The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 purports to move away from the identification doctrine, towards a genuinely organisational model of corporate liability. There is a risk, however, that insistence upon the involvement of senior management in corporate manslaughter will reduce the Act to doing no more than aggregating individual misconduct. Such an approach would fail both to encompass the culpability of the organisation as more than just a collection of individuals, and to offer an effective tool for the prosecution of large organisations. I argue that the senior management requirement should not be interpreted as focusing on individuals, but on the authoritative systems of work that organisations impose upon their employees. Inherent in large organisations is a corporate structure, determining the meaning and value of what employees perceive and the boundaries and direction of their work. These structures emerge from the involvement of senior managers, whose rank and role within organisations enables them to contribute to the development of corporate structure. Through insistence on the involvement of these corporate architects and surveyors, the 2007 Act may be seen to emphasise the role of the organisation in corporate manslaughter, identifying truly corporate culpability.

It has long been argued that the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords, now the UK Supreme Court, is characterised by Justices who are white and male, with a public school and Oxbridge education. Despite continuous debate and reflection on the lack of diversity, by academics, government and the popular press, little has changed. These debates have centred on explicit diversity, overt characteristics that are easily codified and reflect how the judiciary is seen. Drawing on the psychological theory of decision making, this paper argues that judicial decisions are subject to tacit influences that are not limited to overt characteristics. Personal values serve as one such tacit influence on decision making. Personal values are formed by life experiences and reflect many of the characteristics identified within the explicit diversity debates. However, personal values are influenced by more than simple demographic variables. This paper uses the example of personal values to highlight the fact that despite the lack of explicit diversity, there is an element of tacit diversity in the Supreme Court, which is reflected in judicial decisions. The impact of these findings serves to extend the debates surrounding diversity, highlighting the limitation of debates centred on explicit diversity alone.

Based on a findings of a simulation study in which 160 members of the public observed a mini rape trial re-enactment and were then asked to deliberate in jury groups towards a unanimous verdict, this paper explores the extent to which participants were able, and willing, to understand and apply judicial directions, and the legal tests or criteria contained therein. More specifically, it reflects on whether the additional provision of written directions in the jury room influenced the tone or direction of jurors' discussions, and illustrates the limited recourse made by participants to their contents, as well as their tendency to misinterpret or misapply them when they were relied upon. Having done so, this paper moves on to explore the reasons behind this limited impact, suggesting that fundamental tensions may exist between legal and lay imaginaries, such that jurors are reluctant to jettison their more natural inclinations to reach individual and collective verdicts on the basis of narrative constructions grounded in ‘common sense’ and ‘personal experience’.

The constitutional duty of the Irish state ‘to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen’ is the basis of a strict rule excluding unconstitutionally obtained evidence. Although English courts recognise a similar duty to ‘vindicate human rights and the rule of law’, their powers to exclude evidence or stay proceedings for abuse of process are extremely flexible and discretionary. In both jurisdictions, there has been particular controversy over the application of these powers to covert recordings that breach legal professional privilege. This paper argues that the duty to vindicate rights and the rule of law underpins both the exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence and the punishment of offenders. It requires a balancing exercise, not between defendants' rights and an incommensurable public interest but, rather, between two aspects of the same constitutional duty of the courts.

The constitutional referendum is often conceptualised as the ultimate institutional expression of popular sovereignty. However, ‘direct democracy’ is viewed apprehensively by many political and legal theorists, particularly republican scholars. They argue that referendums risk engendering a dangerous ‘populism’ while detracting from the deliberative and moderating virtues of parliamentary democracy. In this paper, I defend the political value of the constitutional referendum from within republican theory, arguing that there is a misplaced focus on parliamentary supremacy within much of the literature on ‘political constitutionalism’. However, I argue it should be valued neither as a mechanism for giving expression to popular will, nor as an intervention by the mythologised ‘constituent power’ – or indeed, contra Tierney, as a ‘sovereign’ exercise in any sense. Rather, it has two main, overlapping virtues: first, its role in facilitating the contestation and checking of executive power in the area of constitutional change, and secondly, its instrumental role in fostering a wider culture of civic participation.

This paper considers the influence of the Supreme Court decision in Jones v Kernott on subsequent cases. It focuses on situations with which Jones was not directly concerned, namely where there is only one legal owner of a home and a non-legal-owning cohabitant seeks to establish that he has an equitable interest in it under a common intention constructive trust. The paper argues that while judges have mostly accepted that Jones is relevant to such sole-owner cases, they have had few opportunities (and taken fewer) to move beyond the restrictive approach of Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset and allow novel outcomes in the light of Jones as yet. It is contended that this state of affairs could ultimately produce a conservative approach that is undesirable for cohabitants who make indirect or non-financial contributions to shared lives, and remain without comprehensive statutory property and financial provision on relationship breakdown.

This commentary updates the paper ‘Excluding evidence (or staying proceedings) to vindicate rights in Irish and English law’ by analysing the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Ireland in DPP v JC. It argues that although the court has relaxed the exclusionary rule in one major respect, it has strengthened it in others, and that Ireland's approach to unconstitutionally or illegally obtained evidence remains very different from that of England and Wales.

The Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 provides protection for whistleblowers; it does not place statutory obligations on regulators to act in response to whistleblowing concerns. Using Freedom of Information requests as a research methodology, this paper seeks to examine how whistleblowing is approached by regulators and what happens when a whistleblowing disclosure is made. Forty-eight national regulators in a variety of fields and 408 county, district and unitary local authorities with responsibility for the regulation of food were contacted. The paper begins by considering the importance of whistleblowing disclosures and how they are protected in PIDA. The examination of the law reveals that several organisations with important regulatory functions are not prescribed, and this has the potential to create inconsistencies in the protection of whistleblowers. The bulk of the paper examines the results of the Freedom of Information requests. By examining the results of these requests, it was possible to show that there are a number of inconsistencies in the way in which regulatory agencies handle concerns. Several changes to practice are suggested in order to ensure that the whistleblowers receive appropriate treatment and that the concerns that they express can be properly addressed.

This paper addresses, from a socio-legal perspective, the question of the significance of law for the treatment, care and the end-of-life decision making for patients with chronic disorders of consciousness. We use the phrase ‘chronic disorders of consciousness’ as an umbrella term to refer to severely brain-injured patients in prolonged comas, vegetative or minimally conscious states. Based on an analysis of interviews with family members of patients with chronic disorders of consciousness, we explore the images of law that were drawn upon and invoked by these family members when negotiating the situation of their relatives, including, in some cases, the ending of their lives. By examining ‘legal consciousness’ in this way (an admittedly confusing term in the context of this study,) we offer a distinctly sociological contribution to the question of how law matters in this particular domain of social life.

This paper compares and contrasts state emergency responses to national security crises with responses deployed in a period of economic crisis. Specifically, this paper challenges the appropriateness and legitimacy of the standard emergency response of legislative (as distinct from judicial) deference to the executive when confronting such economic crises. This will be done by questioning the significance in periods of economic crisis of the two principal factors that justify deferring to the executive during a state of emergency pertaining to national security: (i) the necessity of the action taken; and (ii) that the executive has an expertise in decision making in the specific area in question. Ultimately, this paper questions the application of the emergency paradigm to economic crises, arguing that such responses are rarely temporary and instead usher in a ‘new normalcy’.

In the wake of the financial crisis, there has been much discussion about whether boards (particularly of banks) are sufficiently accountable. However, while a significant literature has grown up in relation to the study of accountability in various disciplines, particularly public administration and politics, in the field of corporate governance there has been little consideration of what accountability means or entails. This is problematic: without a clearer idea of the elusive concept of accountability, debates about board accountability may be at cross-purposes. It will be difficult to assess whether particular corporate governance mechanisms promote board accountability, and if not, why not. The lack of clarity can also mask accountability deficits. This paper addresses this gap, setting out why accountability is important and offering an account of what accountability means in the corporate governance context, focusing on board accountability, in order to provide a framework for future research.

Adapting the concept of ‘interpersonal justice’ used by Professor Robertson to provide a ‘meta-doctrinal’ defence of the law of negligence, this paper asks whether the personal injury system can be thought to have a democratic justification in common beliefs in such justice. It is widely acknowledged that the gross functional inadequacy of the personal injury system makes it implausible to claim that that system can be justified on grounds of compensation or deterrence. But that inadequacy makes it equally implausible to claim that common citizens would choose that system, which exists only because it is effectively compulsory. Constructing a market in first-person insurance would put the existence of the personal injury system to the test of actual choice.

The doctrine of insurable interest grew out of eighteenth-century anxieties over fraudulent seafarers and habitual gamblers. It was created by the courts, entrenched by statute and remains in place to this day despite the fact that it serves no practical or legal purpose. It was hoped by many that, when the English Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission established their joint review of insurance contract law in 2006, the doctrine would be consigned to the proverbial dustbin of history. Eight years later, these hopes have been dashed. The doctrine is here to stay. This paper asks ‘Why’ and finds the answer to be elusive.

Applying the Fairchild exception in Barker, Lord Hoffmann sought to justify apportionment of liability by reformulating the gist of the negligence action as the risk of mesothelioma rather than the mesothelioma itself. This paper examines the notion of risk to show that it cannot coherently be recognised as damage. By distinguishing risk from the related concept of probability, it is apparent that risk is a forward-looking concept that is incompatible with the role in which it is cast in the backward-looking causation inquiry when mesothelioma is an essential ingredient of liability. This paper goes on to consider whether ‘pure’ risk could form the gist of a negligence action and suggests that it lacks the moral significance to constitute damage. Furthermore, the damage requirement would be subsumed into the breach inquiry, effectively being lost as a distinct element of the negligence inquiry. This is incompatible with the traditional loss-based model of negligence.

