We examine whether changes in the degree of pension funding affect economic growth. Our sample consists of 54 countries, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as well as non-OECD, during 2001–10. We do not find any effect of changes in the degree of funding on growth in the short-run. For the long-run the evidence is mixed. Although a growth model with overlapping observations suggests that there is a positive effect of funding changes on economic growth, we find no effect in a simple cross-sectional model.

This study examines the expected retirement replacement rates (RRs) of several cohorts of Dutch employees at the time of their planned retirements. It also computes RRs based on the available pension records. We find that the expected replacement rate (E(RR)) is, in general, higher than the ones we compute. Larger discrepancies are found for younger cohorts and for individuals with less education and working experience. We also examine the difference between the expected and computed RRs and find that the mismatch is mostly related to poor institutional knowledge. We also show the role of assumptions about institutions and wage profiles in determining our results.

Although demographic change leaves pay-as-you-go pension systems unsustainable, reforms, such as a higher pension age, are highly unpopular. This contribution looks into the role of intrinsic motivation as a driver for pension reform preferences. Theoretical reasoning suggests that this driver should be relevant as it decreases the subjective costs of a higher pension age. We test this key hypothesis on the basis of the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS). The results are unambiguous: in addition to factors such as age or education, the inclusion of intrinsic work motivation helps improving our prediction of an individual's reform orientation.

We use a large sample of defined benefit (DB) pension plans to document economically significant differences in the risk-taking of plans sponsored by privately-held versus publicly-traded firms. The magnitude and the main determinants of pension plan risk-taking are different for public and private firms. The effect of pension liabilities’ funded status on risk-taking is two and a half times higher for plans with publicly-traded sponsors than for plans with private sponsors. In contrast, changing sponsor contributions has more than four times higher effect on risk-taking for plans with private sponsors. The results suggest that the alignment of incentives for the stakeholders in a pension contract is different for plans sponsored by private versus publicly-traded firms.