The expectations theory of the term structure is well known to give wrong signals as to the future course of long-term interest rates. One explanation involves rational time-varying term premia. However, the “anomaly” may also be due to inflation forecast errors. We study survey forecasts of inflation. It seems that the respondents' forecasts are insufficiently adaptive. Interest rates reflect expectations similar to the inflation forecasts. As a result, past survey forecast errors reliably predict premia on U.S. Government Bonds.

This paper investigates market manipulation trading strategies by large traders in a securities market. A large trader is defined as any investor whose trades change prices. A market manipulation trading strategy is one that generates positive real wealth with no risk. Market manipulation trading strategies are shown to exist under reasonable hypotheses on the equilibrium price process. Sufficient conditions for their nonexistence are also provided.

We solve for the optimal dynamic trading strategy of an investor who faces a leverage constraint, i.e., a limitation on his ability to borrow for the purpose of investing in a risky asset. We assume that the investor has constant relative risk aversion, and that the value of the risky asset follows a geometric Brownian motion. In the absence of the leverage constraint, the optimal strategy involves investing a fixed proportion of wealth in the risky asset. We prove that, in the presence of the leverage constraint, the optimal investment also involves investing a fixed proportion of wealth in the risky asset when the leverage constraint is not binding. However, the two proportions are different, reflecting the extent to which the investor alters his strategy even when the leverage constraint is not binding because of the possibility that the leverage constraint will become binding in the future.

This paper reexamines long-horizon stock returns and finds that previous work overstates the evidence of mean reversion. The overstatement is largely due to the implicit weighting of ordinary least-squares tests, which place more weight on the Depression and World War II observations, which have both large error variances and stronger mean-reverting tendencies. Additionally, the reliance on asymptotic statistics and the improper focus on only the most negative estimates of mean reversion contribute to the overstatement. Using generalized least-squares randomization tests on the 1926 to 1987 period, the random walk cannot be rejected for value- or equally-weighted real returns at any of 10 return horizons or by joint tests over all 10 horizons simultaneously. Additionally, the random walk cannot be rejected for the extended 1871 to 1987 period.

This paper identifies five universal currency hedge ratio (UHR) definitions. These are hedge positions in foreign bonds, stated as a fraction of national or global equity portfolios, that are the same for all investors, regardless of nationality. The first three involve the total demand for foreign bonds and depend on equities not being held for hedging purposes. The last two are associated with variance-minimizing regression hedges. These hold, in general, but are designed exclusively for hedging other traded asset positions. Jensen's inequality makes the choice of measurement currency irrelevant and makes the HRs universal without affecting their values.

Lease valuation models often begin with the assumption that leases and debt are substitutes. This paper demonstrates that, because leasing is a mechanism for selling excess tax deductions, it can motivate the lessee firm to increase the proportion of debt in its capital structure relative to an otherwise identical firm that does not use leasing. Thus, debt and leases can be complements. We also show that a competitive lessor will use diversification to reduce risk and increase the probability that tax deductions are fully utilized so that it can lower lease payments.

This paper critically evaluates the claim in recent papers that precisely estimated betas explain the cross-sectional differences in expected returns across size-based portfolios. In these studies, the correlations between firm size and betas across the test portfolios are close to one in magnitude, yielding potentially spurious inferences. This paper shows that when the test portfolios are constructed so that the correlations between firm size and beta are small, the betas explain virtually none of the cross-sectional differences in portfolio returns.

This paper examines problems in the use of divergence of analyst opinion as a proxy for estimation risk in empirical studies of security returns and asset pricing models. We demonstrate that diversity of opinion can increase even though the amount of private information increases, and we show that diversity of opinion may overstate estimation risk if the capital market aggregates the information held by investors. We produce empirical results consistent with our conclusions. Specifically, we find that divergence of opinion can produce measures of estimation risk that are inconsistent with a received proxy for estimation risk and with observed common stock returns.

In this paper, we derive simple, directly computable conditions for minimum-variance portfolios to have all positive weights. We show that either there is no minimum-variance portfolio with all positive weights or there is a single segment of the minimum-variance frontier for which all portfolios have positive weights. Then, we examine the likelihood of observing positively weighted minimum-variance portfolios. Analytical and computational results suggest that: i) even if the mean vector and covariance matrix are compatible with a given positively weighted portfolio being mean-variance efficient, the proportion of the minimum-variance frontier containing positively weighted portfolios is small and decreases as the number of assets in the universe increases, and ii) small perturbations in the means will likely lead to no positively weighted minimum-variance portfolios.

Even if true abnormal returns are uncorrelated, estimated abnormal returns are not. This paper presents a simple formula for the variance of estimated cumulative abnormal returns. Both returns and dummy variable procedures for estimating the standard error correctly, taking account of both intertemporal and contemporaneous correlation of estimated residuals, are discussed. They are then applied to an event study of post-merger performance. It is shown that ignoring either the intertemporal or contemporaneous correlation of residuals can result in significant underestimates of standard errors.

The paper analyzes lead-lag relationships for six major stock market indexes: New York S&P 500, Tokyo Nikkei, London FT–30, Hong Kong Hang Seng, Singapore Straits Times, and Australia All Ordinaries, for time periods before, during, and after the October 1987 market crash. Unidirectional and bidirectional causality tests are conducted by means of the Granger methodology. Practically no lead-lag relationships are found for the pre-crash and post-crash periods. However, important feedback relationships and unidirectional causality are detected for the month of the crash. There is also an increase in contemporaneous causality during and after the month of the crash. In general, our findings suggest that the October 1987 market crash probably was an international crisis of the equity markets and that it might have begun simultaneously in all the national stock markets.

