The Mexican Constitution was revised in 1992 to foster privatization of agrarian reform lands. Legal inheritance protections for spouses were removed, and individual title holders (85 percent male) obtained rights to sell land formerly considered family patrimony. State disinvestment contributed to economic crisis in the land-reform sector. This longitudinal study of four communities in northern and central Mexico explores the counterintuitive effects of agrarian law, customary inheritance norms, and women's changing roles in household economies and community sociopolitics on the material and ideological bases for women's entitlement to land. Quantitative and qualitative data show that women's rights to land under customary inheritance norms were upheld locally and that women's control of family land increased along with growing responsibility for production and community activism. Women's property rights were enhanced rather than eroded as families and communities struggled to meet the economic and social challenges posed by the neoliberal agenda.

There are two principal approaches to understanding social structure. One approach, exemplified by social class analysis, consists of postulating an ideal model of class positions and then mapping social reality onto this model. The result is a set of structural relationships that explain, or seem to explain, the positions taken by various social groups at different times. This approach is therefore also an interpretation of politics, in the sense that actions and positions are judged relevant or irrelevant to the extent that they match or fail to match the expected behavior of social classes according to the ideal model.

When President Alberto Fujimori suspended constitutional rule in April 1992, he ended Peru's twelve-year experiment in civilian democratic governance. Citing the growing insurgency of Sendero Luminoso, corruption in the political parties, and difficulties with the Peruvian Congress in passing his economic program, Fujimori announced that democracy would have to be “temporarily suspended” in order to build new institutions. This move was backed by the armed forces. Perhaps most surprising to outside observers was the widespread popularity of Fujimori's move, which reflected the growing disenchantment with traditional political parties of the right and the left. Democratic procedures and institutions during the 1980s had been precarious at best. The military's counterinsurgency campaign against Sendero Luminoso had transformed Peru into one of the hemisphere's worst offenders against human rights, with the highest number of forced disappearances in the world. But despite documented cases of torture and other violations of human rights by state authorities, Peruvian military forces acted with the knowledge that they were virtually immune from prosecution.

Study of religious phenomena in Latin America and the Caribbean covered by the generic term Protestantism has opened up a fertile field of research for sociologists, anthropologists, and historians in the last thirty years. The exponential growth in new non-Roman Catholic religious movements since the 1950s and the breadth of their organized networks have stimulated research based more often on sensationalism than on a scientific perspective. The complex and pluralistic manifestations of this heterodox religious phenomenon have generally been reduced to a notion of Protestantism rarely found in scholarly usage. The multiplicity of non-Roman Catholic religious movements cannot be reduced to some catchall category of “Protestantism.” Moreover, one must also analyze the connection between usage of the term Protestant and a culture marked by the Spanish Inquisition, which shaped the Ibero-American collective unconscious for more than three centuries, in order to understand why a fair number of Latin American researchers look at religious dissidence rather superficially, reducing it immediately to “Protestantism.”

With the publication in 1973 of Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics, Guillermo O'Donnell initiated a new phase in the debate over the relationship between social change and politics in Latin America. In contrast to most of the political development literature of the 1950s and 1960s, O'Donnell argued that social and economic modernization in the context of delayed development is more likely to lead to authoritarianism than democracy. His analysis focused on the emergence of military regimes in Argentina and Brazil in the middle 1960s—regimes that he labeled “bureaucratic-authoritarian” to distinguish them from oligarchical and populist forms of authoritarian rule found in less modernized countries. O'Donnell's suggestion that an “elective affinity” exists between higher levels of modernization and the rise of bureaucratic-authoritarianism in South America anticipated the military takeovers of the 1970s in Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina. The timeliness of his argument, together with its broad theoretical implications, stimulated considerable discussion, which culminated in the recent publication of a volume devoted to the exploration of themes raised by O'Donnell.

Economists have long recognized the importance of migration between less developed and more developed countries, and they have devoted considerable attention to analyzing it within the framework of traditional economic theory (Thomas 1954; Kindleberger 1967; Tapinos 1974; Greenwood 1979; Chiswick 1980; Wachter 1980; Stark 1983). But international migration entails not only an economic exchange of work for wages, it is also fundamentally a social process. Repeated human contact inevitably produces ties between persons in sending and receiving societies. Social networks are created that connect individuals in disparate cultural settings, and these ties ultimately change the context within which economic processes are played out. Understanding how such ties develop and change over time is therefore crucial to understanding the phenomenon of international migration.

