Die Verbandstheorie ist bekanntlich von Dedekind an Hand seiner idealtheoretischen Untersuchungen begründet worden. Es hat sich in letzter Zeit herausgestellt, daß die wesentliche Eigenschaft des Dedekind'schen Idealsystems darin liegt, daß die Ideale einen Halbverband (§1) bilden. Die Idealtheorie führt so auf die Frage nach alien Halbverbänden über einer beliebigen halbgeordneten Menge M. Die einfache Antwort enthält §2. Ebenso einfach ist die Frage nach alien distributiven Verbänden uber M zu beantworten. In beiden Fällen ist unter den Halbverbänden bzw. distributiven Verbänden über M einer dadurch ausgezeichnet, daß alle anderen homomorph zu ihm sind. Diesen ausgezeichneten Halbverband bzw. distributiven Verband nennen wir den freien Halbverband bzw. freien distributiven Verband über M.

Zu neuen Fragen kommt man bei der Untersuchung speziellerer Halbverbände über M. Es ist z.B. bekannt, daß M stets zu einem vollständigen Boole'schen Verband erweitert werden kann. Gibt es unter diesen Erweiterungen stets den freien vollständigen Boole'schen Verband über M, der dadurch ausgezeichnet ist, daß alle anderen zu ihm homomorph sind ?

In §3 wird zunächst die Existenz des freien orthokomplementären Halbverbandes über M bewiesen. Mit Hilfe der hier benutzten Methode läßt sich auch der Existenzbeweis für den freien abzählbar-vollständigen Boole'schen Verband über M führen.

We consider here the pure functional calculus of first order as formulated by Church.

Church, l.c., p. 79, gives the definition of the validity of a formula in a given set I of individuals and shows that a formula is provable in if and only if it is valid in every non-empty set I. The definition of validity is preceded by the definition of a value of a formula; the notion of a value is the basic “semantical” notion in terms of which all other semantical notions are definable.

The notion of a value of a formula retains its meaning also in the case when the set I is empty. We have only to remember that if I is empty, then an m-ary propositional function (i.e. a function from the m-th cartesian power Im to the set {f, t}) is the empty set. It then follows easily that the value of each well-formed formula with free individual variables is the empty set. The values of wffs without free variables are on the contrary either f or t. Indeed, if B has the unique free variable c and ϕ is the value of B, then the value of (c)B according to the definition given by Church is the propositional constant f or t according as ϕ(j) is f for at least one j in I or not. Since, however, there is no j in I, the condition ϕ(j) = t for all j in I is vacuously satisfied and hence the value of (c)B is t.

Dugundji has proved that none of the Lewis systems of modal logic, S1 through S5, has a finite characteristic matrix. The question arises whether there exist proper extensions of S5 which have no finite characteristic matrix. By an extension of a sentential calculus S, we usually refer to any system S′ such that every formula provable in S is provable in S′. An extension S′ of S is called proper if it is not identical with S. The answer to the question is trivially affirmative in case we make no additional restrictions on the class of extensions. Thus the extension of S5 obtained by adding to the provable formulas the additional formula p has no finite characteristic matrix (indeed, it has no characteristic matrix at all), but this extension is not closed under substitution—the formula q is not provable in it. McKinsey and Tarski have defined normal extensions of S4* by imposing three conditions. Normal extensions must be closed under substitution, must preserve the rule of detachment under material implication, and must also preserve the rule that if α is provable then ~◊~α is provable. McKinsey and Tarski also gave an example of an extension of S4 which satisfies the first two of these conditions but not the third. One of the results of this paper is that every extension of S5 which satisfies the first two of these conditions also satisfies the third, and hence the above definition of normal extension is redundant for S5. We shall therefore limit the extensions discussed in this paper to those which are closed under substitution and which preserve the rule of detachment under material implication. These extensions we shall call quasi-normal. The class of quasi-normal extensions of S5 is a very broad class and actually includes all extensions which are likely to prove interesting. It is easily shown that quasi-normal extensions of S5 preserve the rules of replacement, adjunction, and detachment under strict implication. It is the purpose of this paper to prove that every proper quasi-normal extension of S5 has a finite characteristic matrix and that every quasi-normal extension of S5 is a normal extension of S5 and to describe a simple class of characteristic matrices for S5.

13.1. If ‘[p f a]’ is in K′, we will say that ‘p’ is a value of ‘f’ at ‘a’.

13.2. If ‘a’ and ‘b’ are rational U-reals and if ‘b’ is not less than ‘a’, then ‘{a, b}’ will be called a rational U-interval.