This paper examines the adverse selection problem that arises from the repeated trades of informed traders. We develop a model of trading that incorporates the interaction of expectations, prices, and volume. We then examine how trading volume affects the speed of price adjustment to information, and demonstrate how this price effect differs across markets. Our results suggest that the efficiency of price adjustment to new information may differ dramatically depending on security market structure, even when there is endogenous entry of informed traders. We illustrate these price adjustment properties by developing a simulation of our theoretical model.

Agency theory recognizes that the interests of managers and shareholders may conflict and that, left on their own, managers may make major financial policy decisions, such as the choice of a capital structure, that are suboptimal from the shareholders' standpoint. The theory also suggests, however, that compensation contracts, managerial equity investment, and monitoring by the board of directors and major shareholders can reduce conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. This research investigates the relationship between the firm's capital structure and 1) executive incentive plans, 2) managerial equity investment, and 3) monitoring by the board of directors and major shareholders. This paper finds a positive relationship between the firm's leverage ratio and 1) percentage of executives' total compensation in incentive plans, 2) percentage of equity owned by managers, 3) percentage of investment bankers on the board of directors, and 4) percentage of equity owned by large individual investors. These findings are consistent with the predictions of agency theory, suggesting, in turn, that capital structure models that ignore agency costs are incomplete.

This paper provides a theoretical and empirical investigation of the role of the secondary market in the pricing of initial public offerings. We argue that incomplete spanning of the primary issues in the secondary market and limited investor access play an important role in the pricing of initial public offerings. Utilizing a segmented market approach wherein IPO offering values are determined in the primary market and after-market bid prices are determined in the centrally accessed secondary market, we derive a price differential in the primary and secondary markets that is consistent with the received notion of IPO underpricing. Empirical tests on a large sample of IPOs provide results that are consistent with the predictions of our theoretical analysis.

A number of recent papers have reported evidence that stock prices are more volatile than is consistent with efficient markets. We argue that the excess volatility tests address a definition of efficient markets that makes an extreme information assumption. We go on to test a weaker definition of efficient markets, due to Jensen (1978). We show the existence of a profitable trading rule that earns a significantly higher rate of return than a buy-and-hold strategy, and so conclude that stock prices are too volatile, even when judged by this weaker definition.

This paper tests the null hypothesis of no difference in the probability of a trade occurring at the ask using a new database containing intraday bid-ask quotes and transaction prices on both U.S. and Canadian Exchanges. We use LOGIT analysis to test the hypothesis across days of the week, price-stratified portfolios, and times of the day. We find systematic patterns in the probability of a trade at the ask resembling previously documented returns anomalies and conclude that the findings of previous weekend and intraday returns studies may be overstated. The significance of this conclusion substantially increases as one moves from the use of interday to intraday data.

This paper tests the overreaction hypothesis using monthly data for stocks listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange over the 1950–1988 period. Unlike De Bondt and Thaler (1985), (1987), it finds statistically significant continuation behavior for the next one (and two) year(s) for winners and losers, and insignificant reversal behavior for winners and losers over longer formation/test periods of up to ten years. While the systematic risks of the winners decrease significantly over all test periods, the systematic risks of the losers increase significantly for only the 12-month formation/test periods (unlike Chan (1988)). The only significant change in variance from the formation to test periods occurs for the losers for the 12-month formation/test periods. The findings are robust for January versus non-January and size-based portfolios (unlike Zarowin (1989), (1990)). The findings are robust for various performance measures (specifically, market-adjusted CAR, and the Jensen (1968) and Sharpe (1966) portfolio performance measures).

Long-term performance plans are theoretically adopted to better align the interests of the managers and stockholders by redirecting managerial decision-making toward the longterm performance of the corporation. This study reports significant positive excess returns around the announcement of performance plan adoption, which is consistent with the view that such plans would reduce the agency problem. In addition, this study finds an association between the adoption of long-term performance plans and subsequent growth in profitability, suggesting that long-term performance plans may have been successful in motivating an enhancement in the accounting measures of profitability used to reward managers under the plan. Finally, the excess returns around the announcement of performance plan adoption are found to be positively correlated with subsequent change in growth of earnings per share, the most commonly used accounting performance measure.

This paper provides a closed form solution for the value of a multiple claim insurance contract that is subject to a deductible amount and/or an upper limit on claims. The solution is a time integral of European option prices. The model provides three important insights. First, systematic risk in insurance policies is altered in the presence of deductibles and maximum indemnity levels. Second, idiosyncratic risk affects policy valuation and the required rates of return on underwriting portfolios. Finally, contrary to traditional actuarial intuition, changes in the risk-free interest rate may either increase or reduce policy values.

This paper develops a specialized principal-agent model of the investor-investment advisor relationship and embeds the standard advisory compensation schedule in the model. Advisors are endowed with information-gathering abilities and investors are endowed with funds. Information-gathering services are traded indirectly through the investor's receipt of portfolio returns net of advisory fees. Model results show that the parameters of the compensation schedule are both a function of the idiosyncracies of an advisor's information services and the degree of risk sharing between the advisor and investor. Several predictions of the model are supported using data on mutual fund advisors. Unsupported predictions may be due to self-selection of advisors by risk tolerance.