E W Hornung's character Raffles, first introduced to the public in 1898, not only aroused considerable interest at that time but created an enduring image of the suave, gentlemanly burglar far removed from the stereotype of the rough, professional thief more usually associated with the crime. This paper investigates both the creation of the character and the creation of the stereotype in the nineteenth century in an attempt to discover not only the secrets of the appeal of the Raffles, but also some of the characteristics of early criminological discourse, some of which may cast their shadows to the present day. It also highlights tensions between conceptions of ‘amateur’ and ‘professional’ status both in relation to the protagonist's lawful pastime, cricket, and his unlawful career of burglary.

Gwyneth Bebb gave her name to a landmark case in the campaign to open the legal profession to women. In spite of this achievement, which is often mentioned but rarely analysed, historical accounts have given little or no attention to the woman or the campaign of which she was part; and what happened to her then and later has remained shrouded in mystery. The article finds that her disappearance was due in part to the circumstances of her life, outlined here, but mainly to the tendency of institutional histories, if they acknowledge women’s contribution at all, to present it as a simple (though discontinuous) tale of progress, thereby masking continuing prejudice and inequality. The article argues that women’s lives need to be properly examined to produce a more complete and truthful explanation of how things were, and how they are now.

This paper makes two claims. First, it claims that there are various trends within academic law that discourage legal scholars from learning about their predecessors. These trends are explained. Secondly, it claims that there are a number of benefits which could flow from addressing this neglect. Several of these benefits have been acknowledged elsewhere. For example, some scholars maintain that ideas are best treated historically before being dealt with analytically. The more scholars read whole bodies of their predecessors' works, the better their interpretations and understandings of such works become, thus strengthening the intellectual integrity of the discipline. While agreeing with this argument, the purpose of the second section of this paper is to articulate other, perhaps less obvious, benefits. It is argued that by learning about a wider range of past academic endeavour, legal scholars are encouraged to challenge existing notions of academic standing and consider not only what the legal academy has become but also what it ought to be. Learning about scholarly predecessors could help scholars better contextualise current challenges. Such learning could be empowering in the context of a discipline whose scholarly practices have meant that there has been little reason to look to the past.

In a recent study, the influential theorist of higher education Ronald Barnett suggests that one way for academics to address the pressures on their professional lives is to embrace a multidimensional concept of working time. Drawing on the analysis of space by the French philosopher/sociologist Henri Lefebvre, Barnett advocates conceiving academic practice as a continuum of interrelated strands rather than a set of discrete packages of activity subject to bureaucratic domination. This paper examines whether this approach can reassert agency on the part of academics and provide a site for resistance to the obsession on the part of managers and policy makers with outputs and the quantification of working hours. It sets Barnett's analysis in the context of other empirical studies in higher education literature on the management and allocation of workloads, particularly on tensions arising from conflicting demands of research and teaching. It also examines synergies between Barnett and other scholarship on the professional lives of law academics on the part of Bradney, Collier and Cownie. The paper concludes that a Lefebvrean analysis of how time and space are constituted by human activity provides a rigorous theoretical framework within which to reconstitute the coherence in academic practice which is sought by many in higher education.

Framed within the broader context of law's engagement with modernism, this paper offers an argument in defence of copyright protection of John Cage's 4′33″ as a ‘musical work’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. This argument approaches the issues involved analytically and contextually. In doing so, it draws on both legal and non-legal sources. Throughout the paper, the underlying question remains as to whether Cage's 4′33″ really is – or is not – a challenge to law (and to music).

Focusing on a single, uncontested will is unusual within legal studies. And the extensive literature about EM Forster has overlooked the significance of his will. This article endeavours to address these silences and develop a conversation between the two. It first explores the place of inheritance in Forster's life and novels; and in doing so highlights his interest in inheritance as both a concept and a practice. Turning then to his will, it argues that it reveals a reflective personal and political engagement with concerns about kinship, sexuality and intimate citizenship which are central to current debates within socio-legal and sociological scholarship. This reading consequently argues that his will is a text that can be read alongside his other work; that it represents a ‘posthumous publication’. While a close, critical reading of the will of one very particular individual, the article identifies the challenges posed to testators in negotiating the public and private nature of wills and highlights both the rich potential and the difficulties that these texts present for socio-legal, literary and biographical scholarship.

Following a century of legislation about film and the film industry in the UK, and the latest in a series of reports on ‘film policy’, this paper investigates the relationship between law, policy and film. Case studies on the definition of ‘film’ in a time of technological and cultural change consider the privileged position of the cinema in terms of censorship and tax, including the new phenomenon of ‘alternative content’; that is, live relays of theatrical performances. Institutional change is assessed and criticised, particularly the abolition of the UK Film Council and the steady move from statute to executive action. The paper sets out a case for the role of the state to be set out in legislation and the cultural consequences of legal definitions to be taken more seriously.