This paper examines the association between the initialadoption of stock options for senior-level executives and subsequent changes in corporate dividend policy. The primary research hypothesis is that the addition of a stock option to a manager's compensation package provides an incentive for the executive to reduce corporate dividends. This hypothesis follows from the observation that executive stock options are generally not “dividend protected.” The results suggest that dividends are reduced relative to expected dividends. We interpret these results as suggesting that the personal incentives of executives can affect certain aspects of the observed corporate dividend policy.

This paper analyzes the robustness of the day-of-the-week (DOW) and weekend effects to alternative estimation and testing procedures. The results show that sample size can distort the interpretation of classical test statistics unless the significance level is adjusted downward. Specification tests reveal widespread departures from OLS assumptions. Hypothesis tests results are reported using robust econometric methods and a GARCH model. The strength of the DOW and weekend effect evidence appears to depend on the estimation and testing method. Both effects seem to have disappeared by 1975.

This paper analyzes the pricing of stock index options in a simple general equilibrium model. In this model, the volatility of the stock index and the spot rate of interest are functions of a stochastic variable. The paper investigates the biases that arise when using the Black-Scholes model with the assumed volatility and interest rate dynamics. It is shown that the model can, in principle, explain the biases observed in empirical work on stock index options.

We use the modified Black-Scholes model and a random variance option pricing model to study prices of European currency options traded in Geneva. The options, which cannot be exercised early, include calls and puts on the dollar/Swiss franc exchange rate. In the empirical analysis, we examine the model fit and the biases with respect to the strike price, time to maturity, and volatility. There is some evidence of mispricing and there are small gains available by trading with the random variance model.

A new asset pricing model that generalizes earlier results in the downside risk literature is developed and empirically tested using a multivariate approach. By specifying risk as deviations below any arbitrary target rate of return, the generalized Mean-Lower Partial Moment (MLPM) model overcomes the limited appeal of earlier formulations, and, moreover, a large class of extant pricing models using alternative risk measures (variance, semivariance, semideviation, probability of loss, etc.) becomes special cases of the new framework. Empirical tests indicate that the new model cannot be rejected against an unspecified alternative for a large set of target rates of return. The traditional CAPM, on the other hand, is rejected as a well-specified alternative. The MLPM target rates inferred from market data appear to be related to equity market mean returns rather than to the riskfree rate, the target rate that is implicit in the CAPM and explicit in earlier downside risk formulations.

An individual is repeatedly offered the opportunity to invest in a risky asset whose return distribution is unknown. Because the return distribution is constant over time, however, he is able to learn about that distribution by observing investment outcomes. Results are presented regarding the asymptotically optimal investment behavior of a risk-averse individual under these circumstances when his aim is to maximize the expected utility of his end-of-horizon wealth. For the class of isoelastic utility functions with constant relative risk averson less than one, the optimal investment approaches a constant proportion of wealth. The limiting proportion is the same as the proportion put up by the most optimistic individual when the investment opportunity is offered only once. These results are then extended by generalizing the class of utility functions under consideration and, at the same time, restricting the class of possible investment schemes. This paper is distinguished from the previous literature by the assumption of conditional independence of returns across periods.

In a dynamic framework, the advantage of leverage depends upon the firm's recapitalization policy. We show that if bonds are callable at par, then equityholders have an incentive to recapitalize too early. Call premia and issue discounts, however, mitigate the agency problem of early recapitalization. The model provides the optimal call premium and issue discount as a function of firm-specific characteristics. An analysis of a bond sample supports the model's prediction that the optimal call premium is positively related to firm risk.

Focusing on takeover bids for which the outcome can be predicted in advance with certainty, Grossman and Hart established the proposition, which subsequent work accepted, that successful bids must be made at or above the expected value of minority shares. This proposition provided the basis for Grossman and Hart's identification of a free-rider problem and became a major premise for the analysis of takeovers. This paper shows that this important proposition does not always hold once we drop the assumption that the only successful bids are those whose success could have been predicted with certainty. In particular, it is shown that any unconditional bid that is below the expected value of minority shares but above the independent target's per share value will succeed with a positive probability, that the bidder's expected payoff from such a bid (not counting the transaction costs of making the bid) is always positive, and that bidders might elect to make such bids. These results have implications for the nature of the free-rider problem and for the operation of takeovers; in particular, it is shown that, when a raider can increase the value of a target's assets, the raider might elect to bid even if no dilution of minority shares is possible and it holds no initial stake in the target.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a link between the various multivariate tests of asset pricing and a performance measure for asset sets. The paper includes a unified summary of various F tests for mean-variance efficiency, intersection, and spanning for sets and subsets of financial assets. Both the risk-free asset and no risk-free asset environments are discussed. These tests are then related to the concept of potential performance for asset sets. The potential performance measure can be viewed as an extension of the Sharpe performance measure for single portfolios. The economic intuition behind the tests is that the multivariate tests of portfolio efficiency, intersection, and spanning are tests of zero potential performance at particular margins between the asset or portfolio subset and the full asset set.

A large mean price change is observed on the last daily NYSE transaction. This suggests that closing prices may not consistently represent stock values. Transaction prices are studied to further characterize the day-end price rise and to determine whether it is due to any limited subsample of stocks or dates. The results indicate that the phenomenon is pervasive over most firms and days. Some evidence suggests that it is caused by a change in the frequency of ask prices at day-end.

