At common law, any improvements made by a tenant (unless classified as ‘tenants’ fixtures' and, thereby, removable) form part of the freehold and, at the end of the lease, must remain for the reversioner. Subject to the law of waste and to any contrary stipulation in the lease, the tenant remains free to carry out improvements, but is not entitled to compensation. This common law approach can be viewed as a potential benefit to landlords when the improvement adds to the value of the reversion. It may, however, stand as a disincentive to tenants who might otherwise have effected improvements to their properties. It has fallen to Parliament to redress what is widely regarded as this lack of equity.

One of the most distinguishing features of an insurance contract (being a contract uberrimae fidei) is that it attracts the duty of disclosure. As it presently stands, this duty unfortunately has drawn such criticism from many quarters for inflicting what is arguably one of the most onerous burdens upon the insured. The irony of the situation is that the original intention of the doctrine, as had been expressed by Lord Mansfield himself in the celebrated eighteenth century case of Carter v Boehm, was for both contractual parties–and not just only the insured–to exercise the utmost good faith in their dealings. However, all through the intervening years, the tide had almost entirely flowed in one direction. There has, hitherto, not really been any case law developing, or even spelling out, the insurer's duty of good faith. On the contrary, landmark cases such as CTI v Oceanus and Lambert v CIS have been only too generous in showering the insurer with so many privileges that from the perspective of the hapless insured the duty becomes almost like ‘an engine of oppression’.

In 1870, Christopher Columbus Langdell introduced the case method of teaching at Harvard, and dramatically altered the course of legal education in the United States. His method, involving student examination of judicial decisions coupled with Socratic style analysis, ultimately gained widespread acceptance. Today, most US law teachers use the case method. They continue, to varying degrees, to use Socratic questioning as part of that method. But, despite the method's widespread adoption, it has always had critics including both law students and law teachers.

If an employee, as part of a programme of industrial action, refuses to work normally, what is the legal position when he performs only a part of his duties? This question has been the subject of much litigation in recent years, and raises issues of fundamental importance. At a practical level, it has to be determined whether and when the employee is entitled to any remuneration, and if so, how much? Related to this are the options open to the employer in the light of such action. At a theoretical level, questions arise concerning the proper scope of the law of contract, and its relationship to the law of restitution. This paper will explore these issues, and suggest an approach which can adequately deal with both questions.

It may be of some comfort to English and Welsh lawyers to know that they are not alone in having to face up to the challenge of the reform of the traditional basis on which they have practiced. The implications of the impending single market are resulting in moves in other EC member states towards a more competition oriented framework for the provision of legal services. During December 1990 the French National Assembly passed a law introducing major reforms to the legal profession. The rationale behind the reforms is the modernisation of the French legal profession in an endeavour to make it more competitive in the single market, as was made clear by M. Arpaillange, the then Minister of Justice when he said that, ‘there is no longer any need to underline the obsolete character of the separation of the legal profession in the light of the approaching single market’.

After the long discussion of the definition of murder, in the courts and in legal writings, and the deliberations of the Nathan committee (which in essence endorsed the present law, as proposed to be slightly modified in the Draft Code), it might have been hoped that this debate would now subside. But there remain some malcontents, whom William Wilson has now joined by his article in 10 LS 307. This propounds a definition of murder which in the author's view would bring ‘rationality’ into the law (assumed to be at present in some way irrational). His two main proposals are the abolition of the doctrine of oblique intent in the context of murder (or altogether), and the acceptance as an additional mental element for murder, of a purpose to create a lethal risk.

Professor Williams calls me a malcontent. I believe I have an excuse. The law of murder does not do what it should do. Present doctrine allows some who do not deserve the stigma of murder to be convicted, and allows others who do deserve the stigma to avoid it. This, in my view, is a failure of justice - of fairness. It is the result of judges, academics, and others believing that problems in the real world cannot be resolved by internally consistent legal rules. They are pragmatists. My plea for rationality in murder is nothing more pretentious than a repudiation of such pragmatism. It is a plea that the substantive purposes of the law of murder should find expression in formally rational doctrine.