings suggest that ITIs increase the value of cash by incentivizing CEOs to deploy cash strategically to capture its product-market benefits.

We study the effects of accounting losses on chief executive officer (CEO) turnover. If accounting losses provide incremental information about managerial ability, boards can utilize the information in losses to assess CEOs’ stewardship of assets, which is why losses may serve as a heuristic for managerial failure. We find a positive relation between losses and subsequent CEO turnover after controlling for other accounting and stock-performance measures. We also find that losses are associated with an increase in board activity and that losses predict poor operating performance and future financial problems. Our results explain why CEOs manage earnings to avoid losses.

Using a natural experiment to identify the causal effect of an increase in default risk on firm actions, I find little evidence managers shift risk to corporate pension plans following an exogenous shock to the firm’s long-term liabilities. The finding is robust to focusing on firms where the incentive to engage in risk shifting is arguably the greatest, such as financially vulnerable firms and firms with fewer agency conflicts. This study casts doubt on the risk-shifting hypothesis and shows managers do not take risk-shifting actions that would increase shareholder value even when those actions pose little threat to managerial utility.

We study the transmission mechanism of monetary policy through business loans and illustrate subtle aspects of its functioning that relate to the contractual characteristics and the borrower–lender types of loans. We show that the puzzling increase in business loans in response to monetary tightening, documented before the Great Recession, is largely driven by drawdowns from existing commitments at large banks. Spot loans also rise and take a considerable amount of time to adjust. Banks, nonetheless, do curtail credit supply by shortening maturities of new loans. Following the Great Recession, the mechanism has worked differently, with loan responses to monetary tightening displaying a significant downward shift.

We study the link between the individual propensity to violate moral principles and the demand for finance based on two data sets: the World Values Survey and a data set with the legal records of U.S. chief executive officers (CEOs). We find that individuals who are more tolerant of moral principle violations are more likely to borrow. Corporate executives with legal records are also associated with larger mortgages. Reverse causality and attitudes toward risk are unlikely explanations for our findings. We contend that noncompliance relaxes participation constraints in capital markets by lowering the psychological costs of entering and breaking a contract.