This paper examines the relation between the performance and valuations of publicly traded subsidiaries in the United States and the ownership stake of their parent companies. Cross-sectional and time-series tests demonstrate that subsidiaries of parents that own a substantial minority stake exhibit negative peer-adjusted operating performance and are valued at a 23% median discount relative to peers. In contrast, majority-owned and fully divested subsidiaries show no abnormal performance or valuations. The results of our study indicate that the association between parent ownership and subsidiary performance is nonlinear and that some parents behave opportunistically toward their publicly traded subsidiaries.

Existing empirical research investigating the size of the equity premium has largely consisted of a series of innovations around a common theme: producing a better estimate of the equity premium by using better data or a better estimation technique. The equity premium estimate that emerges from most of this work matches one moment of the data alone: the mean difference between an estimate of the return to holding equity and a risk-free rate. We instead match multiple moments of U.S. market data, exploiting the joint distribution of the dividend yield, return volatility, and realized excess returns, and find that the equity premium lies within 50 basis points of 3.5%, a range much narrower than was achieved in previous studies. Additionally, statistical tests based on the joint distribution of these moments reveal that only those models of the conditional equity premium that embed time variation, breaks, and/or trends are supported by the data. In order to develop the joint distribution of the dividend yield, return volatility, and excess returns, we need a model of price and return fundamentals. We document that even recently developed analytically tractable models that permit autocorrelated dividend growth rates and discount rates impose restrictions that are rejected by the data. We therefore turn to a wider range of models, requiring numerical solution methods and parameter estimation by the simulated method of moments.

We examine how shocks to the supply of credit impact corporate financing and investment using the collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.; the passage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989; and regulatory changes in the insurance industry as an exogenous contraction in the supply of below-investment-grade credit after 1989. A difference-in-differences empirical strategy reveals that substitution to bank debt and alternative sources of capital (e.g., equity, cash balances, and trade credit) was limited, leading to an almost one-for-one decline in net investment with the decline in net debt issuances. Despite this sharp change in behavior, corporate leverage ratios remained relatively stable, a result of the contemporaneous decline in debt issuances and investment. Overall, our findings highlight how even large firms with access to public credit markets are susceptible to fluctuations in the supply of capital.

Recent research finds that the stocks that mutual fund managers buy outperform the stocks that they sell (e.g., Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000)). We study the nature of this stock-picking ability. We construct measures of trading skill based on how the stocks held and traded by fund managers perform at subsequent corporate earnings announcements. This approach increases the power to detect skilled trading and sheds light on its source. We find that the average fund’s recent buys significantly outperform its recent sells around the next earnings announcement, and that this accounts for a disproportionate fraction of the total abnormal returns to fund trades estimated in prior work. We find that mutual fund trades also forecast earnings surprises. We conclude that mutual fund managers are able to trade profitably in part because they are able to forecast earnings-related fundamentals.

We investigate the empirical relation between corporate governance and stock market liquidity. We find that firms with better corporate governance have narrower spreads, higher market quality index, smaller price impact of trades, and lower probability of information-based trading. In addition, we show that changes in our liquidity measures are significantly related to changes in the governance index over time. These results suggest that firms may alleviate information-based trading and improve stock market liquidity by adopting corporate governance standards that mitigate informational asymmetries. Our results are remarkably robust to alternative model specifications, across exchanges, and to different measures of liquidity.

A diversified firm can trade at a discount to a matched portfolio of single-segment firms if the diversified firm has either lower expected cash flows or higher expected returns than the single-segment firms. We study whether firms with diversification discounts have higher expected returns in order to compensate investors for offering less upside potential (or skewness exposure) than focused firms. Our empirical tests support this hypothesis. First, we find that focused firms offer greater skewness exposure than diversified firms. Second, we find that diversified firms have significantly larger discounts when the diversified firm offers less skewness than matched single-segment firms. Finally, we find that up to 53% of the excess returns received on diversification-discount firms relative to diversification-premium firms can be explained by differences in exposure to skewness.

