Discussions of political obligation and authority have focused on the idea that the commands of genuine authorities constitute content-independent reasons. Despite its centrality in these debates, the notion of “content-independence” is unclear and controversial, with some claiming that it is incoherent, useless, or irrelevant. I clarify content-independence by focusing on how reasons can depend on features of their container. I then show how the fact that laws can constitute content-independent reasons is consistent with the fact that some laws must fail to bind due to their egregiously unjust content. Finally, I defend my understanding against challenges and show why it retains a place of special importance for questions about the law and political obligation. Content-independence highlights that it is some feature of the law or law-making process in general that is supposed to generate moral obligations for citizens, not the merits of particular laws.

In addition to normative powers by which we alter our rights and duties, we can also forfeit rights. Culpable aggression forfeits the aggressor's right against the victim's use of defensive force. So, what happens when an aggressor “fakes it”? If a culpable aggressor is simply bluffing, has he still forfeited his rights? Because there is no threat, leading accounts of self-defense deny that there is forfeiture.

This paper argues that individuals alter their rights and duties through insincere acts. Specifically, when one person culpably causes another person to believe that a normative power has been exercised or a right forfeited, that normative power is in fact exercised or the right is forfeited. An insincere promise counts as a promise; insincere consent counts as consent; and insincere abandonment counts as abandonment. And, the insincere threat forfeits the bluffer's rights to the same extent as a real threat would.