While political polarization may lead to gridlock and other negative policy outcomes, representation is likely to be enhanced when parties differentiate themselves from each other and make it easier for voters to see the connection between their personal ideologies and the electoral offerings. These differences between parties may be especially important in developing democracies, where voters are still learning parties' priorities and where parties do not always emphasize issues when campaigning. To test this proposition, I develop a measure of elite polarization in Latin America since the early 1990s based on legislative surveys. Individual-level voting patterns from mass survey data confirm that the connection between voters' self-placement on the left-right scale and their electoral choice is stronger in polarized party systems, even when controlling for other party system factors like the age of the party system or electoral fragmentation. This effect on voting behavior is not immediate, however, as voters take time to recognize the new cues being provided by the changing party system.

In the 1980s and 1990s, neoliberalism and changing policy-making regimes presented social actors throughout Latin America with new challenges and opportunities. This article analyzes the political strategies developed by two organizations representing small manufacturers in Mexico for responding to these sweeping economic and political changes, emphasizing the organizational bases of political activism. Strategies are assessed according to organizations' public expression of support for or opposition to economic policies, the extent to which organizations work within existing arrangements for interest representation, and the political alliances made by small business organizations and their leaders. One strategy in Mexico entailed acquiescing to radical economic policy changes, deploying significant resources to preserve a set of corporatist institutions that regulated business association, and supporting the government incumbents. Another strategy entailed voicing persistent public criticism of neoliberalism, spearheading a national campaign against business corporatism, and supporting the Center-Left opposition. Analysis of these strategies demonstrates the important effects of institutional legacies during periods of regime change. The perseverance of corporatist institutions can make it difficult for weak actors to shed old modes of activism, notwithstanding a changed array of material and political incentives.

Researchers studying migration and development have argued over the potential that migration and associated remittances have to improve the economic and social conditions in origin communities. Past research on migration from indigenous communities in Oaxaca has similarly questioned the compatibility of traditional governance systems with high migration rates. We argue, using evidence from four Zapotec communities in rural Oaxaca, that communities can use the organizational capacity of traditional governance systems to access remittances from migrants for the benefit of the community as a whole. Communities can require payment from migrants in lieu of communal labor requirements (tequio) and may directly solicit remittances from migrants for community projects. The extent to which they enforce these requests depends on the existing organizational strength in the community. These findings imply that strong forms of community organization can make the difference between migration contributing to underdevelopment and migration contributing to development.

The demographics of the Paraguayan War (1864–1870) have long fascinated historicans and sociologists. If the oft-repeated tales of a 70 percent loss of life in Paraguay are accurate, then this war represents a singular case in modern history, one full of implications for students of militarism, gender, and culture. This study analyzes a newly discovered census from 1870 and reworks earlier censal materials. The authors conclude that the old stories of a steep loss of population during the war are basically correct.

The causes as well as the consequences of land reform are revolutionary. Land reform is not really reform at all. In an agrarian society, land reform is a revolutionary act because it redistributes the major source of wealth, social standing, and political power. Successful large-scale land reforms in Latin America and elsewhere occur only during social revolution or through the actions of invading armies imposing revolution from above. The land reforms in Mexico, Bolivia, Peru, Cuba, and Nicaragua occurred during revolutions; the land reforms in Japan and Taiwan were imposed by invading armies. The reform in South Korea apparently represented a combination of the two. Fundamental land reform without social transformation is a logical and practical impossibility. This is the reason why land reform as a counterrevolutionary strategy, such as the ill-fated “land-to-the-tiller” program attempted in Vietnam, is bound to fail.

Although this paper is a sequel to an earlier review of Latin American urban research (1965b), the volume and sophistication of work in the urban field during the past five years have made it advisable to limit the number of themes addressed, to dwell on complementary or discrepant approaches to certain central issues, and to suggest comparative perspectives. The first section, restricted to Spanish America, attempts to clarify some colonial antecedents of contemporary phenomena and is even less systematic than the other four sections as a research inventory. Attention to nineteenth-century developments is limited to references in Section V. The review of contemporary themes is weighted toward anthropological, sociological, and general institutional matters; the author has no credentials for prowling the arctic realms of economics, political behaviorism, and geographic place theory.

This article seeks to shift the framework of decades-long debates on the nature and significance of machismo, debunking the commonly held notion that the word describes a primordial Iberian and Ibero-American phenomenon. I trace the emergence of machismo as an English-language term, arguing that a tradition of unself-consciously ethnocentric scholarship in the 1940s and 1950s enabled the word’s entrance, by the 1960s, into popular sources. In fact, machismo was rather a neologism in Spanish, but midcentury US scholarship presumed the category’s empirical validity and applied to it to perceived problems in the “Latin” world. Much of machismo’s linguistic purchase—the reason it has become a global shorthand for hypermasculinity—stemmed from mid to late twentieth-century anxieties about hemispheric security, the Cold War, immigration, and overpopulation, particularly vis-à-vis the United States’ near neighbors, Mexico and Puerto Rico. I have sought out the word’s earliest appearances in various English-language media (books, scholarly articles, newspapers, magazines, and television) and explained how it has long escaped scrutiny as a construct in and of itself. As a result, machismo has resisted the most earnest and well-intentioned of challenges to its scholarly primacy and remains a pathologizing point of departure in approaches to Latin American gender systems.

