This article deals with a foreign policy question of extraordinary importance: what responsibilities do States have to provide economic and technical assistance to other States that have high levels of need affecting the health and life of their citizens? The question is important for a variety of reasons. There exist massive inequalities in health globally, with the result that poorer countries shoulder a disproportionate burden of disease and premature death. Average life expectancy in Africa is nearly 30 years shorter than in the Americas or Europe. In one year alone, an estimated 14 million of the poorest people in the world died, while only an estimated four million would have died if this population had the same death rate as the global rich.

As our world becomes increasingly interconnected, threats to global public health continue to proliferate. New and novel risks to health have emerged consistently over the past 30 years. Moreover, our shrinking world now allows health threats to spread more quickly than ever before. Given these realities, efforts to protect and improve global health must be expansive, flexible, and able to take into account the variety of circumstances that may imperil good health. These efforts also must consider the multiple levels and varying contexts in which laws, policies, and other factors govern global health and affect health outcomes.

In confronting the insalubrious ramifications of globalization, human rights scholars and activists have argued for greater national and international responsibility pursuant to the human right to health. Codified seminally in Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the right to health proclaims that states bear an obligation to realize the “highest attainable standard” of health for all. However, in pressing for the highest attainable standard for each individual, the right to health has been ineffective in compelling states to address burgeoning inequalities in underlying determinants of health, focusing on individual medical treatments at the expense of public health systems. This article contends that the paradigm of individual health, focused on a right to individual medical care, is incapable of responding to health inequities in a globalized world and thereby hampers efforts to operationalize health rights through public health systems. While the right to health has evolved in international discourse over time, this evolution of the individual right to health cannot address the harmful societal ramifications of economic globalization. Rather than relying solely upon an individual right to medical care, envisioning a collective right to public health – a right applied at the societal level to address underlying determinants of health – would alleviate many of the injurious health inequities of globalization.

Important medical advances over the last several decades have vastly improved the technical capacity to control human pain. Millions of patients suffering from cancer, HIV/AIDS, and other conditions have been able to find relief from incapacitating chronic and acute pain. However, despite these developments, pain remains severely under treated worldwide, particularly in developing countries. The tragic consequence is that for millions of people around the globe, excruciating pain is an inescapable reality of life.

The two questions, “What is public health law?” and “How can law improve the public’s health?”, are perennial ones for public health law scholars. They are ideological questions because perceptions about the proper boundaries of law’s role will shape perceptions of what law can do, in an operational sense, to improve health outcomes. They are also theoretical questions, in the sense that, without closing down debate about the limits of public health law, these questions can be addressed by mapping the range of perspectives on how law might “go to work” for the public’s health. Finally, these are immensely practical questions. On our ability to understand the roles that law can play in public health improvement rests our capacity, as a society, to use law strategically as a policy tool.

H5N1 avian influenza has reportedly claimed the lives of 186 persons worldwide, 77 of whom resided in Indonesia. On February 7, 2007, the government of Indonesia announced that it would withhold strains of H5N1 avian influenza virus from the World Health Organization (WHO). On the same day, Indonesia signed a memorandum of agreement with Baxter Healthcare, a United States-based company, to purchase samples and presumably ensure access to subsequent vaccines at a discount.

Corporations, through their products and behaviors, exert a strong effect on the wellbeing of populations. Public health practitioners and academics have long recognized the harms associated with some corporations’ products. For example, firearms are associated with approximately 30,000 deaths in the United States each year1 and over 200,000 deaths globally. Motor vehicles are associated with about 40,000 deaths in the United States each year and over 1.2 million deaths globally. Tobacco products kill about 438,000 people each year in the United States5 and about 4.9 million people worldwide. In addition to producing unsafe or harmful products, some corporations behave in ways that negatively impact the public’s health, such as marketing alcohol to youth and other vulnerable populations. Given these observations, one can conclude that it is possible to quantify the public health impact of individual industries, such as firearms, motor vehicles, tobacco, and alcohol. Health professionals can then target these individual industries to prevent or lessen the harms they cause.

The issue of detention as a tuberculosis control measure has resurfaced following the prolonged detention of a patient with an extensively drug-resistant strain of tuberculosis in a prison cell in Arizona, and the attempted detention in Italy and subsequent detention in Atlanta, Georgia of an American sufferer thought to have XDR-TB in May 2007. These cases have reignited the debate over the evidence that supports detention policy in the control of tuberculosis, and its associated legal and ethical ramifications. This paper considers whether involuntary detention is justified where voluntary measures have failed or where a patient poses a danger, albeit uncertain, to the public, and discusses the need for strengthening evidencebased assessments of public health risk.

Dramatic events involving dangerous microbes often focus attention on isolation and quarantine as policy instruments. The incident in May-June 2007 involving Andrew Speaker and drug-resistant tuberculosis (TB) joins other communicable disease crises that have forced contemplation or actual application of quarantine powers. Implementation of quarantine powers, which encompasses authority for both isolation and quarantine actions, is important not only for the handling of a specific event but also because the use of such authority provides a window on broader issues of public health and the legal rules, ethical principles, and governance systems that support it. Debates about quarantine powers reflect political and social attitudes about public health that often tell us more about this policy endeavor than acts of isolation and quarantine themselves.

This article explores a unique opportunity for shaping public health law and policy to reflect a greater balance between public and private goods in two areas of primary concern to human well-being: medicine and human biosecurity. This opportunity is presented both by the rapid changes likely to occur in these areas as a result of nanotechnology and the fact that multinational corporate actors have not yet had the opportunity to use their well-honed techniques of governance influence to modify public health policy and law in this area to their own narrowly focused advantage. Such a rare opportunity to rethink some fundamental assumptions about a regulatory framework for globally important health issues in advance is one reason why issues concerning nanotechnology regulation in medicine and human biosecurity should have considerable interest to health law and policy scholars.

The role of government in assuring population access to affordable and appropriate health care represents a central question for any nation. Of particular concern is access to prescription drug coverage, not only because of the vital role played by drugs in modern medicine, but also because of their high costs. This article examines the sharply contrasting prescription drug coverage and payment policies found in Australia and the U.S. – strong political allies and international trading partners – and describes how key U.S. interests have sought, through an aggressive trade agenda, to expand markets for U.S. goods and services, even when market expansions clash with other nations’ contrasting emphasis on social equity and fairness. Indeed, the nation’s bilateral free trade negotiations have brought the contours of this policy schism into sharp relief.

In recent years, scholars have begun to lay the groundwork to justify a distinct application of ethics to the field of public health. They have highlighted important features that differentiate public health ethics from bioethics, especially public health’s emphasis on population health rather than issues of individual health. Articulations of public health ethics also tend to emphasize the role of social justice compared to the predominance of autonomy in the bioethical literature. Now that the field of public health ethics is developing a unique focus and a language of its own, including a code of ethics disseminated by the American Public Health Association, the future of public health ethics may well be global health ethics, focusing on issues of global justice. As public health ethics evolves from its nascent stage of reflection to a place of action and application in the national and global arenas, two interrelated developments will need to occur: (1) public health professionals, including practitioners, policymakers, and scholars, will need a richer understanding of the ethical challenges practitioners face on a daily basis and (2) scholars will need to develop useful tools (i.e., frameworks) that practitioners may employ for identifying and tackling these ethical challenges.

On April 16, 2007, Cho Seung-Hui used two semiautomatic handguns to kill 32 persons and then himself at Virginia Tech University in the largest campus shooting in U.S. history. Mr. Cho purchased his handguns from a pawnshop and a gun store in Virginia, where under state law a background check was conducted to determine whether he had any disqualifying criminal or mental health history. The paperwork for the background check was completed at the gun store, and the check itself was conducted through an “instant” system facilitated by a toll-free telephone number. The entire transaction took approximately 20 minutes. At no point was Mr. Cho asked why he wished to purchase the guns. And although he had been deemed a potential danger to himself by a state magistrate in 2005 – which should have disqualified his purchase of a gun under federal law – this information never reached those conducting the background check.

