Recent embodied theories of meaning known as ‘simulation semantics’ posit that language comprehension engages, or even amounts to, mental simulation. What is meant here by ‘language comprehension’, however, deviates from the perspectives on interpersonal communication adhered to by researchers in social psychology and interactional linguistics. In this paper, we outline four alternative perspectives on comprehension in spoken interaction, each of which highlights factors that have remained largely outside the current purview of simulation theories. These include perspectives on language comprehension in terms of (i) striving for inter-subjective conformity; (ii) recognition of communicative intentions; (iii) prediction and anticipation in a dynamic environment; and (iv) integration of multimodal cues. By contrasting these views with simulation theories of comprehension, we outline a number of fundamental differences in terms of the kind of process comprehension is assumed to be (passive and event-like versus active and continuous), as well as the kind of stimulus that language is assumed to be (comprising unimodal units versus being multimodal and distributed across conversational turns). Finally, we discuss potential points of connection between simulation semantics and research on spoken interaction, and touch on some methodological implications of an interactive and multimodal reappraisal of simulation semantics.

Recent psycholinguistic studies on the reality of alternative sets in processing focus NPs have shown that focus particles like ‘only’ play a special role in activating the mental representation of alternatives to focused nouns. In this paper we present a new corpus study which provides converging evidence to support psycholinguistic findings and suggests that alternatives preceded by a focus particle are not only more activated in experimental contexts, but are also more likely to be discussed in the subsequent context. To this end we develop and evaluate inter-annotator agreement on two novel annotation tasks in naturally occurring German corpus data: recognition of nominal alternatives in general without any context, and recognition of alternatives in the context of sentence pairs. We show that while annotators agree poorly on the first, they agree strongly on the second. We also develop a concept of ‘alternative density’, the number of alternatives realized in a sentence following a target NP, and present a mixed-effects model showing a very significant rise in density after the presence of German nur ‘only’ independently of other factors.

In recent years proponents of usage-based linguistics have singled out ‘categorization’ as possibly the fundamental cognitive operation underlying the acquisition and use of language. Despite this increasing appeal to the importance of categorization, few researchers have yet offered explicit interpretations of how linguistic categories might be represented in the brain other than vague allusions to prototype theory, especially as implemented in connectionist-like frameworks. In this paper, I discuss in some detail the implications of superimposing the theoretical representations of linguistic structures onto domain-general models of categorization. I first review the evidence that instance-based, or exemplar-based, models of categorization provide empirically and theoretically better models of both domain-general categorization and of linguistic categorization than do the most commonly cited alternative models. I then argue that of the three exemplar-based models currently being applied to linguistic data, Skousen’s Analogical Model (AM) appears to provide the simplest, most straightforward account of the data and that it appears to be fully compatible with our current understanding of the psychological capabilities and operations that underlie categorization behavior.

This paper provides a theoretical and methodological contribution to the heated debate on intersubjectivity and intersubjectification (Nuyts, 2001, 2012; Traugott & Dasher, 2002; Traugott, 2003, 2010, 2012; Verhagen, 2005; Narrog, 2010, 2012; Dancygier & Sweetser, 2012). I will argue that intersubjectivity, intended as a subject’s awareness of the other persona(s)’ feelings, knowledge, and beliefs, can be construed alternatively on an ‘immediate’ and on an ‘extended’ level. Immediate intersubjectivity (I-I) corresponds to the mutual awareness of the speech participants during the ongoing speech event, whereas extended intersubjectivity (E-I) includes an assumed third party (specific or generic) who has an indirect social bearing on the utterance (cf. Tantucci 2013, 2014). Along a unidirectional cline of change, extended intersubjectification constitutes a further stage of semantic and/or grammatical reanalysis with respect to its immediate counterpart. In order to empirically justify the diachronic continuum between the two, I provide some corpus-illustrated (cf. Tummers et al., 2005, p. 235) examples from Mandarin and corpus-based evidence about the constructions [you don’t want X] and believe it or not in American English.

My goal in the paper is to examine the significance of a root morpheme in language and cognition in three interconnected areas; in the creation of words; in meaning making; and in conceptual structure. I use the Hungarian root es-, meaning ‘fall’, for demonstration – a root that occurs in over 100 Hungarian words. First, I examine the issue of the conceptual–semantic relationship between the various word meanings in which this root can be found. Second, I explore the potential cognitive status of the root in Hungarian, and possibly in other languages (such as English). Third, I compare the meanings in which es- occurs in Hungarian to the nearest counterparts of these words in English. Fourth, I investigate the potential role of the root es- in organizing conceptual structure.

Embodied models of language comprehension are based on the assumption that words become associated with sensorimotor experiences during initial word learning. To test this hypothesis, adult participants learned artificial words as labels for novel objects in a multisensory environment. In a word learning phase, novel objects were located in the participant’s upper or lower visual field and participants learned the objects’ names by interacting with them. In a test phase, participants responded to the color of the words with either an upwards or a downwards directed arm movement in a Stroop-like paradigm. Responses were fastest when the movement direction was compatible with the word’s referent location (i.e., the location of the novel object in vertical space) during the learning phase. This finding suggests that sensorimotor experiences become associated with words during initial word learning. The results of the current study and implications for language learning are discussed.

Interpreting temporal statements involves adopting alternative frames of reference. Previous work has shown that people draw on time-moving or ego-moving perspectives to interpret statements such as Next Wednesday´s meeting has been moved forward two days. The expression move forward in English can be translated into Spanish as mover hacia adelante or adelantar. Corpus data show that when these expressions are used metaphorically to describe time, the former is typically used to describe events parting from the ego (ego-moving perspective) while the latter is typically used to describe events moving towards the ego (time-moving perspective). We provide empirical evidence that different frames of reference are elicited depending on the specific metaphorical expression in Spanish (Corpus Analysis, Experiments 1 and 2), to the extent that the use of these linguistic forms in temporal sentences affects subsequent spatial reasoning (Experiment 3). We conclude that Spanish has some metaphorical expressions that are not neutral regarding the ego-/time-moving perspectives, and that their use affects how people draw on spatial motion schemas when thinking about time and space.