This article surveys, from the perspective of systems theory as expounded by Niklas Luhmann, recent developments in the evolution of the role played by Scottish Children's Panels in the protection of children. It traces the way that in England the problem of the paradoxical nature of the social worker's task in protecting children was resolved by reconstructing the problem in legal terms. The same process, it argues, has now occurred in Scottish social work practice, but there ambiguity in the nature of the Children's Panels makes it difficult for social workers to obtain clear legal authority for their actions. Since the Clyde Report on the Orkney case, therefore, considerable controversy has arisen over the future of Children's Panels and, in particular, over their role in emergency situations. This controversy is seen as part of a wider evolutionary process involving law and child welfare, which cannot be adequately explained in terms of changes in political ideology.

This article argues that the writings of T. H. Marshall contain not one, but two, theories of citizenship, and there is a problem about whether they are compatible with one another. The second, less familiar, theory is mainly developed in Marshall's later works, especially The Right to Welfare, but many of its essential features can be found in Citizenship and Social Class, although not in the sections of that work which are most frequently quoted. Several areas where Marshall's shifting views contributed to this second version of citizenship are discussed: citizenship as national membership and as a body of obligations, the reality of social rights, discretion versus enforceable entitlements, citizenship as a bearer of its own inequalities, the relationship with the capitalist class system. Increasingly, Marshall came to restrict citizenship to the political sphere, thereby endorsing a conventional liberal view: but then he was, it is argued, in many respects a pretty conventional liberal. The article concludes by noting the paradox that much of the current interest in Marshall's thought is because a ‘strong’ view of citizenship is attributed to him which he may never have held, and which he certainly relinquished towards the end of his writing career.

The British government's social policy reforms of the late 1980s have been quickly followed by political embarrassment over a series of social issues (crime, single parenthood, benefit fraud, truancy, drugs). Its response, ‘back to basics’, is a rather clumsy attempt to provide a readymix morality as the cement of society and increased reliance on enforcement. This article uses one of the new right's most effective weapons – public choice theory – to analyse the outcomes of strategic interactions within these new institutional structures, showing that they are collectively sub-optimal. New policies, announced in 1993, merely worsen the situation by driving up costs. Furthermore, the rising prices of the ‘positional goods’ enjoyed by better-off households suggest that the majority coalition in favour of the new systems may not be sustainable.

During the 1980s, unit cost inflation more than swallowed up all the increased spending on local authority social services, leaving a 10 per cent net reduction in service volumes. This increase can be only partly explained by increased labour prices and increased client needs resulting from the implementation of community care. Explanations in terms of quality and efficiency changes are explored in relation to individual services, and there appears to be a prima facie case that efficiency reduced during the 1980s.

Variation between local authorities in the costs of apparently similar services rose during the 1980s. An analysis of these variations shows that those authorities which experienced the greatest rise in unit costs also had the greatest reduction in service volumes. Unit cost containment has been greatest where there was grant reduction and a declining local tax base, while volume declined most where there was rate-capping. The rising variation in unit costs has been responsible for the widening gap between standard spending assessments and what local authorities have wanted to spend on personal social services. If these increased variations reflect widening efficiency standards, then reversing this trend will require that social services department managements have both the motivation and capacity to implement unit cost monitoring and control.

Paul Watt's (1993) response to my article ‘A nation of inheritors?’ (Hamnett, 1991) raises some interesting and worthwhile questions about the class basis of housing inheritance which I would like to address and clarify. To recapitulate briefly, my article attempted to assess the validity of Saunders's (1986, 1990) arguments regarding the importance of home ownership and housing inheritance in the creation of a new consumption cleavage independent of social class. Using data from a survey of beneficiaries I argued that although housing inheritance is distributed across the class spectrum, the incidence of inheritance is far greater amongst home owners, higher social classes and those living in southern Britain (where home ownership is longer established) than it is among council tenants, the lower social classes and those living in the north. I argued that there is nothing inherent in a person's social class, housing tenure or location which makes inheritance more likely. On the contrary, the determinants of housing inheritance are influenced by the social characteristics of dying home owners. Because the structure of inheritance reflects the structure of property ownership a generation ago, current differences in the incidence of inheritance will reflect the class and tenure characteristics of the dying population and their relationship to the class and tenure characteristics of beneficiaries. The incidence of housing inheritance is higher among home owners and those in higher social classes because their parents are more likely to have been home owners. I went on to argue that because home ownership has become much more widely spread across the class spectrum over the last 40 years (Hamnett, 1984), the incidence of housing inheritance in 30–40 years' time is likely to be more widely spread than it is today. Thus, I concluded that whilst Saunders' arguments regarding the distribution of house inheritance are not empirically supported today, they may be more so in 30–40 years' time. I argued, however, that although housing inheritance was likely to be more widespread in future than it is today, the children of tenants were unlikely to inherit. Given the growing social residualisation of the council sector I argued that ‘the less skilled, the low income and the unemployed’ were likely to be excluded from inheritance.

In November, the Secretary of State for Social Security announced that benefits would be uprated in line with inflation in April 1995. However, since 1979, there has been a widening gap between the incomes of poor and wealthier households (94—24/2—1.1). A report from the Social Policy Research Unit (SPRU) highlights government failure to uprate benefits in line with earnings as contributing to this growing inequality. Figures produced by the Government Statistical Service on the estimated take-up of incomerelated benefits for 1992 claim that more than four out of five of those eligible claim some £9 out of £10 of the available cash. The figures for family credit show a steady increase in take-up from 57 per cent of the caseload in 1988–9 to 66 per cent in 1991–2. Income support figures suggest that the take-up is now between 77 and 87 per cent.