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Believable Normative Error Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 November 2021

GERALD K. HARRISON
GERALD K. HARRISON*
Affiliation:
MASSEY UNIVERSITY G.K.Harrison@massey.ac.nz
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Abstract

Normative error theory is thought by some to be unbelievable because they suppose the incompatibility of believing a proposition at the same time as believing that one has no normative reason to believe it—which believing in normative error theory would seem to involve. In this article, I argue that normative holism is believable and that a normative holist will believe that the truth of a proposition does not invariably generate a normative reason to believe it. I outline five different scenarios in which this is believably the case. I then show how each example can be used to generate a counterexample to the incompatibility claim. I conclude that believing a proposition is compatible with believing there is no reason to believe it and that as such normative error theory has not yet been shown to be unbelievable.

Keywords

normative error theorymetaethicsethicsnormative reasonsnormativity
Type
Article
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 8 , Issue 2 , Summer 2022 , pp. 208 - 223
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Philosophical Association

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