This paper examines the determinants of commodity futures hedging and of risk premia arising from covariation of the futures price with stock market returns, and with the revenues of producers. Owing to supply shocks that stochastically redistribute real wealth (surplus) between producers and consumers, and to limited participation in the futures market, the total risk premium in the model is not proportional to the contract's covariance with aggregate consumption. Stock market variability interacts with the incentive to hedge, causing the producer hedging component of the risk premium to increase (decrease) with income elasticity, for a normal (inferior) good. Production costs that depend on output raise the premium. We argue that output and demand shocks will typically be positively correlated, raising the premium. High supply elasticity reduces the absolute heding premium by reducing the variability of spot price and revenue.

We derive formulas for the valuation of call options on stocks and bonds when the defaultfree rate is stochastic. The formulas highlight the role of the correlation between the unanticipated returns on the underlying security and the changes in the short-term rate in determining the options value. Our numerical analysis indicates that option prices predicted by the proposed formula differ from those predicted by the Black and Scholes formula when this correlation is relatively large and the short-term rate's instantaneous variance is relatively large as well. Moreover, the proposed formula predicts higher (lower) stock option prices than those predicted by the Black and Scholes formula for correlation values that are lower (higher) than some positive critical value.

This study examines whether stock returns provide forecasts of changes in interest rates and inflation. In contrast to earlier work that indicated that changes in expected inflation negatively affect stock returns, we find a statistically significant positive relation between stock returns and future inflation rate changes as well as a significant positive relation between stock returns and future interest rate changes. Real estate investment trusts, which are particularly interest- and inflation-sensitive securities, provide better forecasts than a broad market index. Finally, we find that most of the evidence supporting the forecasting ability of stock returns occurs in the October 1979 to October 1982 period when the Federal Reserve Board chose not to counteract interest rate changes.

Among the possible consequences of agency problems between corporate owners and managers is a tendency by managers to make investment decisions for their firms that are deliberately aimed at reducing firm risk, as a means to control managers’ personal wealth risk. The literature has suggested that such behavior may occur to the detriment of shareholder wealth, and that mergers may be a particular class of investment decisions for which the behavior would be observable. We test these hypotheses empirically, but find no evidence from our merger sample that risk reduction for the acquiring firm is the typical outcome nor that, when it occurs, it is differentially costly for shareholders.

This paper tests the Kraus-Litzenberger (1976) three-moment capital asset pricing model using Hansen's (1982) generalized method-of-moments (GMM). The GMM approach does not impose strong distributional assumptions on the asset returns. This is an interesting issue since there is no obvious multivariate distribution for returns that also exhibits co-skewness. Using monthly stock returns to test the model, there is some evidence that systematic skewness is priced.

This paper provides a simple method to account for heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional dependence in samples with large cross sections and relatively few time-series observations. The method is motivated by cross-sectional regression studies in finance and accounting. Simulation evidence suggests that these estimators are dependable in small samples and may be useful when generalized least squares is infeasible, unreliable, or computationally too burdensome. We also consider efficiency issues and show that, in principle, asymptotic efficiency can be improved using a technique due to Cragg (1983).

This paper examines rational expectations in the Treasury bill market from 1961 to 1988 with a risk premium specified to be proportional to the volatility of excess returns using instrumental variables. From 1961 to 1972 and from 1972 to 1979, rational expectations cannot be rejected, and both the predictive power of the yield curve and the risk premium are highly significant. By contrast, with just a constant risk premium and with a risk premium proxied by moving averages of absolute interest rate changes, rational expectations are rejected for each subperiod, and the yield curve has significant predictive information only from 1972 to 1979.

February and August peaks in the growth rates of the seasonally unadjusted Industrial Production Index follow the stock market peaks documented by Rozeff and Kinney (1976) by one month. Coefficients on one-month lead growth rates in industrial production for small firms are positive and significant in time-series regressions even in the presence of the market factor. Moreover, whereas returns on large firms' stocks unidirectionally Granger cause (i.e., predict) future growth rates in industrial production at least six months in advance, returns on small firms' stocks reflect one-month lead as well as past growth rates in industrial production. For these reasons, we argue that seasonal real growth provides a partial explanation for the January stock seasonal among small firms.

A contingent claims approach to capital budgeting may be preferable to traditional methods where uncertainty and managers' strategic reactions to changing conditions are important. As an example of such a case, we solve the classical problem of the duration of an investment in forestry resources (i.e., when to cut down the trees) in the general case of stochastic output prices and stochastic natural growth rate and timber inventories. A contingent claims approach is used to value the forestry resources as a function of: (1) stochastic prices and inventories, and (2) an asymmetric, optimal production policy that incorporates the option to halt timber production temporarily.

A spot portfolio of rate-sensitive assets can be hedged by a portfolio of interest-sensitive futures contracts. The hedge ratios of minimum-variance portfolios are unique when the fixed cash flows of underlying instruments are linearly independent and when the covariance matrix of unexpected changes in spot rates over the term of the cash flows is of full rank. Hilliard's (1984) full-rank model has produced smaller portfolio variances than a duration model in a short-term hedging context. However, the methodology typically requires extensive econometric analysis. This paper develops a structured covariance matrix of full rank that requires only one parameter estimate. Hedging examples are provided.