Ample evidence points to a negative relation between internal funds (profitability) and the demand for external funds (debt issuance). This relation has been interpreted as evidence supporting the pecking order theory. We show, however, that the negative effect of internal funds on the demand for external financing is concentrated among firms that are least likely to face high external financing costs (firms that distribute large amounts of dividends, that are large, and whose debt is rated). For firms on the other end of the spectrum (low payout, small, and unrated), external financing is insensitive to internal funds. These cross-firm differences hold separately for debt and equity, and they are magnified in the aftermath of macroeconomic movements that tighten financing constraints. We argue that the greater complementarity between internal funds and external financing for constrained firms is a consequence of the interdependence of their financing and investment decisions.

We examine the potential profits of trading on a measure of private information (PIN) in a stock. A zero-investment portfolio that is size-neutral but long in high PIN stocks and short in low PIN stocks earns a significant abnormal return. The Fama-French, momentum, and liquidity factors do not explain this return. However, significant covariation in returns exists among high PIN stocks and among low PIN stocks, suggesting that PIN might proxy for an underlying factor. We create a PIN factor as the monthly return on the zero-investment portfolio above and show that it is successful in explaining returns to independent PIN-size portfolios. We also show that it is robust to inclusion of the Pástor-Stambaugh liquidity factor and the Amihud illiquidity factor. We argue that information remains an important determinant of asset returns even in the presence of these additional factors.

Markets should be inefficient enough to allow returns to security analysis to adequately compensate the marginal analyst for his efforts. Cross-sectional differences in the costs of analysis therefore imply cross-sectional differences in market efficiency and in before-cost returns to smart investors. Small growth stocks are difficult to analyze and costly to trade. I find that the abnormal returns of mutual fund investments in small growth stocks from 1980 to 2006 averaged 0.76% per month. Large value stocks are easier to analyze and cheaper to trade. Mutual funds earned average monthly abnormal returns of only 0.05% in large value stocks during the same period.

We show that the abnormal returns on high default risk stocks documented by Vassalou and Xing (2004) are driven by short-term return reversals rather than systematic default risk. These abnormal returns occur only during the month after portfolio formation and are concentrated in a small subset of stocks that had recently experienced large negative returns. Empirical evidence supports the view that the short-term return reversal arises from a liquidity shock triggered by a clientele change.

We examine the wealth effects of 3 regulatory changes designed to improve minority-shareholder protection in the Chinese stock markets. Using the value of a firm’s related-party transactions as an inverse proxy for the quality of corporate governance, wefind that firms with weaker governance experienced significantly larger abnormal returns around announcements of the new regulations than did firms with stronger governance. We also find that firms with strong ties to the government did not benefit from the regulations, suggesting that minority shareholders did not expect regulators to enforce the new rules on firms where blockholders have strong political connections.

This paper studies seasonal predictability in the cross section of international stock returns. Stocks that outperform the domestic market in a particular month continue to outperform the domestic market in that same calendar month for up to 5 years. The pattern appears in Canada, Japan, and 12 European countries. Global trading strategies based on seasonal predictability outperform similar nonseasonal strategies by over 1% per month. Abnormal seasonal returns remain after controlling for size, beta, and value, using global or local risk factors. In addition, the strategies are not highly correlated across countries. This suggests they do not reflect return premiums for systematic global risk.

Disagreement, a key factor inducing trading, has been receiving ever increasing attention in recent years. Most research has focused on disagreement about the expected returns. Several authors have shown that if the average belief coincides with the true expected return, in the portfolio context prices are unaffected by disagreement. In this paper we study the pricing effects of disagreement about return variances. We show that i) disagreement about variances has systematic and significant pricing effects—more disagreement leads to higher prices, and ii) prices are very sensitive to the degree of disagreement: Even if the average belief about the variance is constant, tiny fluctuations in the disagreement about the variance lead to substantial price fluctuations. This second result may offer an explanation for the excess volatility puzzle: When small changes in the degree of disagreement occur, they induce relatively large price changes. Yet, the changes in disagreement may be hard to directly detect empirically, leading to apparent “excess volatility.”