13.3. If ‘f’ has a value at ‘d’, if ‘d’ is within a U-interval ‘{c, e}’, and if all values of ‘f’ at U-reals with ‘{c, e}’ are within the U-interval ‘{r, t}’, then we will say that ‘{c, e}’ restricts ‘f’ to ‘{r, t}’ at ‘d’, and that ‘{c, e}’ is an ‘f’-restrictive correlate of ‘d’ with respect to ‘{r, t}’.

13.4. If ‘d’ is within ‘{a, b}’, we will say that ‘{a, b}’ “contains” ‘d’.

13.5. If ‘f’ has a value at ‘d’ and if corresponding to every U-interval ‘{r, t}’ that contains a value of ‘f’ at ‘d’ there is an ‘f’-restrictive correlate of ‘d’ with respect to ‘{r, t}’, then ‘f’ will be said to be “continuous” at ‘d’. Without loss of generality the ‘f’-restrictive correlate can be required to be a rational U-interval.

13.6. If ‘f’ is continuous at every U-real in ‘{a, b}’, we will say that ‘f’ is continuous in ‘{a, b}’.

13.7. Theorem. If ‘k’ is a positive U-real and ‘f’ is continuous in a U-interval ‘{a, b}’, then ‘{a, b}’ is covered by the class S of rational U-intervals that are ‘f’-restrictive correlates of rational U-reals in ‘{a, b}’ with respect to those rational U-intervals ‘{r, t)’ that contain values of ‘f’ at rational U-reals in ‘{a, b}’ and that are such that’∣t − r∣‘ is equal to ‘k’ (in the sense of 10.10).

If F is a field, and α is an element of F, we say that α is arithmetically definable in F if there is a formula containing one free variable and any number of bound variables, involving only the concepts of elementary logic and the operations of addition and multiplication, which is satisfied by α and by no other element of F. The range of the bound variables is understood to be F. Without changing the sense of the above definition, we can allow in our formulas symbols for specific integers, or even (if F has characteristic zero) symbols for specific rational numbers, since these are arithmetically definable.

As an example, consider the field F = R(2¼), obtained by adjoining the positive fourth root of 2 to the field R of rationals. Notice that 2¼ is not defined arithmetically by the formula x2 = 2, since this equation has two roots in F.

However, 2¼ may be defined arithmetically by the equivalence

where we have used the logical symbols ↔ (if and only if), ∨ (there exists), and ∧ (and). For the equation y4 = 2 is satisfied by no elements of F except y = ±2¼, and in both cases y2 = 2¼. On the other hand, 2¼ is not arithmetically definable in F, since there is an automorphism of F which takes 2¼ into −2¼, so that every arithmetical condition satisfied by 2¼ is also satisfied by −2¼.

In any field F, a necessary condition for the arithmetical definability of an element α is that α should be fixed for all automorphisms of F. That this condition is not always sufficient is shown by considering the field of real numbers. Here there is no automorphism but the identity, but there can of course be but a denumerable infinity of arithmetically definable real numbers. Tarski has shown that only the algebraic numbers are arithmetically definable.

I intend to show that for S1, S2, and S3 the class of true formulas cannot coincide with the class of theorems. This is to hold irrespective of the meaning assigned to “◊”. when only “∼”, “▪”, and the variables are interpreted in the customary manner.

The idea of the proof is extremely simple and can be illustrated by the following argument concerning S3. The formula ~(◊(p▪~p)⥽▪p▪~p) ∨ (◊(q▪~q)⥽▪q▪~q) is a theorem of S3. Suppose now that all S3-theorems are true. Then either ~(◊(p▪~p)⥽▪p▪~p) is true (for every p) or (◊(q▪~q)⥽▪q▪~q) is true (for every q). But none of these formulas is an S3-theorem. Then some true S3-formula is not an S3-theorem. Hence, if all S3-theorems are true, some true S3-formula is not an S3-theorem. Then the class of S3-theorems cannot be identical with the class of true S3-formulas.

In a previous paper, I proved the consistency of a non-finitary system of logic based on the theory of types, which was shown to contain the axiom of reducibility in a form which seemed not to interfere with the classical construction of real numbers. A form of the system containing a strong axiom of choice was also proved consistent.

It seems to me now that the real-number approach used in that paper, though valid, was not the most fruitful one. We can, on the lines therein suggested, prove the consistency of axioms closely resembling Tarski's twenty axioms for the real numbers; but this, from the standpoint of mathematical practice, is a pitifully small fragment of analysis. The consistency of a fairly strong set-theory can be proved, using the results of my previous paper, with little more difficulty than that of the Tarski axioms; this being the case, it would seem a saving in effort to derive the consistency of such a theory first, then to strengthen that theory (if possible) in such ways as can be shown to preserve consistency; and finally to derive from the system thus strengthened, if need be, a more usable real-number theory. The present paper is meant to achieve the first part of this program. The paragraphs of this paper are numbered consecutively with those of my previous paper, of which it is to be regarded as a continuation.