OMISSION AND RESPONSIBILITY IN LEGAL THEORY

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Is the act/omission distinction relevant to assessments of responsibility, and if so, why? The traditional view is that the distinction is relevant in that ceteris paribus acts are more blameworthy than omissions. Until about the 1960s that position tended to be assumed rather than justified, but since then there has been considerable debate over the issue. Some philosophers have challenged the validity of the moral position upon which the distinction rests, and some have questioned its conceptual grounding.See, e.g., J. Bennett, Whatever the Consequences Analysis, 26 (1966); P. Unger, LIVING HIGHAND LETTING DIE (1996) on the moral relevance of the AOD. See, e.g., J. Bennett, THE ACT ITSELF (1995); B. Vermazen, Negative Acts, in ESSAYS ON DAVIDSON: ACTIONSAND EVENTS 95 (Vermazen and Hintikka, eds., 1985) on the concept of omission. But others have come to its defense.See, e.g., A.M. Honore, Are Omissions Less Culpable? in ESSAYS FOR PATRICK ATIYAH 31 (Cane and Stapleton, eds., 1991); M. Moore, ACTAND CRIME 23 (1993). So the question remains. Exactly what (if anything) does the act/omission distinction (henceforth AOD) tell us about responsibility in general or legal responsibility?