Massive modularity theory has replaced classic, Fodorian modularity as a major focus of research within cognitive science. The massive modularity thesis posits that there are a large number of knowledge and action stories, designed in a piecemeal fashion over evolutionary time to solve specific, adaptive problems. We criticize massive modularity as a general theory of human cognition, with particular attention to the issue of context-sensitive perception, thought, and language. First, the experimental methods used to uncover individual modules are notoriously inadequate and fail to meet reasonable standards by which modules may be dissociated from one another. Second, input criteria, by which modules are presumably defined, may be impossible to discover given the context-embedded nature of human performance. Third, catalogues of experimental effects that are assumed to demonstrate the presence of modules do not constitute a comprehensive theory of the acknowledged interaction of brain, body, and world in ordinary cognition. An alternative conception of cognitive performance, based on principles of self-organization, better explains the embedded, context-sensitive mechanisms of adaptive cognition.

In English, numerals modify nouns directly (two tables), but in Mandarin Chinese, they modify numeral classifiers that are associated with nouns (two flat-thing table). Classifiers define a system of categories based on dimensions such as animacy, shape, and function (Adams and Conklin 1973; Dixon 1986), but do these categories predict differences in cognitive processing? The present study explored possible effects of classifier categories in a speeded task preventing significant deliberation and strategic responding. Participants counted objects in a visual display that were intermixed with distractor objects that had either the same Mandarin classifier or a different one. Classifier categories predicted Mandarin speakers' search performance, as Mandarin speakers showed greater interference from distractors with the same classifier than did Russian or English speakers. This result suggests that classifier categories may affect cognitive processing, and may have the potential to influence how speakers of classifier languages perform cognitive tasks in everyday situations. Two theoretical accounts of the results are discussed.

Deontic meanings have frequently been considered in relation to epistemic meanings and the present paper introduces a novel framework for investigating this relationship. The paper first introduces the basic ideas in Deictic Space Theory (DST), illustrating the geometrical elements involved with respect to counterfactual conceptualisations. This framework is then used to explore deontic conceptualisations in relation to epistemic conceptualisations. Following the implications of the geometrical structure logic of DST, epistemic concepts are taken as fundamental and as presupposed in deontic meanings. It is argued that counterfactuality, which can be modelled as a geometrical reflection transformation, is crucial to the modelling of the conceptual space of obligation concepts expressed in English modal verbs. It is further argued that a second-order reflection transformation can model permission concepts. Deontic ‘force’ is modelled in a natural way as force vectors, an already assumed ingredient of DST's geometrical framework. Finally the paper considers ways in which this framework does and does not run counter to existing claims about deontic and epistemic meaning in Cognitive Semantics.

In this paper we examine how vague quantifiers, such as few, several, lots of, map onto non-linguistic number systems. In particular our focus is to examine how judgements about vague quantifiers are affected by the presence of objects in visual scenes other than those being referred to. An experiment is presented that manipulated the number of objects in a visual scene (men playing golf; the ‘focus’ objects) together with the number of other objects in those scenes and their similarity—in terms of form (women or crocodiles) and function (playing golf, not playing golf)—to the focus objects. We show that the number of other objects in a scene impacts upon quantifiers judgements even when those objects are in a different category to the focus objects. We discuss the results in terms of the mapping between the large approximate number (estimation) system and language.

Dynamic conceptualization is a fundamental notion in cognitive linguistics. Abstract motion is one type of dynamic conceptualization. It is said to structure descriptions of static scenes such as ‘The mountain range goes from Mexico to Canada’, and in doing so, invokes a subjective sense of motion or state change. In recent years, a growing body of experimental research supports this claim. However, additional work is needed to understand the dynamics of abstract motion and the extent to which it generalizes. This paper provides some background on abstract motion and reports two new experiments that investigate two unexplored types of abstract motion, including visual paths and pattern paths. Together, the results indicate that abstract motion plays a central role in language use and understanding.

What makes us so smart as a species, and what makes children such rapid learners? We argue that the answer to both questions lies in a mutual bootstrapping system comprised of (1) our exceptional capacity for relational cognition and (2) symbolic systems that augment this capacity. The ability to carry out structure-mapping processes of alignment and inference is inherent in human cognition. It is arguably the key inherent difference between humans and other great apes. But an equally important difference is that humans possess a symbolic language.

The acquisition of language influences cognitive development in many ways. We focus here on the role of language in a mutually facilitating partnership with relational representation and reasoning. We suggest a positive feedback relation in which structural alignment processes support the acquisition of language, and in turn, language—especially relational language—supports structural alignment and reasoning.

We review three kinds of evidence (a) evidence that analogical processes support children's learning in a variety of domains; (b) more specifically, evidence that analogical processing fosters the acquisition of language, especially relational language; and (c) in the other direction, evidence that acquiring language fosters children's ability to process analogies, focusing on spatial language and spatial analogies. We conclude with an analysis of the acquisition of cardinality—which we offer as a canonical case of how the combination of language and analogical processing fosters cognitive development.