This study investigates the conditions under which pro-status quo groups increase their advocacy success during an entire policymaking process. It scrutinises whether pro-status quo defenders who are involved in multiple institutional venues and who join many coalitions of interest groups are able to achieve their policy preferences. A case study focussing on the regulation of stem cell research in California traces the policymaking process and the related advocacy activities of interest groups in legislative, administrative, judicial and direct democratic venues. The empirical results, which are based on a formal social network analysis, reveal that very few groups are multivenue players and members of several coalitions. In addition, occupying a central network position is insufficient for the pro-status quo groups to improve their advocacy success.

In recent years, United States (US) policymakers have instituted quadrennial strategy reviews in several major policy areas. In this article, I examine why policymakers have initiated these large strategic reviews, and why a particular model for them has diffused from the US Defense Department to other government agencies. I find that policymakers have initiated the reviews principally to spur organisational change in agencies and influence the relationship between agencies and the Congress, and that policymakers have replicated the Defense Department’s review model because of that department’s strong political support. My findings suggest more generally that formal strategy activities are often driven more by legislative-executive and bureaucratic politics than by a search for new strategic ideas. Commonalities between the diffusion of quadrennial reviews in the US and the diffusion of other strategy and planning processes internationally underscore the broader applicability and significance of these findings.

The landmark United States healthcare reform law – the Affordable Care Act – provides an opportunity to study the dynamics of implementation for complex, politically contentious policies. Matland’s Ambiguity-Conflict Model suggests that bottom-up models will dominate in such cases. I exploit variation across states in the implementation of online health insurance marketplaces to test whether the federal- (top-down) or state-managed (bottom-up) implementation model produced better outcomes. Specifically, the study examines if state, federal or partnership exchanges were most effective at offering generous plans for consumers based on premiums, deductibles and copayments in 2014, the first year of operation. The results unambiguously indicate that state exchanges were most successful. The findings provide evidence for what Matland suspected – that bottom-up models, by providing more discretion to local implementers to adapt to contexts and build coalitions, are superior for high-conflict, high-ambiguity policies.

Government economic development programmes provide opportunities for firms to leverage financial incentives for business expansion and relocation. This article examines the ability of these incentives to promote employment. Using establishment-level data from the state of Kansas as well as original firm-level survey data, I evaluate the effectiveness of financial incentives in creating jobs through recipient firms. My findings from the establishment-level data indicate that incentive programmes have no discernable impact on firm expansion, measured by job creation. In addition, the survey data suggest that incentive recipients highly recommend this programme to other firms, but few firms actually increased their employment in Kansas because of these incentives; similarly, very few firms would have left the state if they had not benefited from this programme. Thus, incentives have little impact on the relocation or expansion decisions of firms.