The Argentine workfare program known as the “Trabajar” program shared many characteristics with other targeted social welfare programs implemented in Latin America in the 1990s, including being subject to accusations that program funds were misused for political gain. This paper tests existing hypotheses concerning the political manipulation of public spending using data from two phases of the program and a measure of fund allocation that improves on that employed in previous analyses of the program. It finds that partisan criteria most often cited in the literature affected distribution under one administration only. It further demonstrates that political protest had a differential impact on the distribution of program funds across time and suggests some reasons for this.

In the early 1970s, Wayne Cornelius asked, “Are the migrant masses revolutionary? Definitely not, at least in Latin America and many other parts of the developing world.” These words summarized an emerging revisionist view of the political character of Latin America's new urban poor. Careful empirical research had proved wrong previous scholars and observers who had expected the new migrant populations in Latin America's cities to become sources of support for revolutionary political movements. A new picture of the inhabitants of Latin America's burgeoning shantytowns came into focus, showing these populations to be either passive or loyally engaged in the surrounding political system. According to this picture, squatters held considerable hope for individual advancement, forged clientelistic ties with government officials, and showed few signs of joining radicalized, class-conscious social movements.

The Latin American middlemen known as caciques in Mexico and coronéis in Brazil are one of the most widespread sociopolitical features of Mexico and Brazil in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The pervasive institutional arrangements established by such political entrepreneurs at local and regional levels, within the framework of the most “center-dominant” polities of Latin America, are well documented in the literature. In this case, pervasiveness does not imply mere continuity. As changes in structure, meanings, and significance have occurred with the passing of time, the phenomena termed caciquismo and coronelismo have undergone social and semantic transformation. It would therefore be useful to begin by reviewing these historical metamorphoses.

Since the late 1980s, peasants throughout Central America have begun to coordinate political and economic strategy. Agriculturalists from the five republics that constituted “la patria grande” of Spanish Central America (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica) as well as representatives from Panama and Belize have founded regional organizations that meet to compare experiences with free-market policies, share new technologies, develop sources of finance, and create channels for marketing their products abroad. They have also established a presence in the increasingly distant arenas where decisions are made that affect their livelihood. Small-farmer organizations now lobby at the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the European Union, and regional summit meetings. Central American campesinos have attended numerous regional gatherings of agriculture ministers and presidents, as well as events like the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, the 1995 Western Hemisphere Presidents' Summit in Miami, the 1995 World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen, and the 1996 Food Security Summit in Rome.

This article brings new evidence and a revisionary argument to the debate over Mexico's exceptional relations with Cuba in the decade after the Cuban Revolution. It uses recently declassified Mexican intelligence records to show that Mexican leaders defended Castro primarily because they were afraid of domestic leftist groups and individuals. The first part of the article examines the intelligence information that Mexican decision makers received about internal threats, drawing out the connections that they perceived between Cuba and the Mexican left and the reasons they designed their foreign policy for domestic ends. The second section shifts to the international level, challenging the traditional arguments that foreign or ideological factors determined Mexico's policy toward Cuba. It examines the ways that Mexican leaders defused and negotiated against possible repercussions from Cuba or the United States as a result of their decision to maintain relations with Castro's government.

The twelve years of military rule in Peru between 1968 and 1980 witnessed few abuses of human rights, in marked contrast to the activities of military governments in Southern Cone countries like Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. Yet paradoxically, the return to democracy in Peru, with the election of Fernando Belaúnde in 1980 and Alan García in 1985, has brought sharp escalations in political violence and terror. Guerrilla activity by the Sendero Luminoso (“Shining Path”) in the highlands, urban terrorism, and a severe economic crisis have combined to pose a serious challenge to the authority of the state. Thus it is problematic to speak of a “return to democracy” while Peruvians are being subjected to expanding military control and repression.

This Research Note looks at the recent Latin American record in economic and social development from the perspective of the effects of “neoliberalism.” There are at least two ways in which neoliberalism is commonly used: a narrow usage, that refers to a shift in a subset of policies to a greater reliance on markets; and, a broader usage, that implies a wholesale change in the relationship between the state and society, with a more vigorous embrace of the market being part of a generalized withdrawal of state provisioning and action. The first clearly occurred in most of the region in the 1980s and 1990s. We will argue that shifts to a greater dependence on markets were usually beneficial, probably disappointing relative to the expectations of advocates, and certainly incomplete as a development strategy. The effects on growth, stability, and inequality depend crucially on other factors, including the distributions of assets, structural policies (for example, on social development and infrastructure) and political and social institutions.