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Explaining Patterns of Redistribution under Autocracy: The Case of Peru's Revolution from Above

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 September 2022

Michael Albertus
Michael Albertus*
Affiliation:
University of Chicago
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Abstract

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Who benefits and who loses during redistribution under dictatorship? This article argues that expropriating powerful preexisting economic elites can serve to demonstrate a dictator or junta's loyalty to their launching organization while destroying elite rivals out of government that could potentially threaten the dictator's survival Expropriation also provides resources for buying the support of key nonelite groups that could otherwise organize destabilizing resistance. An analysis of the universe of fifteen thousand land expropriations under military rule in Peru from 1968 to 1980 demonstrates the plausibility of this argument as a case of redistributive military rule that destroyed traditional elites and empowered the military. Land was redistributed to “middle-class” rural laborers who had the greatest capacity to organize antiregime resistance if they were excluded from the reform. This finding directly challenges a core assumption of social conflict theory: that nondemocratic leaders will act as faithful agents of economic elites. A discussion of other modernizing militaries and data on large-scale expropriations of land, natural resources, and banks across Latin America from 1935 to 2008 suggests that the theory generalizes beyond Peru.

Resumen

Resumen

¿Quiénes son los beneficiarios y los perdedores de políticas de redistribución bajo dictadura? Este artículo sostiene que la expropiación de poderosas élites económicas preexistentes puede servir para demostrar la lealtad de un dictador o una junta de gobierno a su organización fundadora mientras destruye élites rivales fuera del gobierno que podrían amenazar la supervivencia del dictador. También proporciona recursos para ganar el apoyo de los grupos clave fuera de la élite que podrían organizar resistencia desestabilizadora. Un análisis del universo de 15,000 expropiaciones de tierras bajo el gobierno militar en Perú en el período 1968-1980 demuestra la plausibilidad de este argumento como un caso de un régimen militar redistributivo que destruyó las élites tradicionales y aumentó el poder de los militares. Luego se redistribuyó la tierra a los trabajadores rurales de “clase media” que tenían la mayor capacidad para organizar resistencia contra el régimen en caso de exclusión de la reforma. Esta conclusión desafía directamente una suposición fundamental de “la teoría del conflicto social”: que los líderes no democráticos actuarán como agentes fieles de las élites económicas. Una discusión de otros militares modernizadores y una compilación de datos sobre la expropiación a gran escala de la tierra, los recursos naturales, y los bancos en América Latina entre 1935 y 2008 sugiere que se puede aplicar la teoría más allá del Perú.

Type
Research Article
Information
Latin American Research Review , Volume 50 , Issue 2 , 2015 , pp. 107 - 134
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 by the Latin American Studies Association

Footnotes

I thank the Comisión de Formalización de la Propiedad Informal (COFOPRI) in Lima, Peru, for collaborating on data gathering during fieldwork, and Katerina Nikolova for assistance with classifying expropriation decrees. I would like to thank Jim Fearon, Steve Haber, Peter Klaren, David Laitin, Beatriz Magaloni, Dan Masterson, Enrique Mayer, Cynthia McClintock, Victor Menaldo, Jonathan Rodden, Dan Slater, Paul Staniland, and three anonymous LARR reviewers for helpful comments.

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