In 2012, the Ministry of Justice asked the Law Commission to examine the case for extending the racially and religiously aggravated offences in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, so that they also cover disability, sexual orientation and transgender identity. The terms of reference for the project were narrow, and did not include an examination of whether the existing offences are in need of reform. The Commission recommended that before a final decision is taken as to whether the offences should be extended, a full-scale review of the operation of the existing offences should be carried out. This paper contends that, in determining the future of the aggravated offences, consideration should be given to the procedural difficulties that can be encountered during the prosecution stage of the criminal process. The paper highlights a number of significant procedural problems that arise from the structure of the existing aggravated offences. These problems are largely related to alternative charges, whereby the prosecution charge both the aggravated offence and the lesser offence encompassed within it, and alternative verdicts, whereby the jury can convict of the lesser offence if the aggravated element is not proven. This paper argues that the procedural problems, coupled with a failure to properly understand the offences, can lead, and have led, to unfair outcomes. If the offences cannot be prosecuted effectively, they become little more than an empty gesture to those affected by hate crime, and this may be counterproductive. Procedural problems also put defendants at risk of wrongful conviction. The paper concludes that the preferred way forward would be to repeal the racially and religiously aggravated offences and rely on sentencing legislation to deal with hostility-based offending.

In most of the common-law world, legislation provides for damages to be apportioned where the claimant is guilty of contributory negligence. This legislation gives judges considerable latitude to determine the extent to which damages should be diminished for contributory negligence. It imposes what will be called a system of ‘discretionary apportionment’. This paper draws attention to the fact that, although most common-law jurisdictions are, by virtue of their apportionment legislation, in the thrall of the paradigm of discretionary apportionment, there are many, varied departures from this paradigm. This paper classifies these departures (which will be called ‘fixed apportionment rules’), emphasises that they conflict with the apportionment legislation and considers how the conflicts ought to be resolved. An important conclusion reached is that it can plausibly be argued that the landmark decision in Froom v Butcher, at least as it has been understood in subsequent cases, was decided per incuriam. Froom sits uncomfortably with the apportionment legislation. Attention is then turned to the arguments for and against a discretionary system of apportionment as opposed to a system that incorporates more fixed apportionment rules. It is contended that much stands to be gained from introducing more fixed apportionment rules.

This paper considers how employment laws are being used in response to what we have termed ‘the eldercare–workplace conundrum’. It is well known that people are now living longer but health is still failing in a significant percentage of older people, meaning that many adults require care for longer, albeit to varying degrees and for varying amounts of time. Many of these individuals will receive care from relatives or close friends who are participating in the labour market: this is increasingly likely as adults are expected or want to remain in paid work for longer, often into their sixties and seventies. The requirements of elderly dependants can cause these workers huge difficulties and dilemmas as they attempt, across time, to accommodate the particular needs of the person for whom they wish to provide care, often a loved one, and meet the particular demands of their employment relationship. In this paper, we consider why this is an area of social policy that warrants effective legal engagement and consider, drawing on various examples of legal responses in other countries that face similar conundrums, what might improve legal engagement in this area.

Local environmental quality is best understood as a measure of the aesthetic complexion of public space in the urban environment. Anti‐social acts causing damage to the physical environment of local communities have, traditionally, attracted little moral opprobrium; and the role of local authorities in safeguarding local environmental quality has been undervalued. However, this is an issue that has been proven to have a significant impact on the quality of life of local communities, particularly those in deprived neighbourhoods. This paper argues, therefore, that we need to develop a comprehensive legal framework to safeguard local environmental quality in the future. This problem has so far been tackled as nuisance, local environmental crime or anti‐social behaviour. The paper concludes that an approach based on measures to tackle incivility in society is to be preferred; thus, the Anti‐social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 will be particularly significant in this regard. However, some amendments to this legislation will be required to ensure its effective application to the problems of local environmental quality. Further measures should also be taken to support citizen participation and education as part of a comprehensive legal framework for safeguarding the local environment.

It is often said that distributive justice has no place in private law. However, distributive justice considerations feature strongly in cases involving the remedies imposed over bribes gained in breach of fiduciary duty. This paper argues that courts should exercise structured discretion, guided by principles of distributive justice, in ascertaining the appropriate remedy. The distributive factors of desert, needs and equality should inform the determination of what remedy is apposite to provide justice in the circumstances.

The issue of decriminalising euthanasia and/or assisted suicide has been the subject of a number of high-profile cases, the most recent of which was the Court of Appeal decision in R (Nicklinson & Lamb) v Ministry of Justice [2013] EWCA Civ 961. This paper will focus on the offence of assisted suicide and Martin's argument that the Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide, issued by the DPP following the House of Lords' final judgment in R (Purdy) v DPP [2009] UKHL 45 failed to provide foreseeability where a prospective assister was not someone with an emotional connection to the requester. The success of this claim offers a fresh opportunity to examine a somewhat neglected aspect of the Policy that emanated from the Purdy case, namely its potential challenge to the oft-stated claim that motive is irrelevant to mens rea. It is my contention that the Policy has (effectively) amended s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 by making compassion/motive a definitional element of the offence, and that this is problematic because it contravenes a limitation imposed by the maxim that supports the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy.