The American public has increasingly identified health care as a key issue of concern. In order to address the multiple problems relating to the access and affordability of health care, President Obama and federal lawmakers across the political spectrum continue to call for major health reform. In any debate on health reform, a predictable set of complex policy, management, economic, and legal issues is likely to be raised. Due to the diverse interests involved, these issues could lead to a series of high-stakes policy debates. Therefore, it is critical that advocates of reform strategies anticipate such issues in order to decrease the likelihood that legally resolvable questions become barriers to substantive health reform. In an effort to frame and study legal challenges and solutions in advance of the heat of political debate, the O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation have crafted the “Legal Solutions in Health Reform” project.

Presidential power has provoked increasingly vigorous debate since the turn of this century. In recent years, scholars and lawyers have been grappling with how Congress’s dictates may limit the president’s Commander-in-Chief power to detain enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay, to fight wars abroad, and to conduct intelligence activities at home. But policymakers have not yet explored the many possibilities for invoking the president’s “Take Care” power to change health care policy.

This article explores the scope and limits of President Barack Obama’s ability to invoke his executive authority to reform health care. Specifically, it identifies ways the Obama Administration can use directives to: (1) expand Medicaid and State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) coverage through section 1115 waivers; (2) test quality initiatives through Medicare demonstration authority; (3) expand health information technology; (4) allow drug reimportation and experiment with contracting power under Medicare; (5) enhance patient protections and private coverage requirements; (6) lift coverage restrictions on Medicaid and SCHIP; and (7) build on the health insurance program for federal employees. Consistent with the mission of the Legal Solutions in Health Reform project, this article does not endorse a particular policy. Instead of recommending “what,” it explains “how.”

Many proposals to reform health care finance and delivery require individuals or private employers to pay for private health insurance. Senators Ron Wyden and Robert Bennett’s Healthy Americans Act, for instance, would require every adult person who is not covered by a public program to purchase health insurance. Similarly, President Obama’s campaign proposal requires that parents arrange for coverage of their minor children and that all but small employers pay a tax if they do not provide their workers health insurance.

This paper addresses the constitutionality of such proposals. Compulsory health insurance might raise constitutional concerns because there is no existing social legislation that serves as a perfect legal analogy to an individual mandate for private health insurance. Insurance mandates are familiar in other contexts, such as automobile liability, but they present an easier case for constitutionality because they are a condition of exercising a privilege, such as driving a car.

This “Legal Solutions in Health Reform” paper identifies and analyzes the legal issues raised by health insurance exchanges. Like all Legal Solutions papers, it does not purport to provide a concrete proposal as to how health insurance exchanges should be organized or even whether they should play a role in health care reform. Rather, it attempts simply to describe the legal issues that health insurance exchanges raise, and to propose alternative solutions to legal problems where useful. More specifically, it analyzes and offers alternative solutions to the legal problems raised by proposals to establish insurance exchanges by the federal government, by state governments, and by private entities or associations. Because the focus of this project and paper is on legal issues, discussion of policy and design issues is attenuated. Nevertheless, some attention to policy issues is unavoidable because law is the realization of policy.

This Legal Solutions in Health Reform paper discusses the role that tax law can play in the implementation of health reform. The tax code has served as the primary vehicle for subsidizing health care in the U.S. for most of the last century and will likely play a role in any future reform efforts. However, the interplay between tax law and health policy presents a series of critical design and implementation challenges with which any health care reform package — be they liberal or conservative — must grapple. This paper considers some of the most pressing of these issues. While it does not prescribe a particular outcome, it will attempt to identify potential tax solutions that might receive broad support and to observe the policy and administrative design questions that any discussion of these solutions should take into account.

It should come as no surprise to any observer of health policy debates that the preemption provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) will play a major role in determining the contours of any health reform initiative. For the past few years, many states have been aggressively pursuing health reform experiments, while congressional action has essentially been deadlocked along partisan political lines. Yet after the 2008 election results, there is reason to expect considerable congressional attention to health reform. President Obama has made health reform a priority of his administration, and several members of Congress have long been waiting for an opportunity to pursue health reform legislation.

This is an important time to focus on the question of insurance discrimination based on health status. The nation once again is poised to embark on a major health care reform debate. Even as the number of uninsured stands at some 45 million persons, millions more may be poised to lose coverage during the worst economic downturn in generations. In addition, a large number of persons may be seriously under-insured, with coverage falling significantly below the cost of necessary health care. In recent years, the proportion of insured persons who are underinsured has grown by 60% since 2003, reaching an estimated 25 million persons in 2007. Health care costs experienced by insured persons now account for more than 75% of all personal bankruptcies related to medical care. Underlying these figures is a national approach to health care financing for the non-elderly that effectively increases the odds that those who are in poor health status will be uninsured or underinsured.

In discussions of health reform, the increased use of health information technology (health IT) is a common element of nearly every serious proposal on the table. Health IT includes electronic health records kept by providers, personal health records offered by health insurance plans or owned by consumers, and electronic health information exchanges. Although health reform initiatives being discussed contain little detail regarding health IT, in general they promote health IT to facilitate the electronic sharing of health information to improve individual and population health. During the 2008 presidential campaign, the health care proposals of both President Obama and Senator McCain discussed health IT. President Obama’s proposal invests $50 billion over the next five years to promote the adoption of health IT with privacy safeguards. Senator McCain’s plan also encouraged the adoption of health IT, with an emphasis on coordination.

This paper analyzes the legal issues associated with the leading and much-debated proposals that aim to revitalize state regulatory competition and allow individuals to purchase insurance across state lines (PASL). These proposals seek to reverse decades-old principles of state preeminence in the regulation of individual health insurance and instead create “jurisdictional competition” in the individual market by allowing an insurer to choose the state under whose law it wishes to be regulated, subject to certain consumer protections. Advocates say this type of jurisdictional competition would reform perceived problems in the individual market and lower the costs of individual health insurance by imposing the regulatory authority of only the insurer’s selected “home” state.