It is axiomatic that the first responsibility of researchers, whether they are working in the developed or the developing world, is to (strive to) do no harm to those who participate in their studies or trials. However, on neither side of the Atlantic is there any such settled view with regard to the responsibility of researchers to attend to the ancillary-care needs of their participants – that is, a responsibility to advise or assist participants who have medical condition X in circumstances where the research concerns medical condition Y, and the research did not contribute to the presence of condition X in participants, nor did the having of condition X contribute to the research. Consider, for example, the following hypothetical posed by Leah Belsky and Henry Richardson:

Physicians have long served as expert witnesses in litigation, and their medical knowledge can contribute to the appropriate resolution of a case. However, ethical issues may arise when physicians appear on behalf of the tobacco industry. Two ways that doctors participate in lawsuits are through depositions (statements given under oath before trial to attorneys, who often use them to prepare the case or develop a strategy) and by testifying in court during trial. The Tobacco Deposition and Trial Testimony Archive (DATTA) is an electronic database of depositions, trial testimony, opening and closing statements, and other material from tobacco lawsuits collected by the Center for Tobacco Use Prevention and Research. At the time the research for this article was conducted, the database included depositions and trial testimony of expert witnesses from 232 smoking and health cases.

The desire to have healthy and happy children is the most basic parental instinct. A parent's moral obligation to care for the child extends before the moment of birth back to the point of conception. In classical Jewish tradition, the Talmud itself offers pregnant women advice on how to improve the well-being of their offspring, such as eating parsley in order to have handsome children, drinking wine in order to bear healthy children, or eating coriander to have especially plump children. We stand on the cusp of a new era today because an explosion of genetic knowledge in recent years has provided us the ability to pursue certain health and wellness advantages even before pregnancy has begun. Technology called preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) allows parents to screen the DNA of embryos fertilized in vitro and to implant only those embryos that match the parents' desired genetic makeup. This may include selecting only embryos guaranteed not to have a particular genetic disease, only embryos of one particular gender, or eventually even only embryos with a predisposition for certain traits such as height, eye color, or enhanced memory.

In a little noted passage in A Theory of Justice, John Rawls argued that genetic intervention in the traits of offspring may be morally required as a matter of distributive justice. Given that the “greater natural assets” of each “enables him to pursue a preferred plan of life[,]” Rawls wrote, the parties to the original position “want to insure for their descendents the best genetic endowment.…Thus over time a society is to take steps at least to preserve the general level of natural abilities and to prevent the diffusion of serious defects.…The pursuit of reasonable policies in this regard is something that earlier generations owe to later ones.” (Emphasis added.) Whether biological enhancement actually is a moral obligation we owe to future generations is a question that I have taken up elsewhere, but which lies beyond my scope here. If we agree with Rawls that some measure of safe and effective genetic intervention may be required as a matter of justice, it stands to ask how the distribution of genetic goods – that is, the hereditary basis of human traits – should be carried out.

Many commentators have expressed concern that large investments in biomedical research over the past two decades have not been translated effectively into clinical applications. In its Critical Path Report, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) characterized the problem as a “technological disconnect between discovery and the product development process,” and documented that the number of investigational new drugs (INDs) submitted to the agency had declined “significantly” since 2000. Along a similar vein, another study found that only five of 101 basic science studies showing significant therapeutic promise were successfully translated into clinical applications.

This perceived translational lag is stimulating a shift toward human testing of study interventions earlier in the drug development process. One indication of this trend is a recent guidance encouraging sponsors to pursue human “exploratory” studies before embarking on phase I trials.