This paper explores a grey area of psychiatric practice and, as with other challenging practices, the law is called upon to navigate conflicting legal issues. In particular, this paper explores the covert administration of medication: the concealment of medication in food or drink so that it will be consumed undetected. Rights-based approaches support nuanced understanding of the practices. Few policies, protocols or guidelines govern the practice in Ontario's psychiatric settings. While covert medication is understood to have “something to do” with rights, there is confusion about how those rights play out on the ground. Institutional silences underlie and reinforce the practice. Most pressing, the covert administration of medication warrants an overt discussion, including of its impact on the rights-experience of persons in psychiatric settings.

This paper highlights the need to apply an equity lens when assessing the impact of preemption and related legal doctrines on community health. Community autonomy to set and pursue public health priorities is an essential part of achieving health equity. Unfortunately, the priorities of organized industry interest groups often conflict with health equity goals. These groups have a history of successfully using law to limit community autonomy to pursue public health measures, most notably through preemption and related legal doctrines. We examine this phenomenon using two examples. First, we look at dental association efforts to block the spread of dental therapists in Indian Country. Native dental therapists have been improving the oral health of native people in Alaska for over a decade; yet the national and state dental associations have sought with mixed success to leverage state and federal laws to hinder other tribal governments from utilizing these providers. We compare these efforts with a restaurant association-led movement to limit what municipal governments can do to address food-based health inequities, focusing on a “model” ALEC bill that started in Ohio. Finally, we discuss how municipalities and Tribes are fighting back and continuing to pursue health equity for their communities.

Stigma can lead to poor health outcomes. At the same time, people who are perceived as unhealthy may experience stigma as the result of that perception. As part of a larger project examining discrimination on the basis of health status or “healthism,” we explore the role of stigma in producing disadvantage based on health status. Specifically, we look to the principles of health equality and health justice. An intervention violates health equality when it is driven by animus, which can be the result of stigma. Additionally, laws and policies offend health justice when they worsen health outcomes or they create or deepen health disparities. An intervention that produces stigma — whether intentionally or unintentionally — may offend health justice by making people worse off, in absolute or in comparative terms. Stigma-related health laws and policies can therefore be healthist in at least two ways. We therefore conclude that stigma should neither be the basis, nor the product, of efforts to improve health.

This article argues that teenagers become fully capable of consenting to participation in most IRB-approved research involving human subjects at age 14, four years earlier than they are allowed to consent under virtually all states' laws, and, consequently, four years younger than they are able to consent under currently applicable federal regulations. In determining the age at which person is old enough to have decision-making authority, legal institutions look at the intellectual and emotional maturity of someone of the age of the decision-maker, the risks and benefits of allowing the decision to be made by someone of that age, and the risks and benefits of denying a person of that age the authority to make the decision. Given the high level of safety of participating in IRB approved research, the value of doing so for both the society and the teenage subject, and the psychological and neuropsychological research on the specific nature of emotional and intellectual development during the teen years, the balance comes out in favor of allowing younger teens, by the age of 14, authority to consent to participate as subjects in IRB approved research. The current process requiring both teen assent and parental permission should give way to a process that requires only a teen's consent.

This paper discusses recent changes to state legal frameworks for mandatory vaccination in the context of school and healthcare worker vaccination. It then discusses state laws that allow pharmacists the authority to vaccinate.

The practice of covertly administering medications to patients without their consent is often discussed in the framework of legal questions around the right of patients to consent and refuse medical treatment. However, this practice also raises significant questions surrounding the professional duties and obligations of health care professionals as it relates to the decision-making process of whether to engage in the covert administration of medications. In this paper, I present an overview of the origin of those duties and obligations, and discuss how those duties and obligations when seen from different perspectives may either justify or prohibit the practice. Further, I discuss whether the duties and obligations of health care professionals as they are currently framed are suited to address the complexities of this issue both from the health care professional and patient perspectives. This analysis is conducted in the context of duties and obligations that arise from not only legal framework but also from the ethical requirements from professional codes of ethics.