Comparative analyses of welfare systems have largely proceeded on the basis that coherent nation-states exist. This assumption was always problematic – as many theorists have acknowledged – but globalisation processes have added a further dimension to this debate, not least because of the increasing power of global cities that act as coordinating hubs for the global economy. Although residing in nation-states, these cities have a special status flowing from their central role in the global economy with often rather different economic, demographic and social contexts. While there is growing literature on global cities, what the rise of these cities means for social policy and for welfare states remains an underexplored issue. Here we outline some key issues the rise of global cities presents for welfare states before proceeding to illustrate both theoretical and practical issues we highlight through a case study of Mexico City.

Using data from The International Social Survey Programme this paper compares the social networks of those aged 50 and above in 18 countries. Two different types of networks are conceptualised: family contact and community participation. Using qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), international sets are established for four groups of countries. Set one includes countries that only satisfy a minimal number of social network thresholds (France, Norway, Great Britain, Denmark and the USA). Set two includes a homogeneous group of countries with above-threshold rates of marriage and community participation (Australia, New Zealand, Germany, Austria and Canada). Other separate sets with stronger social network features comprise Eastern European countries (set three) and Southern Europe countries (set four) in these sets, family contacts are above the international country average but community participation is less strong. Country sets with low comparative threshold scores in the QCA are argued to be likely to be in greater need of government care policy interventions.

Over recent decades there has been an international shift towards multi-level governance. Against this backdrop, many comparative welfare studies take government policy outputs as the starting point for their analysis. However, the associated pluralization of electoral systems in unitary states means that welfare choices are no longer exclusively informed by single state-wide ballots. Accordingly, this study makes an original contribution by exploring the formative role of electoral discourse in shaping social policy divergence in (quasi-)federal states. It does this through an examination of party politicization and the issue-salience of homelessness in manifestos for UK state-wide and regional elections. The findings reveal how electoral discourse is a key driver of policy divergence. These territorially-specific structural narratives are used to propose a model of welfare divergence in multi-level systems, one that is cognizant of the formative role of electoral discourse in shaping the development of welfare regimes.

This article explores the role of cultural assumptions in the formation of the only Iranian social programme designed exclusively for women, “Empowering Women without Guardians”. It examines these assumptions at different stages of the policy process: problem definition, policy formulation, and policy adoption. As shown, assumptions behind the adopted policy are not consistent with the ones underlying the original problem definition; women are considered mothers at the problem definition stage, but at the policy adoption stage they are understood as workers. The relative power of these assumptions helps explain both continuity and change in Iranian social policy towards women.

This article undertakes a detailed analysis of the formative role of the World Bank in the framing of youth unemployment. It charts the World Bank's emergence as a powerful political actor in this policy field and identifies the ideational content of its policy discourses on the causes of youth unemployment and responses to it. Four principal themes are identified: skills deficits; wage regulation; the “demographication” of explanations for burgeoning youth unemployment; and connections between youth unemployment, criminal activity and social disorder. The discussion highlights significant evidence of neo-liberal continuity and reinvention in World Bank discourses as its normative and ideational frameworks are extended to new terrains of analysis in ways that infer links between youth unemployment and individual deficits of the unemployed.

Recognition of the significance of public wage employment programmes in tackling unpredictable community “covariate” shocks and ensuring livelihood security of the rural poor has led to the enactment of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, with state guarantee of work. Implementation of the Act, our empirical findings tell us, has become the site of tangible exchanges between state and society, with factors such as the level of material support for it, the balance of power between the local state and the poor on the ground, and the larger socio-economic structure determining programme outcomes.

This paper offers a theoretical and empirical contribution to our understanding of the changing European social models in wake of the economic crisis and the promotion of social investments by the European Commission. Theoretically, the article provides a conceptual framework for comparative macro-analysis of social investments that takes into account how social investment policies and returns vary over the life-course and are interdependent. Empirically, the article uses this conceptual framework to examine whether EU policy strategies and national welfare reforms follow a social investment approach. Analysing developments of social investment strategies and policies in three life-stages, the article finds that many EU strategies embody elements of a social investment strategy whereas the impact of the crisis on the national level differs across countries, life-stages, and policies. In most countries, the overall policy impact of the crisis seems to be small on childcare coverage, large on youth polarization, and to increase retirement ages. The crisis will be felt in years to come with reduced life-income for younger cohorts, lower fertility laying the ground for intergenerational conflicts, and migration of skilled youth implying returns of social investments made in southern parts of Europe benefitting northern parts. That said, the overall evidence points towards social investments taking a larger role in Europe after the crisis. However, the result is unlikely to become a uniform European social investment model as the countries most in need of social investments are also the countries least likely to develop high-quality social investments.