This article looks at income maintenance pressure groups in Britain (the ‘poverty lobby’) and provides an assessment of their impact on policy in the 1970s. It is based on focused interviews with the leaders of 42 national pressure groups, MPs, Ministers, and senior civil servants. There is a discussion of conceptual and methodological problems involved in measuring effectiveness and a review of the theoretical literature on the role of pressure groups in the British political system. The study adopts a reputational approach to measuring effectiveness rather than a series of case studies. A number of specific successes are highlighted as well as examples of ‘agenda changing’ by groups. An explanation is provided in terms of the environment within which groups were operating, the strategies they adopted, and the resources they had available. The state of the economy was a particularly important factor in the 1970s as was the ability of groups to undertake joint action and form alliances with producer interests. The article concludes that the groups in the 1970s were influential rather than powerful and had more effect in the first part of the decade than at the end.

The discussion of health inequalities in Britain (e.g. in the Black Report) has been conducted largely on the basis of social class mortality differentials measured by achieved social class and not by social class of origin. It is shown in this paper that social class mortality differentials by achieved social class are not invariant to the rate of social mobility and that the use of them is likely to result in a biased measure of trends in health inequalities when the absolute rate of social mobility varies over time. It is further shown that if, as is likely, health status is a factor systematically affecting the probability for an individual of upward or downward social mobility, then an increase in the rate of social mobility may well result in constant or widening social class mortality differentials by achieved social class even if the differentials are narrowing when measured by social class of origin. It is claimed that this process may well explain why the observed social class mortality differentials, which are measured by achieved social class, have not fallen in Britain during the post-1945 period.

The period from 1860 to 1870 saw the growth of a campaign to persuade the Poor Law Board to accept the practice of boarding-out pauper children. This paper examines the nature of the requests made to the board and the responses they elicited. The deterrent aspects of the New Poor Law and the difficulty of securing proper supervision of foster placements were the main objections raised in the board's office. Changes occurred through the direct intervention of George Goschen, appointed president in 1868. The campaign for boarding-out saw not only some success in their direct efforts, but increased the role played by women in poor law administration.

The extreme dispersion of authority and power in the American political system fosters a politics of bargaining, negotiation, and compromise. Nevertheless, technical-rational analysis plays a major role in the identification of public problems and in the legitimation of official responses. We explore this apparent paradox through an examination of the interaction between politics, ideology and analysis in the current crisis of the American public retirement system. Two analytical approaches are employed: an interpretation of the historical evolution of the programme through three relatively distinct phases; and an evaluation of the reports of three recent national commissions which have studied the social security crisis. We argue that in the American system policy must be made through either subsystem or consensual politics. Social security has benefited from the unusual conjunction of these two conditions through most of its history. Policy has been made by a small subsystem dominated by the social security bureaucracy itself and the programme has received widespread bipartisan support. Analysis has been central to this process, but its impact has differed over time. Analysis exerted a decisive influence on the initial shape of the programme even in the absence of an ideological consensus because it enjoyed a quasi-monopoly position in the President's Committee on Economic Security. During the long expansionary phase of the programme, subsystem autonomy and bipartisan consensus together fostered the emergence of a technocratic policy style, but the independent effects of analysis were more apparent than real. The contemporary commissions fail to provide an adequate response to the crisis because their technically competent proposals no longer rest on an underlying consensus and because the institutional autonomy of the old social security policymaking subsystem has broken down.