Global political organization in recent centuries has been dominated by the juridical model of the international states system. Originating in early modern Europe, this distinctive way of structuring political authority has progressively extended its reach to the point where, today, the inhabitable land surfaces of the world are entirely divided up among sovereign states. I will argue that we have both practical and moral reasons to move away from this form of political organization. While my immediate target will be the ideal states system that John Rawls proposes in The Law of Peoples,J. Rawls, THE LAWOF PEOPLES (1999); hereafter “LP.” the main conclusions defended here are applicable to a range of possible models that can be characterized as states-system models. Theories in this range may depart in various ways from current international law but all are marked by the claim that legal-political authority should be concentrated in exclusive or nearly exclusive territorial jurisdictions regarded as equal and independent political units.

Joseph Raz has developed a highly detailed analysis of the nature of authority that accounts for its structure, the role it plays in practical reasoning, and the conditions under which it is legitimate. Raz's analysis, which has been evolving over the last few decades, is impressive in both scope and insight. With it, Raz dissolves many of the paradoxes and conundrums that have traditionally puzzled students of authority.

Is the act/omission distinction relevant to assessments of responsibility, and if so, why? The traditional view is that the distinction is relevant in that ceteris paribus acts are more blameworthy than omissions. Until about the 1960s that position tended to be assumed rather than justified, but since then there has been considerable debate over the issue. Some philosophers have challenged the validity of the moral position upon which the distinction rests, and some have questioned its conceptual grounding.See, e.g., J. Bennett, Whatever the Consequences Analysis, 26 (1966); P. Unger, LIVING HIGHAND LETTING DIE (1996) on the moral relevance of the AOD. See, e.g., J. Bennett, THE ACT ITSELF (1995); B. Vermazen, Negative Acts, in ESSAYS ON DAVIDSON: ACTIONSAND EVENTS 95 (Vermazen and Hintikka, eds., 1985) on the concept of omission. But others have come to its defense.See, e.g., A.M. Honore, Are Omissions Less Culpable? in ESSAYS FOR PATRICK ATIYAH 31 (Cane and Stapleton, eds., 1991); M. Moore, ACTAND CRIME 23 (1993). So the question remains. Exactly what (if anything) does the act/omission distinction (henceforth AOD) tell us about responsibility in general or legal responsibility?