The article examines the operation of the Hong Kong stock and futures exchanges during the crash of October 1987 and in particular the controversial decision to close the exchanges. It argues that the closure decision exposes a serious conflict of interest and abuse of power on the part of the major decision makers and fundamental flaws in Hong Kong's self-regulatory system. Moreover, these events raise broader questions about the strengths and weaknesses of different regulatory regimes and about the value of different theoretical explanations of regulatory behavior. In particular, it is argued that the most influential theory concerning the regulation of financial markets—that of certain Chicago School economists—raises as many questions as it answers, and that an alternative view which locates cultural and organizational factors at its core provides a more satisfactory explanation of the events of October 1987.

This article examines a period of profound crisis about the English bar. The metaphor of “moral panic” is invoked in assessing the impact of five notorious cases of barristers’ misconduct which riveted public attention between 1859 and 1863. Four of the barristers involved were subjected to “professional discipline” in what was the first spate of disciplinary proceedings for breaches of bar “etiquette.” Professional “ethics” were applied in remarkably selective ways and amounted to a “shutting down” of laissez-faire professional practices. This was a crucial turning point in the English legd profession, and the effect was to transform the bar from a relatively open, unregulated status group into something akin to a rule-bound disciplinary regime.

A major challenge for scholars seeking new directions in sociolegal research is the persistence of old paradigms and assumptions about law. The challenge for the new is not to be cast as part of the old by efforts that assimilate its methods, goals, and results to earlier approaches. Such efforts, aimed at comparison and clarification, tend to “domesticate” the new, or in Boa Santos's words “doubly institutionalize” a developing project by reading the order of a conventional analysis into the emergent order appearing in the interstices of new scholarly work. In this essay we focus on interpretivism as a developing project in sociolegal research. In particular, we discuss three aspects of interpretive research that are at the center of current debates in sociolegal theory: meaning construction and the dynamics of power, legal ideology, and knowledge as politics. Our discussion focuses on different readings of ideology, on different understandings of power, and on the politics of interpretive research connected with these readings. To illuminate the struggles over these points and at the same time illustrate the process of domestication, we begin with a recent paper by David Trubek and John Esser, “‘Critical Empiricism’ in American Legal Studies.” Their paper lays out a treatment of ideology and politics that provides a basis for our broader discussion of interpretive work in the second half of this essay.

In reading the essays by David M. Trubek and John Esser and Boaventura de Sousa Santos, I thought about what I call epistemological moments that have provided contexts within which to understand the relationship between social science research and politics. I will sketch four moments and suggest that I find one of them more compelling than the others because it speaks particularly to social scientists with critical, democratic ambitions and to Trubek and Esser's concerns about politics and the intellectual vitality of the law and society movement.