The literature on path dependence has emphasized positive feedback effects that make it difficult to shift from a policy regime once it is in place. This article argues that policy regimes may also have strong negative feedback effects that undermine the political, fiscal or social sustainability of an existing policy regime. The prospects for a shift in policy regime depend largely on the balance between positive and negative feedback effects; the availability of incremental reform options that can be used to patch the status quo; and the availability of politically and fiscally attractive regime transition options. The paper argues that differential survival rates of different public pension regimes in western industrial countries can be understood by the interaction of these three factors.

Since the 1980s public investment expenditures have been cut back in many OECD democracies. One explanation is a priority for fiscal stringency in order to curb big government in the context of neo-liberal ideas, which is reinforced by EMU requirements in the 1990s. Another is the potential impact of left and right partisan politics on investment policies. The main finding here is that the overall decrease in public investment expenditure appears to be caused by collateral damage due to the downsizing of total government outlays. This is particularly the case where there is a policy legacy of the Left with high levels of total public spending on the welfare state prior to the 1980s. Where the Right in government has been dominant after 1980, this downward development in public investment is particularly noticeable.

The difficulties of implementing large institutional reforms are legendary. Reform programs may face strong resistance from designated losers, falter at successive veto points, or stall when multiple decision makers have diverse goals. Institutional theories have successfully accounted for failure of reform in many settings, but scholars have paid less attention to how the strategic design of a reform process can have a positive effect on reform initiatives. We seek to fill this gap by studying the impact of planned ambiguity in reform processes. We hypothesize that reform proposals are more likely to succeed when policy entrepreneurs strategically hide the cost-benefit profile of a reform proposal behind a veil of vagueness until the final stages of the process. Designated losers with limited information about the impact of proposed reforms are less likely to succeed in thwarting the reform. We test the theory on four institutional reforms or reform attempts in Denmark.

Risks that emerge during the implementation and enforcement stages of defense procurement help explain procurement outcomes. Adverse events have impacts on the timing, cost and quality of goods supplied. The procurement process is analyzed on the basis of an original dataset covering 48 defense procurement contracts signed by the French Ministry of Defense with 18 European contractors. Contractual problems create the most adverse events in this sector, while technological risk is the second most significant risk. Although opportunism takes various forms, it is found only rarely in these defense contracts.

Security is generally considered a core public good provided by the state. Since outsourcing military and security tasks erodes the state's monopoly of force, we would expect regulation in this area to be stronger than in areas that do not have potentially lethal consequences. But neither caution nor careful regulation is evident in state responses to the emergence of private military and security companies; instead, the industry's rapid growth has outpaced government efforts to control their activities. This article assesses whether two industry associations, the US-based International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) and the British Association of Private Security Companies (BAPSC), have adopted mechanisms necessary for effective self-regulation, and it evaluates different national approaches to self-regulation. Neither the IPOA nor the BAPSC has established self-regulatory mechanisms able to monitor or sanction member companies' behavior. The IPOA's activities correspond to American patterns of self-regulation, while the BAPSC's efforts suggest weaker linkages with the British government than seen in other self-regulatory mechanisms.