This paper investigates the relation between information on the state of the economy and equity risk premium. We use a setup where investors have Epstein-Zin preferences and the economy randomly switches between booms and recessions. We are able to establish 2 key results: First, investors with high elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) will require lower excess returns for holding stocks if they are provided with better information on the state of the economy. Second, we find that this also holds for investors with moderate EIS if they are sufficiently risk averse.

I test for stock return predictability in the largest and most comprehensive data set analyzed so far, using four common forecasting variables: the dividend-price (DP) and earnings-price (EP) ratios, the short interest rate, and the term spread. The data contain over 20,000 monthly observations from 40 international markets, including 24 developed and 16 emerging economies. In addition, I develop new methods for predictive regressions with panel data. Inference based on the standard fixed effects estimator is shown to suffer from severe size distortions in the typical stock return regression, and an alternative robust estimator is proposed. The empirical results indicate that the short interest rate and the term spread are fairly robust predictors of stock returns in developed markets. In contrast, no strong or consistent evidence of predictability is found when considering the EP and DP ratios as predictors.

We examine the impact of explicitly incorporating a measure of debt capacity in recent tests of competing theories of capital structure. Our main results are that if external funds are required, in the absence of debt capacity concerns, debt appears to be preferred to equity. Concerns over debt capacity largely explain the use of new external equity financing by publicly traded firms. Finally, we present evidence that reconciles the frequent equity issues by small, high-growth firms with the pecking order. After accounting for debt capacity, the pecking order theory appears to give a good description of financing behavior for a large sample of firms examined over an extended time period.

We integrate appealing features of Markowitz’s mean-variance portfolio theory (MVT) and Shefrin and Statman’s behavioral portfolio theory (BPT) into a new mental accounting (MA) framework. Features of the MA framework include an MA structure of portfolios, a definition of risk as the probability of failing to reach the threshold level in each mental account, and attitudes toward risk that vary by account. We demonstrate a mathematical equivalence between MVT, MA, and risk management using value at risk (VaR). The aggregate allocation across MA subportfolios is mean-variance efficient with short selling. Short-selling constraints on mental accounts impose very minor reductions in certainty equivalents, only if binding for the aggregate portfolio, offsetting utility losses from errors in specifying risk-aversion coefficients in MVT applications. These generalizations of MVT and BPT via a unified MA framework result in a fruitful connection between investor consumption goals and portfolio production.

This paper tests whether the persistence of the momentum and reversal effects is the result of idiosyncratic risk limiting arbitrage. Idiosyncratic risk deters arbitrage, regardless of the arbitrageur’s diversification. Reversal is prevalent only in high idiosyncratic risk stocks, suggesting that idiosyncratic risk limits arbitrage in reversal mispricing. This finding is robust to controls for transaction costs, informed trading, and systematic relations between idiosyncratic risk and subsequent returns. Momentum is not related to idiosyncratic risk. Momentum generates a smaller aggregate return than reversal, so the findings along with those in related studies suggest that transaction costs are sufficient to prevent arbitrageurs from eliminating momentum mispricing.

The shape of the volatility smirk has significant cross-sectional predictive power for future equity returns. Stocks exhibiting the steepest smirks in their traded options underperform stocks with the least pronounced volatility smirks in their options by 10.9% per year on a risk-adjusted basis. This predictability persists for at least 6 months, and firms with the steepest volatility smirks are those experiencing the worst earnings shocks in the following quarter. The results are consistent with the notion that informed traders with negative news prefer to trade out-of-the-money put options, and that the equity market is slow in incorporating the information embedded in volatility smirks.

We develop a financial market trading model in the tradition of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) that allows us to incorporate nontrivial volume. We observe that in this model price volatility is positively related to the trading volume and to the absolute value of the net order flow (i.e., the order imbalance). Moreover, higher volume leads to higher order imbalances. These findings are consistent with well-established empirical findings. Our model further predicts that higher trader participation and systematic improvements in the quality of traders’ information lead to higher volume, larger order imbalances, lower market depth, shorter duration, and higher price volatility.