Value and momentum returns and combinations of them across both countries and asset classes are explained by their loadings on global macroeconomic risk factors. These loadings describe why value and momentum have positive return premia, although being negatively correlated. The global macroeconomic risk factors also perform well in capturing the returns on other characteristic-based portfolios. The findings identify a global macroeconomic source of the common variation in returns across countries and asset classes.

We use new hand-collected data from corporate filings to study the drivers of corporate capital structure adjustment. Classifying firms by their adjustment frequencies, we reveal previously unknown patterns in their reasons for financing and the financial instruments used. Some are consistent with existing theory, whereas others are understudied. Many leverage changes are outside of the firm’s control (e.g., executive option exercise) or incur negligible adjustment costs (e.g., credit-line usage). This implies a lower frequency of proactive leverage adjustments than indicated by prior research using accounting data, suggesting that costs of adjustment are higher, or the benefits lower, than previously thought.

We study the predictive power of option-implied moment risk premia embedded in the conventional variance risk premium. We find that although the second-moment risk premium predicts market returns in short horizons with positive coefficients, the third-moment (fourth-moment) risk premium predicts market returns in medium horizons with negative (positive) coefficients. Combining the higher-moment risk premia with the second-moment risk premium improves the stock return predictability over multiple horizons, both in sample and out of sample. The finding is economically significant in an asset-allocation exercise and survives a series of robustness checks.

This article studies how minimum-wage policies affect capital investment using the industrial census of manufacturing firms in China, where minimum-wage policies vary across counties. Exploiting discontinuities in minimum-wage policy at county borders, we find that minimum wages increase capital investment. The investment response to minimum wages is stronger for firms that are labor intensive, that have more room for technological improvement, and that cannot sufficiently pass on labor costs to consumers. A natural experiment based on county jurisdictional changes further assures the causal relationship.

We propose that chief executive officer (CEO) exploratory mindset (inherent desire to search for novel ideas and long-term orientation) promotes innovation. Firms with CEOs with PhD degrees (PhD CEOs) produce more exploratory patents with greater novelty, generality, and originality. PhD CEOs engage less in managing earnings and stock prices, invest more in research and development (R&D) and alliances, generate higher long-term value of patents, and experience more positive market reactions to R&D alliances. Their firms achieve superior long-run operating performance. They tend to be hired by research-intensive firms with poor financial performance. Evidence from managerial incentive shocks and turnovers suggests that these effects do not derive solely from CEO–firm matching.

More frequent, larger, and more recent debt and equity issues in the prior 3 fiscal years are followed by lower stock returns in the subsequent year. The intercept of a q-factor calendar-time regression for the value-weighted (VW) portfolio of firms with at least 3 large issues is −0.63% per month (t-stat. = −4.31). Purging the factor returns of recent issuers increases the magnitude of the estimated underperformance following frequent equity issues. A VW Fama–MacBeth regression shows that firms with 3 equity issues underperform nonissuers by 0.65% per month (t-stat. = −2.65). Earnings announcement returns are low following frequent issues, especially equity issues.

We use a threshold-based design to study ex post discretion in lenders’ contractual enforcement of covenant violations. At preset thresholds, lenders enforce contractual breaches only infrequently, but this enforcement is associated with material consequences (e.g., fees and renegotiations). Enforcement varies significantly over time and peaks when credit conditions are tightest, indicating that enforcement is procyclical. Costly coordination reduces enforcement: Syndicates with ex ante restrictive voting requirements enforce at lower rates. Consistent with theories of lender competition and implicit contracting, enforcement rates are lower for borrowers with access to alternative sources of financing and well-reputed lead arrangers.

We hypothesize that social trust, in mitigating contracting incompleteness, may have an important effect on the activeness and effectiveness of delegated portfolio management. Using a complete sample of worldwide open-end mutual funds, we find that trust is positively associated with the activeness of funds and that trust-related active share delivers superior performance (e.g., approximately 2% per year for cross-border investments). Moreover, “trust in the market” and “trust in managers” play important yet different roles for different types of cross-border delegated portfolio management. Our results suggest that trust acts as a fundamental building block for delegated portfolio management.

Analyzing several developed and emerging international markets, I test the ability of global, regional, and local models to explain a large set of 134 cross-sectional anomalies. My main finding is that both global and regional factor models create substantially larger average absolute alphas than local factor models. Annual (absolute) anomaly portfolio alphas are on average 1.7 and 1.1 percentage points higher, respectively, with global and regional than with local factor models. Even for the most recent period, there is no evidence of a catch-up of global and regional factor models. There is substantial potential for international diversification of anomaly strategies.

Using cash flows from a large sample of buyout and venture funds, I show that private equity (PE) distributions predict returns in the industries of funds’ specialization. My tests distinguish timing skill from reactions to market conditions and spillover effects of PE activity. Fund managers foresee comparable public firms’ earnings but sell at the industry peaks only if they have performance fees to harvest. These results have implications for manager selection and improve our understanding of PE fund returns and the role of PE in capital markets.

Small and micro-enterprises are usually majority-owned by entrepreneurs. Using a unique sample of loan applications from such firms, we study the role of owners’ gender in bank credit decisions and post-credit-decision firm outcomes. We find that, ceteris paribus, female entrepreneurs are more prudent loan applicants than are males because they are less likely to apply for credit or to default after loan origination. The relatively more aggressive behavior of male applicants pays off, however, in terms of higher average firm performance after loan origination.

We offer a new social approach to investment decision making and asset prices. Investors discuss their strategies and convert others to their strategies with a probability that increases in investment returns. The conversion rate is shown to be convex in realized returns. Unconditionally, active strategies (e.g., high variance and skewness) dominate, although investors have no inherent preference for these characteristics. The model has strong predictions for how the adoption of active strategies depends on investors’ social networks. In contrast with nonsocial approaches, sociability, self-enhancing transmission, and other features of the communication process determine the popularity and pricing of active investment strategies.